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The Transatlantic Oarsmen Cooperative:  






Adviser: Professor Ming Xia 
 
This project argues that, in the wake of the 2007-09 financial crisis, the United 
States (US) and European Union (EU) are doubling down on finance-led domestic 
growth strategies and that this is their goal in constructing a transatlantic financial 
regulatory regime. The regime’s goal privileges the input of industry actors over other 
civil society actors. The construction of this regime is in response to pressure from 
emerging markets and to service domestic industry actors after the financial crisis. The 
regime is intended to allow the US and EU to maintain their dominance within the 
international financial regulatory regime and continue to enjoy finance-led growth. In the 
emergent transatlantic regulatory regime, there has been a new division of labor emerging 
between the state and civil society, best illustrated with a nautical analogy: civil society 
and industry are steering regulatory activity and the state is rowing by creating regulatory 
institutions to serve industry. I thus propose the term oarsman state to explain this 
division of labor and assert that the EU and US are operating a transatlantic oarsmen 
cooperative. 
 Empirically this project demonstrates that the financial crisis was a critical 
juncture that caused institutional and functional changes in the (i) EU, (ii) US, (iii) 
 viii 
international and (iv) transatlantic financial regulatory regimes. In order to address the 
first empirical dimension of institutional and functional change, the research method of 
process-tracing will be used to compare the regimes before and after the financial crisis.  
 The second goal of this project is to explain how the changes in the EU, US and 
international regimes triggered an escalation in the creation of the transatlantic financial 
regulatory regime. This project applies an analytic framework that combines top-down 
and bottom-up approaches to explaining regulatory and institutional change to address 
the second question regarding causation. The changes in the EU, US, and international 
financial regulatory regimes are analyzed as causal factors that contribute to the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“A clear lesson of history is that a sine qua non for sustained economic recovery 
following a financial crisis is a thoroughgoing repair of the financial system. The 
necessary steps are occurring now, but restoration of the financial system to full health 
will be a long, drawn out process.” Janet Yellen, Current Chair of the Federal Reserve, 
January 2009 (Yellen 2009:1) 
 
“The crisis has also reminded us of the lessons of the technology bubble, Japan’s 
experience in the 1990s and of the US Great Depression – that finance-led growth is 
problematic. In retrospect, the fact that 40 per cent of American corporate profits in 2006 
went to the financial sector, and the closely related outcome – a doubling of the share of 
income going to the top 1 per cent of the population – should have been signs something 
was amiss.” Lawrence Summers, Former Treasury Secretary and Former Director of the 
National Economic Council, October 2008 (Summers 2008) 
 
“While the immediate causes of the crisis currently affecting the European Union are 
indeed financial and economic, they are also, on a more fundamental level, the product of 
a crisis of values and of the non-respect of the norms. […] The present crisis has shown 
the limits of individual action by nation states. […] We need more integration, and the 
corollary of more integration has to be more democracy. This European renewal must 
represent a leap in quality and enable Europe to rise to the challenges of the world today 
by giving it the tools it needs to react more effectively and to shape and control the 
future.” José Manuel Durão Barroso, Former President of the European Commission, 
September 2012 (Barroso 2012) 
 
 
Policymakers in the United States (US) and European Union (EU) hastily 
declared that the financial crisis of 2007-9 would be a turning point in financial 
regulation, prompting tighter regulation and more oversight of the financial industry. 
Using comparisons to other crises, policymakers announced that they had learned a 
lesson. The EU and US each created new legislation and regulatory agencies to regulate 
the financial services industry.1  At the same time, the international financial regulatory 
regime expanded its mandate to tackle the threat that failing financial institutions posed 
                                                
1 EU is broadly used to mean the antecedent institutions that have evolved to now be part of the EU, 
including the European Economic Community and the European Community. For more information about 
the history of the EU, visit European Union, “The History of the European Union.” 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en. 
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to global economic stability. American and European policymakers also reaffirmed that 
the immediate solution to the crisis was to restore the stability of the existing global 
financial system. They consulted industry actors for guidance on how to create this 
stability while maintaining finance-led growth strategies. The EU and the US have 
sought to shore up their dominance in the international financial regulatory regime 
by establishing new transatlantic institutions and expanding the role of existing ones 
to transform the transatlantic regulatory regime to serve industry actors.2 
The financial crisis presented an opportunity to change the way financial 
regulation is created and whose interests it serves. The crisis of pro-market Anglo-
American capitalism led to domestic and global challengers to policies that promote 
financialization. However, despite these challengers to financialization the new 
regulations adopted by the US and EU still promoted finance-led growth strategies 
because of deep ideological capture. The EU and US are doubling down on their existing 
strategy in financial regulation: financial regulatory regimes are designed to encourage 
finance-led growth by creating regulation made in the interest of the regulated. 
This work argues that while the EU and US continued to pursue finance-led 
growth in their domestic regulatory regimes the financial crisis marked a period of 
change that altered the existing transatlantic regulatory regime and the relationship of 
industry to the state within that regime. Pro-market, financialization ideology is shaping 
EU and US policymaker preferences on financial regulation. This financialization 
ideology was a constant before and after the financial crisis. Policymakers in the US and 
United Kingdom (UK) have expressed a preference for regulation that encourages 
                                                
2 This analysis covers the time period up to and including 2015. The epilogue addresses 
developments after 2015. 
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finance-led growth. Policymaker preferences are also influencing the transatlantic 
regulatory regime, notably by privileging the input of industry. The international and 
domestic pressures that arose from the financial crisis incentivized the EU and US to 
continue to privilege and institutionalize the preferences of industry. These efforts to 
continue to compete globally with a finance-led growth strategy have culminated in the 
creation of a transatlantic financial regulatory regime.   
The coordinated transatlantic response to the financial crisis is being driven by 
domestic pursuit of financial-led growth and compounded by external pressures from the 
international regulatory regime. Initially the financial crisis of 2007-9 disproportionately 
negatively affected the US and EU compared to emerging market economies. This posed 
a challenge to the leadership of the US and EU in the international financial regulatory 
regime and necessitated the creation of a transatlantic regulatory regime. In card games 
and casinos, gamblers have the opportunity at certain junctions in the game to stay with 
the original bets they have already placed or to increase their bets. Some gamblers use 
this opportunity to double their bets, and potential winnings, in an action called doubling 
down. Oxford dictionary describes the action of doubling down as, to 
“[s]trengthen one’s commitment to a particular strategy or course of action, typically one 
that is potentially risky” (Oxford 2016a). The financial crisis of 2007-9 made it clear that 
finance-led growth is inherently risky to domestic economies and the global financial 
system. The US and EU have used the opportunity created by the financial crisis to 
double down on their finance-led growth strategies and have created new institutions to 
organize industry input and allow that input to directly influence the content of a 
transatlantic regulatory regime. Previously, the regulatory state directed the service 
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provision activities of civil society by providing regulation and regulatory agencies. 
Transatlantic institution building is a new form of service provided to industry, which is a 
new paradigm in the relationship between state, industry and civil society in regulatory 
policymaking.  
Background 
The global economic and financial crisis that began in 2007 has spurred a 
realignment of financial oversight in the international political economy much like the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 did. However, unlike the Asian crisis, this crisis originated 
in the West and impacted advanced economies more than emerging market economies. 
The EU, US, and international regulatory regimes had disparate reactions to the financial 
crisis. The crisis prompted a shift in participation in the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and a reliance on a broader group of states for international financial regulation, 
including mandates for the Financial Stability Board (FSB).  The expanded voice and 
vote granted to emerging market economies in the IMF and FSB accompanied new 
powers given to the IMF and FSB. This is significant because the IMF is responsible for 
determining the conditions of loans to states suffering during subsequent crises. 
Increasing the participation of emerging market economies in the IMF and Group of 20 
institutions is a significant development because global regulatory outcomes may be 
changed by their input. Other states do not pursue finance-led growth to the extent that 
the US and EU do, so it is likely that increased participation of emerging market 
economies in the international financial regulatory regime will lead to regulation less 
favorable to finance-led growth strategies. 
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 In areas in which the US and the EU seek to promote a harmonized transatlantic 
regulatory regime, they dominate global governance (Drezner 2007; Ziegler 2012). Since 
the US and Western European nations have privileged positions and structural power in 
international institutions such as the IMF and Group of number formations (such as the 
G7 and G20 groups), they are able to decide the rules of international regulatory regimes 
(Woods 2010; Wade 2011). This governance is in policy areas as diverse as industry 
regulation, food labeling rules, transport, property rights, and sanctions. Though their 
agendas diverge occasionally, mostly in substantive areas in which they compete, their 
dominant positions in the international system and similar gross domestic product growth 
strategies encourage them to seek similar governance measures. The EU and US have 
traditionally agreed on structural power issues and sought similar arrangements in 
international institutions. In some issue areas they have different regulatory regimes and 
this leads to competition (Drezner 2007).3  The transatlantic relationship has a massive 
impact on global governance, particularly in influencing regulatory standards (Drezner 
2007; Mattli and Woods 2009; Posner 2009). A harmonized transatlantic financial 
regulatory regime could define the contours of the international financial regulatory 
regime. 
Examining the existing status of their cooperation in the international financial 
regulatory regime is especially important because of the series of international conflicts 
the EU and US have collectively sought to diffuse by working through international 
organizations. Many transatlantic and international institutions formed at the end of the 
Second World War continue to be influential in both the security and economic spheres. 
                                                
3 The World Trade Organization is an example of a forum in which this regulatory competition between the 
EU and US has taken place. This period will be addressed in Chapter 4. 
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Initially created to counter the communist threat, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) became the dominant regional security organization. Rather than disband 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO transformed its raison d’etre to 
focus on out-of-area missions; the EU and US have effectively used NATO to address 
new global security governance challenges. The Bretton Woods Institutions, and notably 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were similarly used to pursue the agenda of 
neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s as part of the Washington Consensus. The IMF 
surveillance function has also undergone a transformation following the 2007-2009 
financial crisis.  
When the EU and US pursue a common policy or outcome, they often attempt to 
use international institutions or regimes in their pursuit. Transatlantic regulatory regimes 
are projected internationally.4 Existing institutions in the transatlantic financial regulatory 
regime have intensified their activities. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, the TransAtlantic 
Business Dialogue (TABD) and the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) have 
increased their activity. New institutions, such as the High Level Working Group on Jobs 
and Growth (HLWG) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
have also been added to the transatlantic financial regulatory regime. A transatlantic 
financial regulatory regime is being created to be projected into the international financial 
regulatory regime.  
Literature Review 
 The transatlantic financial regulatory regime is the main subject of inquiry of both 
research questions in this work: (i) has there been a change in the transatlantic financial 
regulatory regime following the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and if so (ii) why.  
                                                
4 One example detailed in Chapter 5 is the transatlantic intellectual property rights regime. 
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Transatlantic financial regulatory regimes lay at the intersection of three fields that are 
traditionally not mainstream political science: (i) international political economy of 
finance, (ii) transatlantic affairs, and (iii) regulatory public policy. This literature review 
will address the relevant literature in the three subfields, discuss the points of departure 
for this work, and identify the gaps in the literature that this project will fill.  
 The international political economy of finance literature is largely focused on the 
history of financial development and the power of individual nation states in setting 
financial regulation. Those works with an institutional focus have addressed the 
emergence of the Bretton Woods and contemporary monetary systems (Eichengreen 
2006; Eichengreen 2008), the significance of embedded liberalism in shaping the role of 
the state and the policies of international economic institutions (Ruggie 1982; Keohane 
1984), and how nation states use their power to create international institutions that then 
replicate their power (Dreyer and Schotter 1980; Strange 1986; Strange 1999; Leech 
2002; Gilpin 2001; Smaghi 2004; Woods and Lombardi 2006; Perry and Nolke 2006; 
Nolke and Perry 2008). The last stream of scholarship attempts to explain how 
institutions are created to preserve and reproduce power inequalities but the focus is 
firmly on structural power rather than the content of the regimes; this project will extend 
this stream of the literature to argue that the transatlantic regulatory regime is being 
created to preserve and reproduce the power inequalities created by financialization. The 
transatlantic financial regime is being built to stave off the challenges of emerging market 
economies and allow the US and EU to continue to be rule-makers in the international 
financial regulatory regime.  
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One gap in the international political economy of finance literature that this 
project fills is explaining the interactions between civil society and state actors in 
international regulatory regimes that include trade processes, that is, using the lens of a 
regulatory regime and applying regulatory state theory. Many authors have addressed the 
interaction of civil society and state actors in the negotiation of trade agreements and at 
the World Trade Organization (Scholte 1999; Robertson 2000; Dunoff 2000; Orellana 
2009; Hopewell 2015). However, there has generally been a separation between 
regulatory literature and trade literature because traditional trade agreements have tackled 
tariffs and focused less on non-tariff barriers to trade. Overlap in the discipline exists in 
subjects like regional trading blocs, such as the European Union, and more work will fill 
the gap as new generation trade deals tackle mostly regulatory, non-tariff barriers to 
trade. This work studies interactions of civil society and the state using the lens of the 
regulatory state and sees trade agreements and regulatory cooperation councils as parts of 
a regulatory regime. 
The second gap is reconciling the top-down and bottom-up dynamics of 
regulation. The international political economy literature has focused on either explaining 
how domestic institutions and interest groups shape international regulatory regimes 
(Rogowski 1989; Lake 2009), or how international regimes impact domestic regimes. 
Farrell and Newman (2014) have labeled an emerging body of scholarship that tries to 
reconcile these approaches by “ask[ing] how interdependence transforms the distribution 
of domestic interests and the institutions of the system’s units” as the “new 
interdependence approach” (334-335). According to Farrell and Newman, the authors of 
the new interdependence literature first: 
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“examine how domestic institutions affect the ability of political actors to 
construct the rules and norms governing interdependent relations and thus offer a 
source of asymmetric power. Second, they explore how interdependence alters 
domestic political institutions through processes of diffusion, transgovernmental 
coordination, and extraterritorial application and, in turn, how it changes the 
national institutions mediating internal debates on globalization. Third, they study 
the shifting boundaries of political contestation through which substate actors 
affect decision making in foreign jurisdictions. Hence, they challenge prevailing 
notions that interdependence, domestic institutions, or interest group distributions 
are static or exogenous” (332-333). 
  
This project will continue in the tradition of this burgeoning literature and explain 
how the transatlantic financial regulatory regime is emerging because of both the US and 
EU regulatory regimes and the changes to the international financial regulatory regime 
after the financial crisis. 
 The transatlantic affairs literature applies a foreign policy lens to transatlantic 
institutional cooperation by explaining institutional dynamics by focusing on the state of 
relations between the US and EU (Sola and Smith 2009; Peterson and Steffenson 2009). 
Another stream of transatlantic affairs literature focuses on the paradigm of transatlantic 
economic competition and cooperation. Petersmann and Pollack (2003) and Damro 
(2006) address the dynamic of regulatory competition in the EU-US relationship that led 
to disputes in the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
Less attention has been paid to transatlantic relations in regulation; this literature 
also explores the dominant cooperation and competition paradigm. Evenett and Stern 
(2011) provide a systematic review of transatlantic regulatory institutions and examine 
transatlantic competition and cooperation by policy sector but omit finance. They find 
that in some sectors increasing interdependence coupled with failed multilateralism 
motivate the US and EU to cooperate. According to Drezner (2007) the US and EU 
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decide whether to compete or cooperate with their respective regulatory standards 
depending on which standards other countries adopt. Posner (2009) argues that after the 
financial crisis regulatory centralization in the EU empowered the EU vis-à-vis the US 
and this was the major impetus behind a new round of transatlantic cooperation.  
Fewer studies have focused on transatlantic cooperation in financial regulatory 
standards and its implications for other countries (Porter 2014b). Daniel Hamilton and 
Joseph Quinlan (2005) argue that the economic integration between the EU and US is 
driving globalization and that this increases prospects for a deeper regulatory relationship 
between them. In testimony to the US Congress, Hamilton has asserted that transatlantic 
regulatory cooperation can “strengthen the ground rules of the international economic 
order” by setting standards preferable to the EU and US (Hamilton 2012, 8). However, 
overall, the literature fails to provide an account of the relationship between the 
transatlantic financial regulatory regime, the international financial regulatory regime and 
the broader international political economy. This project will fill this gap by identifying 
the dynamic of regulatory competition and changes in the international political economy 
after the financial crisis as drivers behind the establishment of a transatlantic financial 
regulatory regime. 
 The third field of public policy has also neglected regulatory policymaking and 
tended to focus instead on regulation as a part of implementation in public administration 
and public management studies (Bartle 2006, 1). Lowi (1964) identified regulatory policy 
as one of three types of policy, alongside distributive and redistributive and asserted that 
each type of policy has its own policymaking process characterized by a power arena. He 
later (1972) identified constituent policy as another type of policymaking. He describes 
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regulatory policy as being the “residue of the interplay of group conflict” (Lowi 1964, 
692). Public policy scholars studying regulatory policy focused mostly on national 
contexts (Kelman 1980; Vogel 1986) until the European Union became a significant 
subject of inquiry (Majone 1994; Majone 1996). Reinicke (1998) argues that the 
outcomes of interaction between states, corporations, NGOs, regional and international 
organizations can be understood as global public policy. Stone (2008) has asserted that 
global public policy is made in a “global agora” and is delivered by “transnational policy 
communities” (1). 
Since regulatory public policy mostly focuses on national contexts, scholars have 
largely analyzed the input of domestic interest groups to determine the role and 
composition of civil society. One stream of this scholarship considers the conflict among 
the groups and the winners and losers; the other stream is preoccupied with the access 
and influence of interest groups. Regulatory capture is a concept from the latter stream. 
Bernstein (1955) identified regulatory capture as the way US independent agencies, 
removed from political control, make regulatory policy. In the broader global governance 
literature scholars have studied an emerging transnational civil society. (Florini 2000; 
Price 2003; Nash 2008) Other scholars have focused on the role of business interests 
groups and trade associations in influencing global and transnational financial 
governance (Koppell 2006; Young 2012; Tsingou 2015). Young (2012) finds that there is 
not total regulatory capture at the transnational level at the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS). Tsingou has developed the concept of “transnational veto players” 
to describe lobby groups, firms, and regulatory authorities who block change in the 
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financial regulatory regime by “ideational bargaining on the feasible” (Tsingou 2015, 
330). 
The concept of the regulatory state came from public policy scholars analyzing 
the changing role of the state in relationship to civil society in the UK, EU and US 
(Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). Osborne and Gaebler (1992) initially explained that 
ideally the state authority would be responsible for steering by guiding and directing and 
that civil society would be responsible for service provision. Braithwaite calls this 
division of labor the regulatory state and distinguishes from the other divisions of labor 
between the state and civil society (Braithwaite 2000). The table below has been adapted 
from Jordana and Levi-Faur  (2004) to identify the steering and rowing roles for the 
Nightwatchman state, postwar or interventionist state, and the regulatory state. 
Figure 1: Steering and Rowing Roles 
Type of State Nightwatchman State Postwar/Interventionist 
State 
Regulatory State 
Era 19th Century-1930s 1945-late 1970s Late 1970s-mid 
1990s 
Steering Civil Society State State 
Rowing Civil Society State Civil Society 
Source: Adapted from Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004. 
 This project will build on the regulatory state literature by identifying a new phase 
in the division of labor between the state and civil society that I call the oarsman state 
and by applying the concept to transatlantic regulatory policymaking. The public policy 
literature will benefit from an account of the transnational regulatory policymaking 
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institutions in a trade process because transnational regulatory policymaking is 
increasingly made through trade. 
 Regulation is an interdisciplinary topic, spanning economics, law, and political 
science (Bartle 2006). The prominent work on regulation in economics has set the terms 
of the conversation for the other disciplines and much of the terminology in regulatory 
studies was defined in economic terms. For example, in the previously mentioned 
division of labor between civil society and the state, industry and business are 
incorporated into the category of civil society. In political science, civil society is a 
distinct category from business or industry. However, this project includes business and 
industry in the category of civil society for the concept of the transatlantic oarsmen 
cooperative because the transatlantic regulatory regime is defining civil society to include 
them. The regime is operationalizing civil society to allow business and industry to be the 
dominant voices guiding the oarsmen cooperative’s activities. 
Theory 
This project answers two major research questions: (i) was there a change in 
the transatlantic regulatory regime after the financial crisis and (ii) why or why not. 
Answering the first empirical question, I use a critical junctures framework to analyze the 
structure and intensity of cooperation in the transatlantic regulatory regime before and 
after the financial crisis of 2007-2009. This project maps the transatlantic institutions, 
paying particular attention to those in financial regulatory governance, in snapshots 
before and after the crisis, and classifies the degree of cooperation in each institution as 
strong, moderate and weak by measuring two criteria: activity and institutionalization. To 
answer the second question, I propose an analytic framework that combines approaches 
from comparative politics theory and international relations theory to provide an account 
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of causation in regulatory cooperation. The framework employed explains that the 
multilevel nature of regulatory regimes creates competition between jurisdictions to 
create regulation that attracts people and businesses. As a result globalized, transient 
actors are often more empowered in the formulation of regulatory policies than domestic 
state actors. 
Specifically, this project applies regime theory to state and international financial 
regulatory systems. Krasner defined regimes as, “principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” 
(1982, 185). Regime theory is an ideal approach to studying regulatory governance 
because of its diverse modes and mechanisms. There are many definitions and levels of 
abstractions for the concept of regulation. For example, Baldwin et al. (1998) and Jordana 
and Levi-Faur (2004) develop three layered meanings of regulation; at the most narrow 
definition as a “specific form of governance: a set of authoritative rules, often 
accompanied by some administrative agency, for monitoring and enforcing compliance”, 
in the second intermediate sense, “as governance in a general sense: the aggregate efforts 
by state agencies to steer the economy”, and in the broadest sense as “all mechanisms of 
social control” (Jordana and Levi Faur 2004, 3). The principles, norms and rules of 
regime theory are all potentially forms of regulation. Regime theory also asserts the 
importance of decision-making procedures to setting actor expectations. In this project, 
the focus on decision-making is essential to explain the interaction of actors in different 
levels of regulatory regimes. For example, the concept of a regime can be used to analyze 
how and why EU member states interact to create EU financial regulation. Finance is the 
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issue area of the four regulatory regimes discussed in this project; those are the EU, US, 
transatlantic, and international financial regulatory regimes.  
The framework is primarily concerned with interaction between the regimes and 
two categories of actors: the state and civil society. At the domestic level, regulatory 
regimes are created by interaction between the state and civil society. The state includes 
all governmental actors and agencies. Civil society is defined, as it is by the EU and US, 
to include labor, consumers, industry and nongovernmental actors. However, the 
transatlantic regulatory regime has been structured with formal opportunities for 
categories of globalized civil society actors to directly influence the course of regulation 
and the development of the regime. This is distinct from other global regulatory regimes 
that are structured to formally accommodate only state actor input, in intergovernmental 
institutions like the World Trade Organization, or to negotiate differences between two 
domestic regulatory regimes, like a technical regulatory dialogue.  
Figure 2 below maps the connections between the actors in the transatlantic 
regulatory regime. The category of global civil society overlaps with the categories of US 
civil society and EU civil society since some civil society actors operate both 
domestically and globally. Applying this framework to the empirical evidence of changes 
in the transatlantic financial regulatory regime reveals that civil society actors organizing 
at the transatlantic and global level are successfully influencing the shape of the regime. 
Global civil society is driving the process towards a strong transatlantic financial 
regulatory regime rather than domestic civil society actors or state actors.5  
                                                
5 This project deals with activity at the international, transnational or global, and domestic levels. 
International refers to interactions and institutions between national governmental actors or representatives. 
Transnational and global refers to phenomena extending or active across national boundaries. Domestic 
refers to phenomena within national boundaries. 
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Figure 2: Transatlantic Regulatory Regime 
 
 
Source: Author generated. 
 
 
This theoretical approach is designed to overcome deficiencies of two competing 
theoretical perspectives on regulatory cooperation dynamics: the top-down and bottom-
up approaches. As noted in the literature review, the international political economy 
literature is only beginning to address the interdependence of multilevel regulatory 
regimes. Frieden, Lake and Broz have noted the disparity in the internationalist and 
domestic institutional approaches (2009, 6-9). This project considers the impact of both 
domestic regulatory regimes and civil society actors on the transatlantic regulatory 
regime and the impact of the transatlantic and international regulatory regimes and civil 
society actors on domestic regulatory regimes.  
To determine why a transatlantic institutional response to financial regulation has 
emerged, I first address the US and EU domestic regulatory regimes. Comparing the US 
and EU domestic regulatory regimes before and after the financial crisis, I use a critical 
juncture framework to demonstrate that changes have occurred and identify the 
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underlying causes. In historical institutionalism a critical juncture represents an event or 
moment that acts as a catalyst to break with past institutional structures and prompt 
dramatic change (Pierson 2000; Pierson 2004; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). The change 
can shift the trajectory of the institution, or its self-reinforcing path dependency. 
Financial crises are often categorized as “critical focal points for public debates and 
policy makers’ interventions” (Battilossi and Reis 2010, 6). Recent work in economic 
history has reaffirmed that critical junctures are useful for determining causality in the 
path dependency of states (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). 
After presenting empirical evidence that changes have occurred in the regimes I 
will consider the actors, institutions and ideology contributing to those changes. Dahl has 
asserted that groups and individuals compete to influence policy outcomes in pluralism 
(1961; 1978). While Dahl’s theory of pluralism is relevant, it cannot be used to 
completely account for the nature of the domestic regulatory regimes in the EU and US. 
This project instead uses the theory of regulatory capture to explain the US and EU 
regulatory regimes. Regulatory capture is a claim that there is a distinct policymaking 
mode in which regulation is made in the interest of the regulated. Marvin Bernstein 
initially investigated seven independent US federal regulatory agencies and their 
susceptibility to private pressures in his 1955 work, Regulating Business by Independent 
Commission. The agencies he analyzed regulated transportation, utilities, and industry 
practices; the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was the only regulator of the 
financial services industry included in the project. His work considers the work of these 
agencies in light of their removal from political control and ambiguity about the extent of 
their power and connections to a legitimate democratic government (Bernstein 1955, 14-
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15). He determined that agencies “tend to define the interest of the regulated groups as 
the public interest” (Bernstein 1955, 296). 
  Bernstein’s theory is used to explain the capture of regulators and legislators in 
the domestic EU and US contexts. The operationalized definition of regulatory capture 
used in this analysis is borrowed from legal scholar Lawrence Baxter who states, 
“whenever a particular sector of the industry, subject to the regulatory regime, has 
acquired persistent influence disproportionate to the balance of interests envisaged when 
the regulatory system was established” (Baxter 2011, 176). This project addresses how 
civil society actors interact with and organize around the domestic regulatory regime in 
the area of financial regulation. Particular attention is paid to the ideology that makes 
financial industry actors considered part of civil society in the oarsmen cooperative and 
to the domestic narratives that governments and financial industry members rely on to 
increase the salience of the financial industry and manipulate the relationship of the 
regulated to the regulators (civil society to the state). 
Most scholars have applied the concept of regulatory capture to domestic 
regulators who have international roles. Applying capture to trade, Bhagwati argues that 
domestic industries capture the United States and European Union and that they 
subsequently push for the inclusion of issues not related to trade in World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rounds on behalf of those domestic industries (Bhagwati 2008). In 
legal scholarship, Margot Kaminski argues that the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) is particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture as it is exempt 
from legal constraints that apply to other regulatory policymakers and commits 
regulatory paraphrasing (Kaminski 2014). Condon and Sinha also argue that the USTR 
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effectively exported domestic regulatory capture to the WTO in intellectual property 
rights and that national capture becomes “de facto” capture when the state has a large 
influence in an international institution (2008, 168-169; 2013, 10). However, these are 
principally domestic applications concerned with how domestic capture occurs and how 
it is projected to the international level. This work will apply the concept of capture to a 
phenomenon occurring at the transatlantic level by connecting highly mobile multi-
national corporations (MNCS), their trade associations, and cross-sector organizations to 
the emergence of the transatlantic financial regulatory regime.  
Ideological capture, or “deep capture” (Baxter 2011, 182), in the US and EU 
financial regulatory regimes puts industry in a privileged position to set the agenda of the 
transatlantic financial regulatory regime. This is distinct from the “shallow concept of 
visible capture” of individual regulations created in the interest of the regulated (Baxter 
2011, 182). Policymakers in the US and EU are captured by the ideology of 
financialization and Anglo-American finance-led capitalism and prioritizing this above 
other policy options prompts them to consider the input of industry actors above other 
civil society actors. 
As regulations are increasingly established in trade agreements and international 
technical dialogues, when extending the existing theoretical concepts from the domestic 
context to the global one it is imperative to understand who participates and exerts 
influence in regulatory regimes. Carpenter acknowledges that understanding the 
mechanisms through which capture occurs is one important line of inquiry (Carpenter and 
Moss 2013, 68). This project assesses the access of different civil society and industry 
groups to the transatlantic regulatory regime by reviewing formal advisory institutions, 
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open consultations and stakeholder presentations. This project also maps the connections 
between the institutions in the transatlantic financial regulatory regime to demonstrate the 
centrality of different institutions in the policymaking process. These connections will 
demonstrate that industry is the predominant agenda-setter for the financial transatlantic 
regulatory regime. 
The state contributions to the regulatory regimes are also considered, though in 
the case of the EU not all member states have equal influence over the financial 
regulatory regime. Multilevel intergovernmental theory is used to explain the decision-
making of twenty-eight member states in the European Council. Putnam developed two-
level game theory to explain how states formulate negotiation positions for international 
level agreements. Two-level game theory posits that domestic groups anticipating 
international level negotiation strategically alter their domestic negotiating positions to 
compensate for the later negotiation (Putnam 1988). Moravcsik (1991; 1993) built on this 
theory to explain how EU member states formulate domestic preferences and negotiation 
positions ahead of EU level negotiations. His theory of intergovernmental decision-
making will be used to explain financial regulatory decisions taken by the European 
Council that favor Anglo-American, finance-led capitalism. As a key veto player in the 
European Council, the United Kingdom’s ideological capture is often replicated at the 
EU level.  
This project also assesses the role that the international regulatory regime has 
played in the emergence of the transatlantic regulatory regime. Network theory is used to 
explain that some states, and particularly the US and UK, have a disproportionate 
influence over the international financial regulatory regime because of the relative 
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strength of their regulatory systems and their domestic financial industries. One important 
consequence of this disproportionate influence is domestic and global industry actors are 
relatively empowered within the transatlantic regulatory regime. Network theory explains 
the connection between system position and influence; the more central the position of an 
actor in a system, the more influence the actor has over the content and operation of the 
system. Scholars have applied network theory to financial and regulatory activities. 
Castells (2000) and Pike and Pollard (2010) have mapped financial flows to identify 
central nodes of significant activity. Strange (1998) and Sassen (2002) have asserted that 
these nodes are influential because they are hubs of activity within their broader 
networks. Drezner also discusses nodes of dominant regulatory activity (2007). He posits 
that regulatory influence is directly correlated to market size. According to Drezner the 
EU and US are regulatory standard setters in finance because of their large developed 
markets. Network regulatory theory will be used to explain that the EU and US choose to 
cooperate and seek to adopt a common transatlantic approach in a transatlantic regulatory 
regime in part because of the alignment of UK-US financialization. The EU and US 
cooperate in creating a transatlantic financial regulatory regime partially because of the 
UK dominance in the EU financial regulatory regime and because of the London-New 
York nexus of financial services.  
Empirical and Theoretical Contributions 
There are two major contributions of this project, one empirical and the other 
theoretical. Empirically, this project maps the differences in the transatlantic 
regulatory regime before and after the financial crisis. Evidence is presented to 
demonstrate that a period of institutional development and revitalization in the 
transatlantic regulatory regime followed the financial crisis; existing transatlantic 
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institutions took on new functions and adopted new goals. The EU-US High-Level 
Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG) was steered by industry input to 
recommend the launch of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and 
include financial services in the agreement despite the existence of the Financial Markets 
Regulatory Dialogue (FMRD). Civil society actors responded to and encouraged this 
process. In some cases, EU domestic civil society actors and US domestic civil society 
actors reorganized on the transatlantic level to respond to and influence the emerging 
transatlantic financial regulatory regime. The traditional theoretical approaches of 
international relations to explaining international institutions and regimes are state-
centric. The major empirical finding of this project challenges these approaches: the 
financial industry is driving the shape and deciding the content of the transatlantic 
financial regulatory regime. Though the financial crisis could have reduced the salience 
of input from the financial industry, the EU and US have doubled-down on the ideology 
of financialization and have given the financial industry a guiding role in the regulatory 
regime. 
The empirical evidence of changes in the transatlantic financial regulatory regime 
fills gaps in existing literature. First, transatlantic literature with a historical institutional 
dimension has been largely focused on developments in the defense relationship (Cogan 
2001; Kagan 2002; Peterson and Steffenson 2009). Second, thus far scholars like Posner 
and Nolke have addressed developments in individual spheres of financial regulation 
(securities in 2009 and accounting standards in 2010, respectively), but have not 
undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of EU-US cooperation in all 
spheres of financial regulation. 
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The theoretical contribution of this work is combining two seemingly disparate 
approaches to regulatory cooperation and institution building to explain a new role for the 
state. Specifically, this project proposes the oarsman state meaning that there is a new 
division of labor between the state and civil society, best illustrated with a nautical 
analogy: civil society is steering regulatory activity and the state is rowing by creating 
regulatory institutions to serve industry. Regulatory state theorists assert that the state is 
steering regulatory activity while civil society is rowing. In Reinventing Government 
(1992), Osborne and Gaebler propose that the ideal division of responsibility between 
government and civil society is one in which government is steering, by guiding and 
directing activity, and civil society rowing, by doing entrepreneurial activities and 
traditional service provision. Braithwaite distinguishes this as the most recent form of the 
division of responsibility between civil society and the state, identifies the other divisions 
that preceded it, and associates the division with the contemporary regulatory state that 
emerged with neoliberalism in the 1980s (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000; Braithwaite 2000). In the 1980s and 1990s, many of the works developing 
the theory of the regulatory state emerged from studying the US and EU (Majone 1996; 
Moran 2002). 
This work proposes a new phase in the relationship between the state and 
civil society at the transatlantic level: in the oarsman state global civil society and 
industry actors are steering regulatory activity and the state is rowing by providing 
services and building institutions for civil society and industry. This claim is 
supported by examples of US and EU civil society and industry actors steering state 
provision of services at the transatlantic level. Rowing now encompasses not only 
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conventional service provision but also institution building. The state is creating 
regulatory institutions in the service of industry preferences. 
Statement of the Argument 
 This project argues that, in the wake of the 2007-09 financial crisis, the US and 
EU are doubling down on finance-led domestic growth strategies and that this is their 
goal in constructing a transatlantic financial regulatory regime. The regime’s goal 
incorporates industry actors into the category of civil society and privileges the input of 
industry actors over other civil society actors. Financialization ideology underpins the 
convergence of EU and US regulatory approaches. The construction of this regime is in 
response to pressure from emerging markets and to service domestic industry actors after 
the financial crisis. The regime is intended to allow the US and EU to maintain their 
dominance within the international financial regulatory regime and continue to enjoy 
finance-led growth. In the emergent transatlantic regulatory regime, there is a new 
division of labor between the state and civil society, best illustrated with a nautical 
analogy: civil society is steering regulatory activity and the state is rowing by creating 
regulatory institutions to serve industry. I thus propose the term oarsman state to explain 
this division of labor and assert that the EU and US are operating a transatlantic oarsmen 
cooperative. 
Research Design and Chapter Plan 
To demonstrate the changes in the transatlantic regulatory regime after the 
financial crisis, I use a critical junctures framework to analyze the structure and intensity 
of cooperation in the transatlantic regulatory regime before and after the financial crisis 
of 2007-2009. 
 25 
This work uses the research method of process tracing to demonstrate that the 
2007-2009 financial crisis was a critical juncture in the regulatory regimes of the EU and 
US. It compares the policies, institutions, and ideology of the regulatory regimes before 
and after the financial crisis. The evidence presented makes it clear that the critical 
juncture has not delivered what policymakers initially presumed the outcome would be—
domestic financial regulation made in the public interest—but rather the long-term 
outcome has been regulation made through deep regulatory capture of policymakers by 
global industry.  
In order to determine if a critical juncture has occurred, first the antecedent 
conditions need to be addressed and later compared to the legacy of the critical juncture. 
(Collier and Collier 1991; Pierson 2004) I address the history of financial regulation in 
the US in Chapter 2 and the history of financial regulation in the EU in Chapter 3 to 
establish the baseline of the antecedent conditions. I compare the policies, ideology, and 
institutional structures and procedures of the US and EU financial regulatory regimes 
before and after the financial crisis. The data I use are laws, directives, and regulations. 
The data collection included official US government documents, EU Council and 
Commission directives, and secondary source literature written about these 
developments. However, regulatory change manifests gradually. For example the Dodd-
Frank bill, a highlight of the US regulatory response to the crisis, was first passed in July 
2010, but the public comment periods on certain provisions have extended well into 2015 
and some rules, mandated under Dodd-Frank, have not been proposed yet. Until these 
provisions take effect, the shape of implementation is ambiguous. 
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By comparing maps of the regimes before and after the financial crisis, I 
demonstrate that the financial crisis was a critical juncture resulting in change in the 
policies and institutions of the regimes but that financialization ideology remained fairly 
constant. In the case of the EU, this also requires comparing the relative influence of 
different member state regulatory approaches in creating the EU financial regulatory 
regime and reviewing EU decision-making procedures. I use multi-level governance and 
network theory in order to explain the interaction of EU member states which creates the 
EU regulatory regime.  
Critical junctures theory also requires identifying the stability of core attributes 
which could provide alternate explanations for the legacy of the critical juncture. In 
Chapters 2 and 3, I identify financialization ideology backed by pro-market, Anglo-
Saxon capitalism ideology as a stable core attribute and latent variable in both the US and 
EU regulatory regimes. Financialization is commonly defined as an increasing reliance 
on profits from financial activities rather than profits from production-based activities, 
the latter activities comprising the ‘real economy.’ Financialization ideology is ideology 
which prioritizes finance-led economic growth over other forms of growth. 
Financialization persists before, during, and after the financial crisis with few 
interruptions. I find that financialization ideology partially overwhelmed the presumed 
causal relationship6 between the financial crisis and regulation (that regulation would be 
more restrictive of the financial industry and made in the public interest) and led 
                                                
6 Several policymakers (see Introduction and Chapters 2 and 3) in both the EU and US have suggested that 
the financial crisis is a “lesson learned” and that it would lead to fundamental reform in financial 
regulation.  Although some EU and US regulations have become more restrictive and these are addressed in 
Chapters 2 and 3, the domestic level is just one level of financial regulations. The international and 
transatlantic levels give industry actors and policymakers an opportunity to impact domestic level 
regulations.  
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policymakers to support industry actors through domestic mechanisms such as bailouts, 
and seek to service industry actors and further the financialization strategy. Regulatory 
capture occurs.  
In order to conduct both the longitudinal and case study comparisons, I need to 
define the scope of regimes and the scope of regulation. Using Krasner’s definition, 
regimes will be operationalized as rules, norms, principles, and decision making 
procedures that set actor expectations in the issue area of finance. In this project 
regulation will be defined as all activities undertaken by governance authorities to steer 
behavior. 
 Financial regulation does not consist merely of regulation of financial activity 
and products. Governance authorities formulate and implement financial regulation. The 
term governance authorities allows multilevel governance actors to be included in this 
analysis by incorporating national state agencies as well as transnational, transatlantic and 
international public and private governance organizations. This project will use 
Keohane’s definition of governance: “Governance can be defined as the making and 
implementation of rules, and the exercise of power, within a given domain of activity. 
‘Global governance’ refers to rule-making and power-exercise at a global scale, but not 
necessarily by entities authorized by general agreement to act. Global governance can be 
exercised by states, religious organizations, and business corporations, as well as by 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. Since there is no global 
government, global governance involves strategic interactions among entities that are not 
arranged in formal hierarchies” (Keohane 2003: 121). 
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While the economy is essential to understanding the substantive content of the 
regulation in this project, national government agencies have also attempted to steer 
individual behavior and interactions with finance to produce social good and not just 
economic outcomes, for example by encouraging people to buy a home in order to 
establish security or a sense of community. Financial regulation will be defined as all 
activities undertaken by governance authorities to steer behavior towards or interaction 
with financial activities, providers, and products. Because of the breadth of activities 
which govern not only financial activities but also how individuals and industry actors 
interact with financial activities and products a holistic examination of EU and US 
approaches to finance rather than regulation of finance is necessary.  
The elements of EU and US regulatory regimes that are compared are policies, 
institutions, and ideology. I operationalize policies by looking at directives, rules, and 
actual laws and codifications of financial regulation. I operationalize institutions by 
identifying new institutions or institutions that have had change in their procedures. I 
operationalize ideology by surveying existing literature about historic attitudes towards 
finance, public speeches of national and European Union politicians during and after the 
financial crisis on the subject of finance, finance’s role in the national economy, and 
opinion polls.  The predominant idea and phenomenon driving both the EU and US 
financial regulatory regimes is financialization ideology.  
Financialization is a concept that has been developed to explain corporations’ 
increasing reliance on profits not from value added production but from investment or 
rentier activities. Financialization has also been used to explain governments relying on 
these strategies to grow gross domestic products (King and Levine 1993; Foster 2007; 
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Van der Zwan 2014). The later version of financialization is also described as finance-led 
growth. The degree of financialization is operationalized by measuring the contribution 
of the financial sector to gross domestic product in the EU member states and US. I use 
statistics collected by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and supplement them with official national statistics. This methodological 
approach to measuring financialization has been applied elsewhere in the financialization 
literature, notably in Epstein and Power (2003) and Nolke and Perry (2008). 
Next, in Chapter 4 I consider the impact of the international financial regulatory 
regime on the emerging transatlantic financial regulatory regime. The financial crisis was 
a critical juncture that took place more or less simultaneously at the global level. Though 
it produced disparate responses, one external force on both the US and EU has been a 
challenge to the existing international financial order. During the crisis emerging market 
economies initially fared better than the US and EU and challenged the structural power 
and dominance of the US and EU member states in international financial institutions. I 
demonstrate the changes in the international financial regulatory regime that reduced the 
power of the US and EU. This challenge to the dominance of the US and EU in the 
international financial regulatory regime incentivized policymakers in the US and EU to 
establish a strong transatlantic regulatory regime to compete globally: they doubled-down 
on financialization. I will trace the development of the transatlantic institutions before 
and after the financial crisis to demonstrate this.  
A primary contention of this project is that the role of the TransAtlantic Business 
Dialogue, Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, Transatlantic Labour Dialogue, and 
Transatlantic Economic Council changed after the financial crisis and that the High Level 
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Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG) and the TTIP were new institutions in the 
regime. In the 1990s the EU and US created new transatlantic groups for civil society and 
some were given an advisory status. After the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) 
subsided, some of these advisory groups fell into fallow. However, when the HLWG and 
then the TTIP negotiations were launched some of these civil society channels were 
revived. To assess the internal dynamic of the changes I categorize the two dimensions of 
function and institutionalization in the relevant transatlantic institutions as weak, 
moderate or strong in 2006, 2007 and again in 2015.  For the dimension of function the 
activity of each institution is rated on an index with two factors: the frequency of 
meetings and the number of outcomes or deliverables. The degree of institutionalization 
is rated on an index with two factors: the number of staff and the number of members. I 
made the distinction between the weak, moderate and strong categories by comparing the 
institutional factors (such as number of staff, and frequency of meetings) to those of other 
international organizations. Appendix 5 contains a full accounting of my methods. 
In Chapter 5 I identify the ongoing political and institutional processes that 
produce and reproduce the legacy of the critical juncture: the pursuit of a transatlantic 
financial regulatory regime and a fundamental change in the relationship between 
regulators and the regulated. I identify the regulatory authorities in the US and EU and at 
the transatlantic level, and the methods of access and input given to different stakeholders 
groups, such as consultations, hearings, and meetings. 
At the transatlantic level I identify the transatlantic institutions, governmental and 
private, that cooperated on regulatory issues before the crisis and compare them with 
those that do so after the crisis. These institutions are then analyzed for the methods of 
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access and input open to stakeholders. In the case of the High Level Working Group on 
Jobs, the data used are the agendas and list of stakeholder meetings, and responses to 
public consultations conducted in the EU and US. For the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership the data used are agendas and lists of stakeholder meetings 
conducted, transcripts of hearings before legislative bodies in the EU member states as 
well as in the European Parliament and the US, responses to public consultations 
conducted in the EU and US as well as the profiles of the members of the official 
advisory groups to the EU, US and to the Transatlantic Economic Council. The 
limitations to this data set are that not all meetings have transcripts which are publically 
available. Further, unlike the EU the US does not publish its negotiating position papers. 
Another contention of this project is that the EU and US are privileging the input 
of one category of civil society in transatlantic institutions, namely, industry actors. To 
assess the external dynamic of the changes, I map the connections between the 
institutions in 2006, 2007 and in 2015. This mapping will categorize the institutions 
according to type and will chart the relationships between them. Revitalized and new 
interstate and industry institutions design the transatlantic regulatory regime. The 
industry institutions include the Trans-Atlantic Business Council (TABC) and the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) advisory groups.7 The interstate 
institutions include the TTIP regulatory chapters and the Transatlantic Economic Council 
                                                
7 In 2013 the TransAtlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) merged with the European-American Business 
Council to become the Trans-Atlantic Business Council (TABC). Since 2013, the TABD refers to the 
executive council within the TABC and is composed of, “chief executive officers and C-Suite executives 
from leading American and European companies operating in the U.S., Europe, and globally” (TABC 
2013). 
  
In this work, TABD is used unless it is comparing the activity across after 2013 and then TABC/D is used 
to avoid confusion. 
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(TEC). These institutions provide service primarily to industry and enable the pursuit of a 
financialization-fueled growth strategy.  
Finally, in the conclusion, I use the gathered evidence to propose the concept 
oarsman state to explain this new division of labor.  The oarsman state is the emergence 
of a new stage of regulatory relationship in which the state serves civil society actors in 
the creation of regulation and institutions. I consider the potential impact of the 
transatlantic financial regulatory regime on the EU, US, and international financial 
regulatory regimes. The conclusions look broadly at the implications of this arrangement 




Chapter 2: US Financial Regulatory Regime 
This project argues that the financial crisis was a critical juncture in the US, EU, 
transatlantic and international financial regulatory regimes, and that the changes to the 
US, EU, and international regimes partially explain why the US and EU are changing the 
transatlantic regulatory regime. This chapter will use within-case process-tracing to 
compare the US financial regulatory regime before the financial crisis of 2007-2009 to 
the US financial regulatory regime after the financial crisis. Identifying the changes in 
policy, and institutional processes and structures will demonstrate that the financial crisis 
was a critical juncture in the US financial regulatory regime that centralized the regime’s 
institutions under the Financial Stability Oversight Council, added new surveillance and 
rule-making functions to existing institutions, and established the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau and the Office of Financial Research. The underlying ideology of 
financialization did not change and the US financial regulatory regimes’ commitment to 
financialization is identified as an underlying cause of the emergence of the transatlantic 
financial regulatory regime.  
The US changed its financial regulatory regime after the financial crisis, and the 
elements of its regime influence the transatlantic regulatory regime. The fragmented US 
system comparatively empowers industry, while financial regulation at the EU level 
increasingly originates from technocratic bodies with an abridged role for organized 
industry. Establishing the role of industry at the domestic level is important to later 
determining the role that industry has been afforded at the transatlantic level in the 
process of regulatory cooperation. The different roles for industry can be attributed to the 
development of two distinct models regarding the role of finance to the economy, the 
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Anglo-American market model and the German model, a difference in political salience 
for industry in the regulatory policy processes, and internal dynamics at the EU level.  
Identifying Regulation 
 Regulation is a concept fraught with political and social expectations and 
understandings as well as divergent meanings in subdisciplines of political science. Once 
constrained to explaining state limits on economic activity, regulatory policy studies have 
spilled over into the social sphere (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). Regulatory politics and 
policy scholars have conceived of three levels of definitions for regulation. The most 
narrow definition conceives of regulation as specific rules or standards set by the state; 
this is a limiting definition because much regulation seeks to encourage or incentivize 
certain behaviors rather than limit them. One such example is the variety of tax breaks 
related to home ownership. The second, broadest level covers all activity by a state. This 
work will use the term regulation in the sense of a middle level general concept: all 
actions undertaken by the government or other legitimized regulatory actors to prohibit, 
direct and incentivize the behavior of individuals and firms.  
Another division over the concept of regulation is whether the regulation targets 
the demand or supply side. In the financialization section of this chapter, I address the 
way that federal taxation policy has incentivized individuals to use financial services. 
Taxation policy is therefore one element of demand-side regulation. Demand-side 
regulation targets individual behavior. The field of behavioral economics considers how 
firms and government can encourage certain behavioral changes. Thaler and Sunstein 
identify a number of ways to make small changes to the “choice architecture” to “nudge” 
individual behavior towards a desirable outcome or decision; one pertinent example is the 
suggestion that employers should auto-enroll employees into 401(k)s and force them to 
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opt-out in order to ensure higher enrollment rates and higher retirement savings (Thaler 
and Sunstein 2009). The federal government regulation of the financial industry, through 
agencies, laws, and tax code, is part of supply-side regulation. Policymakers usually 
present supply-side regulation as the entirety of financial regulation. 
Before and After the Financial Crisis 
 The United States has created financial regulation incrementally and in response 
to crises, market failures, and shifts in productivity in the real economy (White 2009; 
Farrell and Newman 2010). The financial crisis of 2007-2009 served as a critical juncture 
in US regulation but not one with the legacy many policymakers and pundits anticipated 
it would. The developments occurred in three categories of regulation, (i) policies, (ii) 
institutional structures and processes, and (iii) ideas. In this section I will detail the US 
financial regulatory regime before and after the financial crisis to demonstrate that the 
financial crisis was a critical juncture in the US financial regulatory regime. This is 
central to explaining why there has been a change in the transatlantic regulatory regime.  
In the industrialization period (1790s-1910s), advances in technology contributed 
to a robust growth in US finance as a result of the connections between production and 
banking institutions. This was then followed by a period of reregulation and contraction 
(1910s-1920s). States enacted Blue Sky Laws in the 1910s to regulate the nascent 
securities industry and protect incumbent interests (Battilossi and Reis 2010). However, 
the fragmented approach to regulation by states was not sufficient to stave off the stock 
market crash in 1929 and the Great Depression. Historical attitudes which had viewed 
financial activity as dangerous, swindling, gambling, or immoral and questions about the 
level of state intervention in markets were not completely set aside and contributed to a 
substantial wave of regulation during the Great Depression (Banner 2002; Busch 2008). 
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The stock market crash in 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression in the United States 
precipitated significant changes. The Securities Act of 1933 required the sale of 
instrumentalities (securities) across states to be registered with the government in an 
attempt to establish disclosure. In 1934 the Securities Exchange Act established the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to centrally regulate securities trading in 
stock exchanges and punish fraud (Sherman 2009). The Roosevelt administration closed 
banks temporarily in 1934 to fend off the permanent folding of banks (Busch 2008, 36).  
The Glass-Steagall Act, which partitioned the sale of securities from traditional 
bank activities (deposits and loans), was a part of the Banking Act of 1933 (White 2009, 
7) One of the most influential provisions of Glass-Steagall was Regulation Q. Regulation 
Q put limits on the interest rates that banks could offer depositors but notably made an 
exception for institutions involved in mortgage lending.  Mortgage lending institutions 
were given a quarter-percent advantage (Johnson and Kwak 2011, 35-37). This 
advantage, “was explicitly designed to encourage a flow of money into housing” 
(Sherman 2009, 4). Even in a period of regulation in response to the Great Depression, 
the federal government sought to support financing in the social sphere rather than 
potentially alter American attitudes towards finance. Partially as a result of the new 
restrictions on financial activity following the Great Depression, advanced countries 
including the US were more financially developed in 1913 than they were until the 2000s 
(Rajan and Zingales 2003).   
In the 1970s and 1980s as the US encouraged deregulation in the global economy, 
the US Congress removed some of the existing regulations for finance. In 1978, the 
Supreme Court decided in Marquette v. First of Oklahoma to allow banks “to export the 
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usury rate laws of their home state nationwide” (Sherman 2009, 1). As a result of the 
decision, states competed to have the least regulated usury rates in a race to the bottom. 
In 1999 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act or Financial Services Modernization Act allowed 
commercial banks to engage in investment activities with deposits, deregulating a 
provision of the Glass-Steagall Act (Sanati 2009). 
The federalist structure of US government, in which power is shared between the 
national and state governments, can create competitive regulatory regimes between states 
when the national government does not create national regulation. In regulatory 
competition, jurisdictions change their regulations to attract business, households, and 
industries. In Tiebout’s original model of regulatory competition, regulatory competition 
was meant to lead to optimal outcomes of preference aggregation, representing a race to 
the top since each jurisdiction would attract only the households that desired the mix of 
public goods and tax rates that it was offering (Tiebout 1956). However, a frequent 
criticism of this model is that devolution inspires competitive deregulation, or a race to 
the bottom, which allows industry actors to use regulatory arbitrage (Geradin and 
McCahery 2005).  
The trend of deregulation in finance ended sharply with the financial crisis in 
2007-2009. The crisis prompted not only a change in social attitudes towards finance but 
also in the policies and institutions that regulate financial services.  
At the forefront of the US response to the crisis was Secretary of the Treasury 
Henry Paulson. His reaction to the crisis was to bring bankers together for deal making 
behind closed doors. In this way he sought to shore up the institutions facing ruin. After 
realizing that the crisis was threatening to ruin not only individual corporations but the 
 38 
entire financial system he began to despair and consider more systematic action. Many 
accounts paint Paulson as the policy entrepreneur who engineered the banking bailout. In 
Too Big to Fail, Andrew Ross Sorkin gives an account of how policymakers were moved 
to take action (2010). Secretary Paulson was moved when he appreciated that the 
financial crisis was “ ‘an economic 9/11’ ” (Sorkin 2010, 420). He realized that 
individual deals would not stave off the collapse of every financial institution and that an 
holistic solution was necessary. “ ‘Nothing is breaking our way,’ Paulson declared. ‘We 
can’t solve the problems of today; we need to think of tomorrow. We need to get ahead of 
this It’s deepening, moving too quickly. This is the financial equivalent of war, and we’re 
going to need wartime powers’ ” (Sorkin 2010, 421). Paulson was at the forefront of 
politically securitizing finance and calling for extraordinary, interventionist measures. 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke shared Paulson’s analysis and “didn’t 
believe the crisis could be solved by individual deals or some one-off solution. ‘We can’t 
keep doing this,’ he insisted to Paulson. ‘Both because we at the Fed don’t have the 
necessary resources and for reasons of democratic legitimacy, it’s important that the 
Congress come in and take control of the situation’ ” (Sorkin 2010, 431). 
On September 18, Paulson and Bernanke met with two dozen congressmen in 
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s office to convince the Congressional leadership that 
a politically unpopular bailout was necessary to avoid a dramatic economic collapse 
(Dodd 2009). Bernanke appealed to them by referencing his research, “ ‘I spent my 
career as an academic studying great depressions. I can tell you from history that if we 
don’t act in a big way, you can expect another great depression, and this time it is going 
to be far, far worse’ ” (Sorkin 2010, 446). Bernanke and Paulson proposed a vague 
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version of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act with a three-and-a-half page prospectus. Paulson followed up his 
presentation by noting, “ ‘If it doesn’t pass, then heaven help us all’ ” (Sorkin 2010, 446). 
Senator Christopher Dodd’s account of the meeting echoes the imagery of an economic 
version of the devastation during the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001: “It's the 
economic equivalent of 9/11 in my view, having been here for both events, ... sitting in 
that room with Hank Paulson saying to us, in very measured tones, no hyperbole, no 
excessive adjectives, that unless you act, the financial system of this country and the 
world will melt down in a matter of days. There was literally a pause in that room where 
the oxygen left” (Dodd 2009). Dodd spent three days expanding what he considered an 
“insulting” three-and-a-half page bill into 80+ pages (Dodd 2009). 
 Opposition from Republicans to TARP led to immense frustration amongst the 
Democratic leadership and Paulson literally took a bended knee in front of Speaker Pelosi 
begging her to keep TARP alive to a House vote. Bernanke and Paulson made a 
concerted effort to emphasize the potential catastrophic consequences if TARP was not 
enacted. After the initial bill was voted down on September 29, staff hustled to revise the 
bill and it was passed by the Congress and signed by President Bush on October 3.  
Criticisms of TARP centered around the lack of conditions on the capital 
infusions. Two Democratic Senators and chairmen of relevant committees, Christopher 
Dodd and Barney Frank, were particularly vocal in criticizing TARP and worked on 
legislation that would address reforms to the US financial regulatory regime. In 2010 the 
US Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank), to add protection against the series of regulatory failures that culminated 
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in the financial crisis. While the impact of the legislation is unclear as several provisions 
have yet to be implemented, it restructured the fragmented system of regulators and 
added new requirements for financial service providers.8 Dodd-Frank creates policy 
changes, but it also has implications for institutional structures and processes. 
This chapter will not seek to describe all of the changes to the regulatory system 
but rather highlight the changes which represent significant breaks with the past, such as 
new legislation and the creation of new regulatory agencies. Critical junctures are not 
only about change, but also about continuity of systems. In the next section about the 
relationship of the regulators to the regulated, I will argue that there has been continuity 
because of the underlying narrative and ideas of financialization. Where possible, this 
chapter distinguishes between policy change and institutional structural or procedural 
change. 
The first significant policy change was that commercial banks were banned from 
proprietary trading and investing in hedge funds and private equity funds with their own 
accounts. A solution proposed by the former United States Federal Reserve Chairman, 
Paul Volcker, the Volcker Rule targets the speculative activity of banks that contributed 
directly to the financial crisis (Carney 2013). Proprietary trading allowed insured deposit 
banks to take excessive risks with deposits, so partitioning the activities of investment 
and commercial banks would theoretically protect those institutions from the large losses 
possible through those speculative investments. This partitioning is not a new idea. The 
Glass-Steagall Act also separated investment and commercial bank activities. However, 
in 1999 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act or Financial Services Modernization Act 
                                                
8 The delay itself is indicative of the state serving industry actors. 
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effectively repealed that provision (Sanati 2009).  The partitioning of investment and 
commercial activities is a policy change that has implications for the structure of banks. 
The second change occurred in institutional structures and procedures with the 
creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). The FSOC has been 
granted very broad oversight of the activities of the individual regulatory agencies as well 
as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). Since previously states and 
different agencies have had fragmented regulatory purviews, the centralization of 
responsibility for the stability of financial markets marks a major turning point in US 
regulation.9 The FSOC has the ability to designate SIFIs, which must then meet more 
stringent regulation and reporting requirements than other financial institutions. SIFIs fall 
into two categories, Nonbank Financial Companies and Financial Market Utilities, and 
there are different threat tests for their identification.10 In order to be designated a SIFI, 
the head of the eight regulators,11 an independent member with insurance experience, and 
the Treasury Secretary must vote (Winkler 2014). The Treasury Sectary has a veto 
power, as s/he must vote for an institution to be designated. Figure 3 below details the 
institutions that have been designated in each category thus far as well as the threat test 
required in order to qualify as such an institution. 
 
                                                
9 The FSOC website acknowledges this fact by noting that, “The Financial Stability Oversight Council has 
a clear statutory mandate that creates for the first time collective accountability for identifying risks and 
responding to emerging threats to financial stability” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, ‘About FSOC’). 
10 Banks which are deemed to be globally systemically important are identified by the Financial Stability 
Board.  
11  The eight regulatory bodies are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the Federal Reserve (FRB), National Credit Union Administration 




Figure 3: US Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
 Threat Designated Institutions 
Nonbank Financial 
Companies 
“material financial distress at the 
U.S. nonbank financial company, or 
the nature, scope, size, scale,          
concentration, interconnectedness, or 
mix of the activities of the U.S. 
nonbank financial company, could 
pose a threat to the financial stability 
of the United States” (Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act) 
American International 
Group, Inc. (AIG), General 
Electric Capital, 
Corporation, Inc., 
Prudential Financial, Inc. 
Financial Market 
Utilities 
 “failure of or a disruption to the 
functioning of a financial market 
utility or the conduct of a payment, 
clearing, or settlement activity could 
create, or increase, the risk of 
significant liquidity or credit 
problems spreading among financial 
institutions or markets and thereby 
threaten the stability of the financial 
system of the United States” (Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act) 
The Clearing House 
Payments Company 
L.L.C., CLS Bank 
International, Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, Inc., 
The Depository Trust 
Company, Fixed Income 
Clearing Corporation, ICE 
Clear Credit LLC, National 
Securities Clearing 
Corporation, The Options 
Clearing Corporation 
Source: Author generated. 
 The FSOC designations are significant because they politically securitize 
financial institutions;12 institutions are only identified if they pose a threat to the financial 
stability of the US. After the financial crisis, the narrative politically securitizing finance 
was successful in making speculative activities a threat to the health of not only the US 
                                                
12 Securitization is used with two meanings in this project: financial securitization and political 
securitization. When the term is used in the latter sense, it will be referred to as political securitization to 
avoid confusion. Initially developed to apply to security studies, political securitization is a process through 
which political actors commit a speech act to convince the public that there is a threat posed to a referent 
object (Buzan et al. 1998). Successful completion of the speech act then convinces the public to allow the 
political actors to use extraordinary measures to prevent the threat from damaging the referent object. 
 
In the financial sense, securitization is “the process of creating securities by pooling together various cash-
flow producing financial assets. These securities are then sold to investors. Securitization, in its most basic 
form, is a method of financing assets. Any asset may be securitized as long as it is cash-flow producing” 




economy but also the world. This is evidenced by Secretary Paulson and Senator Dodd’s 
remarks comparing the potential of a financial system breakdown to the devastation of 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Dodd-Frank also expanded the authority of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), the US Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The extent of their new responsibilities 
is addressed in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 4 below maps the institutions in the US financial regulatory regime 
immediately before the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and lists their responsibilities. 
Notably the individual agencies and commissions are decentralized. There is a division of 
responsibility for regulating traditional commercial banking and regulating securities 
activities; the FDIC and Federal Reserve were responsible for the former and the SEC 
was responsible for the latter. Figure 5 on the following page illustrates the changes to the 
financial regulatory system after Dodd-Frank. 
Figure 4: Pre-Crisis US Financial Regulatory Regime Map 
Source: Author generated; adapted from Dimon 2012, 20.  
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Figure 5: Post-Crisis US Financial Regulatory Regime Map 
 
Source: Author generated; adapted from Dimon 2012, 20.  
 
In Figure 5 the new functions and responsibilities of the agencies are listed below 
their original responsibilities and have a shaded background. The connections between 
the agencies and FSOC denote that the chairperson, director, or comptroller of each 
agency serves on the Council. The Office of Financial Research supports FSOC directly 
by responding to its requests for information. The two new institutions are the Office of 
Financial Research and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Though CFPB is an 
independent agency it is located in the Federal Reserve. 
 The establishment of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was a 
significant institutional change. CFPB was created in 2011 to educate consumers, and 
collect and investigate complaints against financial institutions. Before the financial crisis 
there was no centralized body that collected consumer complaints. State authorities and 
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attorneys general are responsible for enforcing the rules that CFPB writes. Thus far CFPB 
has focused on financial products that extend credit to citizens, including mortgages, 
college loans, and credit cards.  
 Dodd-Frank enshrined the main policy and institutional changes in US financial 
regulatory regime after the financial crisis. The Volcker rule was a policy change that 
separated commercial and investment banking activities. Dodd-Frank changed the 
institutional processes of the CFTC, SEC, and FDIC. It also created new institutions: the 
CFPB and the FSOC. The new policy of identifying SIFIs politically securitizes financial 
institution. Thus, the US response to a crisis in financialized capitalism was to secure, via 
new policies and oversight institutions, the nation’s financial institutions. 
Financialization 
The financial crisis was a critical juncture that produced changes in the policy and 
institutions of the US financial regulatory regime, centralizing and increasing regulatory 
oversight over financial activities. However during and after the financial crisis, 
financialization ideology remained a fairly constant influence on the regulatory regime. 
The form of the regime changed but the function of prioritizing finance-led growth 
strategies persisted. This section addresses the extent of financialization in the US and its 
impact on the US financial regulatory regime. The high-degree of financialization in the 
US economy and its ideological regulatory capture of the US financial regulatory regime 
are driving modifications to the transatlantic regulatory regime that make the regime 
promote finance-led growth. Financialization of Anglo-American capitalism has 
increased the political salience of input from the financial industry into regulatory policy 
formulation, decision-making and implementation.  
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Scholars have noted that since the 1970s businesses have gradually begun to rely 
on profits from investments in financial products rather than production based profits. For 
example, in a number of members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) profits of financial activities/rentier income have increased as a 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) relative to profits from other sectors. 
(Epstein and Power 2003) Financialization is commonly defined as the separation of 
financial activities and profits as removed from production-based activities and profits, 
the latter activities comprising the ‘real economy’ (Foster 2007; Foster and Magdoff 
2009; Van der Zwan 2014). 
Another debate in the development literature is whether financialization of the 
economy leads to economic growth, represented in GDP (King and Levine 1993; 
Jayaratne and Strahan 1996; Bordo and Rousseau 2012; Law and Singh 2014). Though 
there is no consensus about the relationship between growth and financial development, it 
seems that solid legal and banking institutions are preconditions for financialization to 
contribute to economic growth (Chinn and Ito 2006; Law et al. 2013). These 
requirements would prime the US and EU for financialization, since they have some of 
the most developed legal and regulatory systems (Quaglia 2011). 
Financialization has not just happened in the economic sphere but in the social 
sphere as well. Financial inclusion refers to the degree to which financial institutions and 
services are embedded in states.  Measurements of financial inclusion include the number 
of loans from financial institutions, the number of bank accounts at formal financial 
institutions, and the number of points of service (bank branches) per capita (World Bank, 
Global Project for Financial Inclusion). The more central financial products and services 
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are to everyday life, the more financial regulatory policies are likely to affect not just the 
financial service and product providers but also consumers and clients. This potentially 
creates a new broader interest group with political salience but without direct access to 
the regulatory regime. This process is reinforced by the prevalence of the financial-
growth narrative; citizens can be made to believe that finance is central to their economic 
success and growing their net worth. This is perhaps no more prominent than in the 
United States, as will be discussed below.  
 Financial regulation as a substantive policy area is different from other types of 
regulation. First, the pace of innovation in financial products and techniques is quick. 
Some official accounts of the financial crisis suggest it was not deregulation or 
speculative investments which were to blame but rather a failure of regulatory agencies to 
keep up with industry innovation (Bernanke 2010). Susan Strange has argued that 
policymakers have routinely shirked their responsibility to regulate financial markets 
(Strange 1986; Strange 1999). The corollary argument is that individuals working in the 
financial industry, either through a revolving door or self-regulation, are best poised to 
regulate finance because they are keeping up with industry innovation.  This is a 
suggestion that regulation should be created by the regulated. This mode of regulatory 
policymaking has several consequences for the regulatory regime. The first is that former 
finance industry insiders heading regulatory agencies may be more sympathetic to or 
familiar with the desires of industry than to the desires of the American public; second, 
the access and relationships they have to other members of the financial industry may 
inappropriately influence their decisions; and third, they may plan their return to the 
financial industry after their turns as regulators.  
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These three scenarios might result in regulation in the interest of the regulated, or 
regulatory capture. Regulatory capture emerged in public interest theory to describe 
undue influence of one interest group over the decision-making of a regulatory agency 
(Bernstein 1955; Stigler 1971; Posner 1974).  
The second reason financial regulation is different from other types of regulation 
is that financial activity is a phenomenon relatively unrestrained by borders. National-
level financial regulation is responsive to what occurs at the international level and to 
developments within global markets.13 Some financial regulation seeks therefore to limit 
or block exposure to global markets or financial flows, treating them as exogenous, 
potentially destabilizing forces.  But the very act of having a currency traded 
internationally can expose states to the whims of markets composed of transnational 
forces. This is distinct from other economic regulation targeting exogenous forces that 
can be identified as within or of another state. This creates a very dynamic and 
interdependent regulatory process and again can increase reliance on industry 
representatives who represent the abstract markets to shape regulation. It also has led 
some states to use political narratives to securitize markets and financial activities. 
Assessing the structure of the US financial industry, the financial sector’s size as a 
percentage of GDP, the narratives of financialization present before and after the crisis, 
and the dynamics that have dominated the regulatory policies will provide a basis for 
understanding if the role of civil society actors or state actors have changed in the US 
domestic regulatory regimes after the financial crisis.  
                                                
13 This project will treat the market as an exogenous sphere of activity which is mostly independent from 
states and governments. Government intervention into markets is one form of regulation. 
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Financialization of the Economic Sphere 
The US financial industry is marked by its diversity, size, pervasiveness in 
everyday life, and political influence. The extent of financialization in the economic 
sphere changed very little after the financial crisis and puts the financial industry in a 
privileged position to contribute to the content of the US financial regulatory regime. 
There are a wide variety of financial products and services provided by the 
financial sector in the US and the process of disintermediation has increased the typology 
of financial industry actors.14  The major subsectors are asset management, banking, 
insurance and venture capital (U.S. Department of Commerce). However, the trend 
towards consolidation of firms means that the US financial services industry is dominated 
by a relatively small number of firms in each sector (Berger et al 1999).  
In 2014, the industries of insurance and finance alone accounted for 7.2 percent of 
US GDP (U.S. Department of Commerce). It is important to consider this percentage as it 
relates to finance’s increasing contribution to GDP and as a smaller part of the entire 
financial sector’s overall contribution to GDP. Epstein and Power used Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data to determine the finance sector’s 
contribution to US GDP in every year from 1960-2000 (Epstein and Power 2003). Figure 
6 shows that rentier income, or the income generated from economic rents, such as 
securities and other applications of existing wealth, has sharply risen as a percentage of 
GDP from the 1960s to the late 1980s. Non-financial sector profits have not declined as 
drastically as a percentage of GDP, hovering around ten percent, but compared to the 
                                                
14 Disintermediation is the process by which steps or intermediaries are removed from a supply chain; in 
finance, different financial services and products are made directly available to consumers and firms rather 
than requiring a bank, for example, as a means to attain a financial product. As will be discussed later, this 
process has led to a broader lobby in US regulated politics and has increased the imperative for industry-
wide and transnational lobby groups. 
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other sources of contribution to GDP it has lagged behind. If larger contributions to GDP 
are made by the finance industry, combined with income from financial products, than 
are made by manufacturing or the totality of the non-financial sector industries, then 
policymakers may privilege industry input into regulation to prevent a decrease in GDP. 
Financialization ideology prioritizes finance-led economic growth in GDP. This ideology 
leads policymakers to consult industry actors. Privileging industry input into regulation to 
keep finance-led growth assumes that states are competing to have GDP growth and 
larger GDPs than other states. States are in a financial regulatory competition with other 
jurisdictions. Beginning in the 1970’s the US has relied on financialization in order to 
grow the economy and as a result has politically securitized the economic success of the 
financial industry. That is, what is good for the financial industry, which will also be 
preferable to other industries that earn profits through financial activities, is treated as 












Figure 6: Rentier Income Share and Non-Financial Sector Profit Share: US GDP 
1960-2000 
 
Source: Epstein and Power 2003, 17. 
Financialization in the US, reliance on growth from investment in and creation of 
financial products rather than growth in the real economy, is deeply entwined with a 
consumer and investor culture which fuels a seemingly boundless expansion of credit and 
securitization. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 revealed how much of the US financial 
system was driven by a desire to extend credit and securitize existing credit. The earliest 
signals of a crisis came from pundits who noticed the unsustainable housing bubble in the 
US. Individual borrowers took large loans to purchase homes with exponentially 
increasing value, regardless of poor credit scores. As mortgage lenders made larger and 
larger sub-prime loans the prices of homes across the country were inflated beyond their 
actual values, creating a supply-side driven bubble (Coffee 2009). Mortgage firms have 
been labeled as irresponsible and blamed for their risky lending practices. When the 
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bubble did ‘burst’ it was alongside a large financial systematic failure that quickly 
overtook the housing market failure as the focus of both political inquiry and societal 
outrage. 
Mortgage lenders are culpable for issuing loans to borrowers who could likely 
never repay, but the motivation for lenders to issue the loans existed because of another 
larger market distortion. With the advent of structured finance, investment banks were 
able to make large profits from buying existing debt and repackaging it as securities.  One 
source of products to securitize was mortgage loans, even sub-prime mortgage loans. 
Many banks even sought to acquire mortgage firms in order to assure a steady supply of 
loans to securitize.15 Securitization, in the financial sense, is a phenomenon essential to 
understanding the financial crisis and the different types of capitalism pursued in the US 
and continental Europe.16  
“Securitization provides funding and liquidity for a wide range of 
consumer and business credit needs. These include securitizations of 
residential and commercial mortgages, automobile loans, student loans, 
credit card financing, equipment loans and leases, business trade 
receivables, and the issuance of asset-backed commercial paper, among 
others” (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, 
“Securities: An Overview”). 
 
The securities created by investment banks to be resold for profit are rated by 
credit rating agencies. This rating is supposed to act as a form of quality-assurance of 
complex structured products. However the two large credit-rating agencies, Standard & 
Poors and Moodys, disregarded their role as “gatekeepers” in order to pursue profit 
(Partnoy 2006; Partnoy 2009). Investment banks pay fees to the credit-rating agencies for 
their services, creating an incentive for the agencies to inflate their ratings to obtain more 
                                                
15 This risky vertical-integration strategy was especially fatal to Lehman Brothers Holdings and Merrill 
Lynch (Coffee 2009, 16.) 
16 An initial definition is in footnote 12, on page 42. 
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business from the investment banks (Coffee 2009, 9). The rating agencies also faced 
competitive pressure from a new firm and may have inflated their ratings to keep the 
share of investment bank business they already had.  
 This profit-motivated interaction between credit rating agencies and investment 
banks created incentive distortions that produced contagion: mortgage firms were 
encouraged to produce sub-prime mortgages, investment banks were encouraged to lower 
their due diligence standards and use these mortgages to create securities, and credit 
rating agencies were encouraged to lower their professional standards and overvalue 
securities.  
 The systematic overvaluation of these securities led to a confidence crisis in 
American financial markets. Realizing that the securities they themselves were producing 
were of less than advertised value, investment banks began to doubt the credibility of the 
entire rating system, and this undermined the entire system’s perceived reliability 
(Gourevitch 2009, 1-2).  
 Though there were very tangible causes of the 2007 crisis, an analysis that 
attributed fault only to immediate tributaries would be superficial. The causal links 
involved with the 2007-2009 crisis extend to a set of underlying narratives of American 
financialization that fueled securitization and credit. 
Financialization Ideology	
The US has contributed much of its own ideology and economic culture to the 
international financial industry standards. Much has been made of the Protestant work 
ethic and its contribution to successful capitalist national economies, but there is a new 
ethos that permeates corporations and popular culture in the US (Weber 2009). Financial 
product innovation is spurred by a focus on profit-making separated from the real 
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economy. A crash in 1987 led to a brief pause in the “greed is good” mentality, but the 
slow and steady rise of markets during the 1990s led many analysts to proclaim 
capitalism perfected (Krugman 2009, 9-10). Of course, the financial sector became aware 
of the remaining volatility in both 2000 with the crash of the high-tech sector and with 
the more severe liquidity implications of the 2008 crisis. The American form of 
capitalism and the cyclical lack of regulation makes the entire system vulnerable to these 
bubbles and crises (Miller 2008, 126; Helleiner 2009, 14). The American emphasis on 
securitization and pro-market capitalism is also at odds with other models of capitalism. 
Financialized capitalism suggests that it is a form that eschews adding true value or 
growth to the economy in favor of adding profit and using derivatives (Miller 2008, 127-
131). This is an extreme form of financialization. 
American financialized capitalism enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the rise 
of neoliberalism. During the Reagan administration, neoliberalism championed 
privatization, liberalization, and deregulation (Harvey 2005; Miller 2008, 127-8). These 
principles quickly took root in the US, and the US used its global influence to advocate 
an international corollary, the Washington Consensus, which scholars assert is the 
primary evidence of the dominance of US interests in the international financial 
institutions (Konings and Panitch 2008, 22). Neoliberal principles became the basis for 
conditionality in the structured adjustment policies of the IMF and were presented as the 
panacea after the East Asian crisis of the 1990’s as well as the solution to transitioning 
planned economies (Stiglitz 2002).  
Adoption of neoliberal tenets in the US created ideal conditions for an American 
financial crisis that spread globally (Beder 2009; Kotz 2009). Liberalization led to an 
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erosion of those regulations meant to protect American financial health, such as those on 
leverage ratios. The pursuit of finance-led growth through deregulation made the US 
extremely vulnerable to financial crises by lowering the standards to which financial 
institutions were held; shoddy or no due diligence led to many structured products having 
faulty foundations (Coffee 2009, 4-5). This deregulation will be examined in a later 
section of this chapter. Furthermore, the deregulation of finance in the United States 
created conditions which made the crisis a cold other nations couldn’t help but catch. 
Liberalizing leverage ratios and financial flows, as well as having little oversight over 
structured products and their ratings, created conditions for a global economic pandemic. 
Neoliberal policies are applied by policymakers, economists and technocrats who 
are also susceptible to the notions that the growth of finance is central to the growth of 
the US economy and that the complex financial industry is too engrained in the American 
economy to abandon.  This has led to the political securitization of the financial industry 
in the US.17 There have been some attempts to extend political securitization theory to the 
economy (Aitken 2011). In the case of the financial crisis, political actors communicated 
repeatedly that the collapse of major financial institutions would threaten not only 
national economic stability but also elements of the ‘real’ economy, such as jobs and 
wages.18  
                                                
17 Footnote 12 on page 42 contains a definition of political securitization. 
18 The political actors committing the speech act were bipartisan in the US. One emblematic example is that 
both candidates for the presidency in 2008, then Senators Barack Obama and John McCain, included 
references to the risk posed by the threat of global financial instability. Obama’s speeches include 
references to the need to grant financial regulatory bodies “broad authority” (Obama 2008b). McCain 
suggested the connection of the financial system to the everyday economic activities of Americans: “any 
action should be designed to keep people in their homes and safe guard the life savings of all Americans by 
protecting our financial system” (McCain 2008a). He also suggested that despite the high financial cost of 
the proposed bailout, it was better than the potential ripples into the real economy if financial institutions 
failed (McCain 2008b). 
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Even at the height of the financial crisis, several systemically important US 
financial institutions were categorized as ‘too big to fail’ by the executive branch. The 
resulting bailout packages and new regulation constitute the extraordinary measures. The 
US government provided TARP funds to support financial institutions whose dissolution 
was deemed dangerous to the economy as well as to shore up industries, such as the 
housing industry, whose failures were the result of contagion.  
One dramatic episode marked the distribution of 130 billion dollars of TARP 
funds. In a meeting on Monday, October 13, 2008 nine banks were forced to accept 
capital injections (TARP funds) from the federal government (Landler and Dash 2008). 
Hastily summoned over the weekend, the Chief Executive Officers of the nine largest 
banks in the US gathered at the Treasury Department. None of the CEOs were given any 
information about what the meeting was about before hand and their confused assistants 
bombarded Treasury Secretary Paulson’s office with calls and emails to inquire about the 
agenda up to an hour before the meeting. Assembling the leaders all in one room, 
simultaneously was a plan to build “peer pressure” so great they would agree to the 
proposal (Sorkin 2010, 519). Key US regulators were waiting to meet the CEOs: 
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke, 
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Timothy Geithner, FDIC Chair 
Sheila Bair and Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan. Paulson opened the meeting by 
noting the instability of the financial system and suggested they had devised a scheme to 
restore confidence. What followed was an ultimatum to either accept the capital funds or 
be declared capital deficient. According to attendee Richard Kovacevich, then-CEO of 
Wells Fargo & Company, he rejected the offer at first since Wells Fargo had adequate 
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capital (Kovacevich 2012). Paulson interrupted him: “ ‘Your regulator is sitting right next 
to me. And if you don't take this money, on Monday morning you'll be declared capital-
deficient’ ”(Kovacevich 2012). Kovacevich’s account is supported by Paulson’s talking 
points: “If a capital infusion is not appealing, you should be aware your regulator will 
require it in any circumstance” (Paulson 2008). The regulators threatened to lie about the 
adequacy of capital in banks that had not participated in the exotic mortgage markets in 
order to keep the public from speculating about good and bad banks when the 
government would later lent money to several smaller banks. The regulators were 
concerned about stigma (Blinder 2013, 201). In the end, all of the bankers accepted the 
capital infusions rather than being painted by their regulators as undercapitalized.  
In 2008 Secretary Paulson identified the institutions so central to US finance that 
they were held to a higher standard of capital reserve ratios.  Now, the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC), which is discussed earlier in the chapter, maintains a list of 
the systemically important bank and non-bank institutions with large concentrations of 
assets and is empowered to institute more restrictive regulations on those institutions. 
Attorney General Eric Holder has also admitted that prosecuting large financial 
institutions for breaking existing regulations is too dangerous to the national and world 
economy because of the size of financial institutions.19 
As key service providers to citizens as well as financial intermediaries, banks are 
a cornerstone of the US financial industry. The trends towards consolidation means that 
                                                
19 " But I am concerned that the size of some of these institutions becomes so large that it does become 
difficult for us to prosecute them when we are hit with indications that if we do prosecute — if we do bring 
a criminal charge — it will have a negative impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world 
economy. I think that is a function of the fact that some of these institutions have become too large." 
Holder in testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, ‘Oversight of the US Justice Department’, March 
6, 2013.  
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‘the big five’ banks, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Inc., Goldman 
Sachs, and Wells Fargo & Co, have been expanding over the past decade (Lynch 2012). 
Assets at the largest banks have even increased in size by around 37% since the financial 
crisis and in 2013 accounted for 67% of all assets in US banks.20 The largest banks are 
only becoming larger. Bank size is a crucial feature because it signifies their centrality to 
the financial system. More institutions will become ‘too big to fail.’ 
Financialization ideology prioritizes finance-led economic growth. The near 
hegemony of financialization ideology in the US led to deregulation, liberalization, and 
poor oversight before the financial crisis. Though there have been changes to the 
institutions and policies in the US regulatory regime, financialization ideology has 
remained the dominant force of the US regulatory regime. 
After the financial crisis, some groups challenged the hegemony of 
financialization ideology. This will be discussed in the section on social attitudes. 
However, these groups were largely unsuccessful in dismantling financialization 
ideology. One potential explanation for the nearly seamless continuation of 
financialization ideology is the degree of financialization in the social sphere. 
Financialization of the Social Sphere 
 Regulation can incentivize behavior of individuals and households and influence 
social expectations and norms. Several aspects of the US regulatory regime have 
contributed to the financialization of the social sphere, creating a system in which 
individuals and households take for granted their reliance on finance in their everyday 
lives and are encouraged to use financial products and services to accomplish social 
                                                
20 This measure includes the big five and Morgan Stanley (Gandel 2013). Accounts of the expansion are 
also confirmed by earlier accounts of these trends in Andrews 2009. 
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tasks. Individuals in the United States are not necessarily more likely than their 
counterparts in other industrialized economies in Western Europe to use financial 
services, such as having savings or retirement accounts (Global Partnership for Financial 
Inclusion 2011, Charts in Appendix 1). However, unique political and social regulatory 
narratives shape American attitudes towards credit, the role of financial products in 
personal life and a consumer culture which exacerbate reliance on credit. Attitudes 
towards the role of the financial industry are important not only because they shape 
financial activity but also because they can contribute to the content and focus of 
regulation. As Stuart Banner put it, “One thus cannot understand why securities markets 
were regulated the way they were without situating them in the broader culture […]. How 
people in the United States regulated transactions in the shares of business enterprises in 
the middle of the nineteenth century, to take another example, often followed from their 
ideas about corporations at the time” (Banner 2002, 3). 
This section will address two major dimensions of the social sphere in which the 
state has encouraged financialization: home ownership and retirement. Financialization of 
home ownership contributed directly to the financial crisis of 2007-2009. US government 
encouragement of financialization in retirement savings and personal accountability for 
retirement is coupled with an insecure domestic retirement system. This section addresses 
how the US government has supported financialization of two aspects of the social 
sphere. This can contribute to the salience of industry input into regulatory policymaking 
because it connects Wall Street to ‘main street’ by embedding financial products in the 
daily life of citizens. 
Home Ownership  
Home ownership in the United States is a prominent part of the American Dream 
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and central to the notion of civic engagement. Housing policies at the federal and state 
levels have supported this notion by providing institutions, tax incentives and lending 
programs designed to enhance accessibility. These programs created pressure to provide 
liquidity in mortgage markets and extend credit to a wider pool of buyers. Prior to the 
housing market bust, buying a home was considered one of the safest and most reliable 
long-term investments, and a method of encouraging civic participation (Brandlee 2011). 
Social and political mechanisms have thus sought to extend the ability to own a home to 
all members of American society, including the poorest, despite the risks inherent in 
borrowing an amount that for many is a high multiple of their annual income.21 
Incentivizing home ownership through first-homebuyer tax credits and mortgage interest 
deductions sends the message to unsophisticated buyers that buying a home is a cost-
saving measure that benefits everyone. These policies are accompanied by state and non-
profit grants, which lend or gift down payments to low-income or first-time buyers (Stern 
2011, 894).  
In the absence of mortgage lending and down payment financing, the only people 
who can afford to purchase homes are those with an accumulation of wealth equal to the 
total purchase price or down payment amount. As part of a broader reform to make home 
ownership more accessible to all Americans, and particularly minorities, the federal 
government has supported policies that would increase low-income household home 
ownership and suggested that access to financial products is important for social equality. 
In fact, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has referred to 
                                                
21 At the height of the housing market boom, leverage ratios increased. A leverage ratio is the amount of 
credit extended, in the form of a mortgage in the case of housing, to the amount of income or capital 
supporting that debt. A conservative approach to lending would entail lower ratios, since it is easier for the 
borrower to fulfill the loan. 
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minority and low-income households as “underserved” populations or communities, 
labeling them in relationship to their position as consumers of financial products. 22 One 
argument in favor of encouraging low-income household home ownership was that it 
would lead to a positive social impact since new buyers would be incentivized to make 
long-term contributions to the community that they would not otherwise make as renters; 
the goal of these policies was to use financial products to change social behavior (Shlay 
2006, 512-514). Policies seeking to extend home ownership to all Americans were 
successful and between 1994 and 2006 when,  “homeownership among the lowest 
income quintiles grew more quickly than the national average, increasing at roughly 
double the national rate during the first half of the period” (Bostic and Ok Lee 2009: 
218).  
Incorporating these groups in the ranks of homeowners however also created a 
dangerous niche mortgage market: subprime mortgages. Mortgages made at less than 
favorable terms to borrowers with poor credit, subprime mortgages expanded rapidly 
between 2000 and 2006, from 2.6 to 13.5% of all loans in 2006, and loan quality rapidly 
decreased (Kratz 2007; Demyanyk and Hemert 2011).23 Many subprime loans are 
adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) loans, which allow borrowers to pay a much lower 
interest rate during an introductory phase of the loan. These ARM mortgage rates are 
considered teasers and increase after a set period of time. By coupling products with low, 
introductory rates that enable low-income Americans to buy into the American dream 
                                                
22 This language is pervasive in HUD documents, particularly those developed by the Office of Policy 
Development and Research. One prominent example is “Path to Home Ownership for Low Income and 
Minority Households” published by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in fall 2012.  
23 Demyanyk and Hemert define loan quality as “based on their performance, adjusted for differences in 
observed loan characteristics, borrower characteristics, and subsequent house price appreciation” 
(Demyanyk and Hemert 2011, 1849). 
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with insufficient regulation to ensure financial literacy or credible commitments, the 
mortgage regulatory process and federal government policies encouraged borrowers to 
make unsustainable financial decisions. In investigating the government role in 
affordable housing policy in creating the financial crisis, the Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform in the US House of Representatives found that “successive 
Republican and Democratic administrations made campaign promises to extend 
homeownership to lower and middle income families through the action of the federal 
government which were later fulfilled through extending the subprime mortgage market” 
(Commission, Financial Crisis Inquiry 2011). 
 In a comparative lens, US government policies are among the most encouraging 
of a broad use of financial products to attain high levels of home ownership in the 
developed world. Tax incentives for home ownership in the US are “among the highest in 
the OECD world” (Schelkle 2012, 67). In a comparative study of social regulatory 
policies promoting homeownership, Schelkle finds that the institutions that the US 
government established to provide liquidity (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) and guarantee 
mortgage loans to lenders (Federal Housing Authority or FHA) used less targeted lending 
practices than their equivalents in France (68). The effect on demand was that a very 
“ambitious” market for mortgages was created; people of different income levels wanted 
to and expected to be able to buy homes (68). 
 Homeownership support provided by the government has also increased 
financialization in the social sphere by decreasing the percentage of the total purchase 
price a required down payment must represent. Through the FHA loans, buyers can 
qualify to make a down payment of only three point five percent on a home rather than 
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the traditional ten percent down payment to establish a base of equity.24 The equity 
homeowners have in their homes has decreased substantially. That is, they are financing a 
greater portion of their homes initially and taking equity out of their homes by 
refinancing. Figure 7 presents owners’ equity as a percentage of value of household real 
estate from the early 1950s to the present.  
 
Figure 7: Owners' Equity in Real Estate as a Percentage of Household Real Estate 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Data  
Despite the risk of mortgage default, the federal government has encouraged 
owners to remove equity from their homes and finance a greater portion. The Department 
of Housing and Urban Development website details buying a home and loan programs 
offered by the government. One suggestion the Department of Housing and Urban 
                                                
24 Figures and regulations are valid for single-family homes; multiple-family homes and cooperative 
apartments are subject to different regulations. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) web page on buying and loans has detailed information (Buying/Loans).  
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Development website makes is that seniors who have paid off most or all of their homes 
would potentially benefit from a reverse mortgage.25 A reverse mortgage allows owners 
to take equity out of their home as a loan. Low equity levels in home ownership can lead 
to default, especially during an economic crisis since it can trigger negative equity in 
which homeowners owe more on their mortgage loans than their homes are worth 
(Campbell and Cocco 2014). 
US federal government regulatory activity in the sphere of homeownership has 
increased household reliance on financial products and encouraged the usage of new 
financial products such as types of subprime mortgages and down payment grants. This 
has contributed significantly to the financialization of the social sphere. 
Retirement Accounts 
 Federal government retirement income in the US is provided through a monthly 
Social Security payment, the amount of which is determined based on the recipient’s 
lifetime contributions and annual income. For some retirees, this social security income is 
not sufficient to cover monthly expenses. Retirees in the US are less likely than other 
countries to have other pensions provided by their jobs (Wisenberg 2014). As a result, 
retirees often supplement their social security income with income from private 
retirement accounts.  
The US government has encouraged Americans to use financial products to save 
for retirement through tax deductions, developing new government-backed products, and 
even proposed automatic enrollment in private account schemes. Contributions to 
                                                
25 “Are you 62 or older? Do you live in your home? Do you own it outright or have a low loan balance? If 
you can answer "yes" to all of these questions, then the FHA Reverse Mortgage might be right for you. It 
lets you convert a portion of your equity into cash” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
‘Let FHA Loans Help You’). 
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individual or employer-provided retirement accounts are tax deductible subject to a 
maximum contribution, employment status, income level, and age criteria. In 2001, 
President Bush signed the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
(EGTRRA) into law. Though the law is likely most known for its reduction in the 
percentage of personal income tax paid by those individuals in the top tax bracket, it also 
increased the limits for tax-deductible contributions to savings accounts, allowed catch up 
payments for individuals over 50 years of age, offered incentives to small employers to 
offer sponsored retirement plans, and created the transfer of retirement accounts (Burman 
et al. 2004, 11-14). Individual retirement accounts (IRAs) are not only prudent financial 
planning but a money saver in years with unexpected growth in earned income.  While 
employer-sponsored retirement accounts are traditionally managed by a firm of the 
employer’s choosing, IRAs are managed by the contributor’s choice of manager. Though 
it is possible that these accounts can be kept as savings, both allow allocation in various 
financial products, such as stocks, index funds, and mutual funds, and a conservative 
allocation strategy is a likely outcome of self-guided or private management.26 
Similar to the case with access to homeownership, although retirement savings 
were initially more accessible to higher-income American workers the federal 
government has also tried to extend employer-sponsored and private retirement accounts 
to low-income American workers. “Pension and IRA tax benefits are mostly concentrated 
among high- income taxpayers for two reasons. First, they can afford to save. Second, 
                                                
26 The self-guided investment services, offered by firms such as Vanguard and Fidelity, coach investors 
towards using their stages of life as a way to determine investment strategy but often explicitly caution 
against too conservative of an investment strategy even for those close to retirement. “While many 
investors approaching retirement today may be more comfortable investing conservatively as a result of 
market volatility, they could be missing growth opportunities” (Fidelity Investments 2013, 6.  ‘Income 
Diversification: Creating a Plan to Support Your Lifestyle in Retirement’). 
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they face the highest marginal tax rates and thus stand to gain the most from tax 
deductions and exclusion” (Burman et al. 2004, 1). EGTRRA introduced a Saver’s Credit 
for low-income households, which currently is available to single filers with less than 
$30,000 in adjusted gross income. The Saver’s Credit allows the percentage of 
contributions which are tax deductible to increase as adjusted gross income decreases 
(See chart in Appendix 2. Internal Revenue Service,  ‘Retirement Savings Contributions 
Credit (Saver’s Credit)’).  
According to the White House, only half of American workers have access to 
employer-sponsored retirement accounts (White House 2014). With the additional 
hindrance of fees required to open and maintain IRAs, many low-income workers are 
dissuaded from contributing money to any separate retirement account. In an attempt to 
redress this, the Treasury Department introduced government-backed retirement accounts 
called myRA. The funds allow workers to set aside small amounts of money, as little as 
$5 per paycheck, towards a retirement account administered by the Treasury Department 
with an interest rate tied to the Government Securities Investment Fund and no risk of 
losing the principal contribution (White House 2014). This program will also encourage 
employers to provide access to an auto-enroll feature, through which employees would 
need to opt-out in order to not participate in the myRA program. However, these accounts 
are ultimately folded into private sector fee IRAs. After either 30 years or $15,000 in 
contributions participants must transfer their funds to the private sector. This feature of 
the program serves two purposes, both of which demonstrate the degree to which 
retirement is a section of the social sphere that has been financialized.  
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First, elements of the financial industry, seniors’ organizations and the Tea Party 
have noted their concern that the government was going to “nationalize” all retirement 
accounts (Stern 2012; National Seniors Council 2010; Corsi 2014; TeaParty.org 2014). 
The cap ensures that eventually low-income contributors will become consumers of 
traditional fee-generating financial services and existing accounts are not folded into the 
plan ensuring that the revenue stream from wealthy earners to the financial services 
industry continues. Second, as mentioned previously myRA accounts would be earning 
interest at the rate of the Government Securities Investment Fund (G Fund). The G 
Fund’s stated investment objective, “is to produce a rate of return that is higher than 
inflation while avoiding exposure to credit (default) risk and market price fluctuations” 
(Thrift Savings Plan). The lack of volatility and risk makes the G Fund an appealing 
investment choice, but those with a higher risk tolerance could earn considerably more 
interest in other options or diversify their portfolios with a mix of risky and conservative 
investment choices. The cap serves to ensure that those with retirement accounts of 
$15,000, providing a certain security, will have the potential to earn more than the G 
Fund interest rate on some of their accumulated retirement funds. 
Rather than enhance the existing scheme for government-provided retirement 
income in response to the burst of the dot-com bubble which eroded private investment 
accounts, the federal government sought to compensate for insufficient social security 
income and private savings by incentivizing private retirement accounts that earn fees for 
managers and financial firms. The government solution to ensure low-income earners 
have sufficient savings for retirement is to extend a new tax credit and providing free, 
government-backed private accounts. 
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In summation, Americans rely on financial products for key tasks in their 
everyday lives. They are encouraged by policymakers to use financial products. 
Policymakers are captured by financialization ideology to solicit the input of industry 
actors in making financial regulation, but this is compounded by the deep financialization 
of the social sphere. Despite the financialization of the social sphere, during the financial 
crisis two groups emerged to challenge financialization ideology. 
Financial Crisis: Challenging Social Attitudes 
Public attitudes can contribute to the shape of regulation and in the US 
financialization of the social sphere has influenced public attitudes and convinced 
Americans that finance is necessary to grow the economy and perform essential functions 
in their lives. In other states that do not pursue finance-led growth or those with less 
financial inclusion, public attitudes towards finance are different. Some social forces 
have attempted to counterbalance this narrative following the financial crisis of 2007-
2009. During the financial crisis, the financial elites received a national bailout of their 
risk-taking though ‘main street’ did not. For this reason, the financial crisis of 2007-2009, 
much like the stock market crash of 1929 before it, caused a shift in social attitudes 
towards finance. Two groups emerged in response to the bailouts: Occupy Wall Street 
and the Tea Party. The Occupy Wall Street movement and Tea Party movement were 
emblematic of a societal question about the role of finance in American lives and the 
privileged access of the financial industry to the US government.  
The Occupy Wall Street movement responded to the US government bailout of 
the financial industry during the financial crisis by distinguishing itself as representing 
the ninety nine percent and not the top one percent of US income earners (Piven 2012). 
This deliberate effort to separate ‘main street’ from Wall Street and single out the 
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financial elite allowed those involved with the movement to articulate what about the 
political consequences of financialization was troubling: finance was deemed by the US 
government as too crucial to the success of the national economy to fail—or be 
prosecuted—but individuals were not. The bailout proved that there was a form of 
financial exceptionalism. Occupy Wall Street raised public concerns about inequality in 
economic distributional gains as well as inequality in justice (Jordan 2011). One account 
from Investment News concisely surveys the issues that members of the occupy 
movement raised, “Demonstrators have called for a variety of changes, including the 
return of the Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act and an enactment of the so-called Buffett 
Rule, a new tax that would be assessed on individuals making more than $1 million a 
year. But the movement also has raised objections to broader issues, including the dismal 
job market, student loan debt and investment banks' role in selling doomed mortgage-
backed securities” (Mercado 2011). There are scholars (Craven and Zhang 2012) who 
would contest that the Occupy movement was too diverse and too loose of a coalition to 
characterize as standing for any shared set of goals, but the sum of their individual calls 
questioned the role of finance and capitalism in the American economy and questioned 
the performance of the national government as an intermediary between them. 
The movement inspired critiques of the government’s special handling of the 
financial industry. Some went as far as to suggest the national government had been 
complicit in ‘engineering’ mergers which prevented banks from failing but also exempted 
them from carrying the risk of toxic debts.27  
                                                
27 “First let's consider the action that was undertaken in early 2008 by the Federal Reserve with respect to 
the troubled investment banker, Bear Stearns. The collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds in mid-2007 is 
widely regarded as ushering in the worldwide financial crisis. Rather than permit this notorious investment 
banker to fail, the Fed engineered an ‘acquisition’ of Bear Stearns by J. P. Morgan Chase (‘J.P. Morgan’) 
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The Tea Party emerged as a social and protest movement opposed not only to the 
bailout of financial industry actors but also of those measures designed to bailout 
individual borrowers in negative equity on their mortgages. The rhetoric recognized the 
government’s role in advocating the use of and even providing mortgages to individual 
borrowers but did not shield those who borrowed from blame. One prominent example of 
such rhetoric is an on-air statement from Rick Santelli, a Consumer News and Business 
Channel (CNBC) editor: “ ‘The government is promoting bad behavior,’ Santelli said, 
asking why Obama would make Americans who pay their bills subsidize the mortgages 
of "losers’ ” (Perlberg 2014). The Tea Party asserted that individuals whose borrowing 
behavior responds to government incentives should be held accountable for their 
mortgages and that the if the Obama administration bailed the individuals out it would 
contribute to moral hazard (O’Hara and Malkin 2010).28 
Adherents to the Tea Party movement have since sought institutional participation 
in the legislative branch of the federal government. In 2010, Representative Michele 
Bachmann formed a Tea Party Caucus in the US House of Representatives and 52 
Republican members joined (Zernike 2010; Gervais and Morris 2012). The 
institutionalized political voice is characterized as belonging to the “militantly nativist, 
                                                                                                                                            
whereby the central bank contributed $29 billion of U.S. taxpayer money to J.P. Morgan to accomplish the 
transaction. The agreement, which was ‘negotiated’ during the weekend before the merger, provided a 
sweetheart deal to J.P. Morgan, including that the funding to J.P. Morgan would be nonrecourse, i.e., J.P. 
Morgan would not be required to repay the debt out of its own assets if things went bad. Instead, to ‘secure’ 
this massive bailout, the Federal Reserve, on behalf of the U.S. taxpayers, took some of Bear Stearns' 
worst, most abysmal, toxic finance products as security” (Myers 2012, 53). 
 
28 Moral hazard is the economic principle that individuals and firms are more likely to take risks if they do 
not expect to suffer negative consequences from the risk taking. In an account of the financial crisis, 
Krugman provides this definition: “any situation in which one person makes the decision about how much 
risk to take, while someone else bears the cost if things go badly” (Krugman 2009, 63). 
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anti-labor, and libertarian populist right” (Post 2012). In an analysis of the 52 members of 
the caucus, Gervais and Morris discovered that the members of the House of 
Representatives have constituencies with more similar ideology about the government’s 
role in the financial system, a finding which echoes the rhetoric from the social 
movement. “Our analysis also strongly suggests that voters’ ‘anger,’ which is widely 
presumed to drive the movement, is not so much a reaction to desperate economic 
circumstances but a reaction to government spending in response to the economic 
downturn. Rather than serving the districts hardest hit by the recession, caucus members 
serve the districts that are paying for the projects, programs, and payments to more 
depressed areas” (Gervais and Morris 2012, 249). 
One reform proposed in the US is also being considered in the EU: a financial 
transaction tax. Since the financial crisis, a number of members of the US Senate and 
Congress have proposed a financial transaction tax (Pollin 2012). Modeled after the 
Tobin tax proposed on cross-border currency swaps, a financial transaction tax is 
intended to stave off short-term and speculative trading activity and fund ‘main street’ 
programs. The Congressional efforts have thus far been, “stymied by Wall Street 
lobbyists and the Obama administration” (Carter 2015). US Senator Bernie Sanders, a 
contender for the US Democratic Party nomination for President in 2016, proposed a 
national financial transaction tax and introduced the Too Big to Fail, Too Big to Exist 
Act. The latter, “would break up the big banks and prohibit any too-big-to-fail institutions 
from accessing the Federal Reserve’s discount facilities or using insured deposits for 
risky activities” (Sanders 2016). This would address a problem discussed earlier; that 
regulation has not prevented the concentration of assets in the big five banks. Senator 
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Sanders’s proposed tax would apply to “speculative trading in stocks, bonds, derivatives, 
and other financial instruments” (Nichols 2015). Financial industry actors are funding 
studies that will question the benefits of such a tax (Baker 2015). 
After the financial crisis social attitudes shifted to oppose government 
intervention to support financial institutions, and, in the case of the Tea Party movement, 
to support individual borrowers. However, the changes in the US financial regulatory 
regime supported financial institutions and made stabilizing them a top priority. This 
apparent contradiction will be explained by regulatory capture in the US regulatory 
regime and developments in the international regulatory regime that US policymakers 
used to justify their securitization of the US financial system. 
Network Salience 
 Despite the transnational nature of financial flows, geographic locations still can 
provide a meaningful demarcation of specialization and activity. The global financial 
system has a “hierarchical network” structure and is “centered firmly on US capital 
markets” (Oatley et al. 2013, 135). This section will assess the implications of this 
centrality for the transatlantic, and international regulatory regimes. In the transatlantic 
regulatory regime, the network centrality makes industry actors salient to the creation of 
regulation because it allows for competition with other regulatory regimes. In the 
international regulatory regimes, the US’s network centrality empowers it to set 
regulation. 
New York City is a central hub for finance in the US and the world and is 
currently ranked as the number two financial center in the world (The Global Financial 
Centres Index 15). The Global Financial Centre Index (GFCI) is published in March and 
September every year. London took the top spot from New York in September 2015. The 
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GFCI ranks centers based on measures of the business environment, infrastructure 
factors, human capital, reputation, and financial sector development. Since the first index 
in 2007, London and New York have always occupied the top two ranks. They also 
currently hold the top two spots in all of the sub-indices (Global Financial Centers Index 
15, 9). 
Susan Strange (1998) and Saskia Sassen (2002) have emphasized New York’s 
status as a crucial location for the finance industry because of the concentration of 
financial activities which take place in the city. In network theory cities with particular 
strength in an industry are seen as hubs. Connecting these hubs to financial flows, which 
seemingly occur in the ether, is a task that is reputed to daunt financial regulators and a 
phenomenon which has spurred several transnational regulatory bodies (Buthe and Mattli 
2011). Castells has furthered the network theory by attempting to map such economic 
flows over places (Castells 2000). It also creates an opportunity for interdisciplinary work 
into, “the extending social, spatial, and political reach of financialization” (Pike and 
Pollard 2010, 3). This concept of global financialization has been analyzed in a network 
context by the disciplines of geography, economics, sociology and political science 
(Buck-Morss 1995; Krippner 2005; Lee et al 2009; Pike and Pollard 2010).  
Although there is a well-documented centralization of financial industry activity 
in New York, the financialization of the American economy through economic liberalism 
has provided additional regulatory salience. Some scholars note that American finance 
has developed a power of attraction and that financial globalization is actually the 
expansion of American financial imperialism (Konings and Panitch 2008; Konings 2009; 
Gindin and Panitch 2012). The implications of this model are that the American financial 
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firms are the most relevant to the international financial regulatory regime and have a 
transnational standard-setting power and political salience. The alignment of US finance 
and the global financial markets gives American financial regulators and financial 
industry actors a competitive advantage in setting global financial regulations through 
both intergovernmental bodies as well as private industry bodies (Oatley 2013). Drezner 
has asserted that the EU and US are privileged in establishing global regulations which 
favor their interests because of the size of their markets (Drezner 2007). Though it may 
seem paradoxical with the plethora of global governance arrangements which include 
non-state actors, his contention is that the EU and US as “great powers” have become 
more relevant to international regulatory networks because other states are eager to 
participate in their markets.  
However, Drezner underplays the role that different levels of industry 
development play in determining regulatory outcomes. High levels of industry 
development attract foreign adopters of private and public industry regulatory standards. 
The level of development of American financial markets, the financial depth of markets, 
and the centralization of financial services in New York are the primary sources of 
attraction to the US model of finance (Castells 2010; Wojcik 2013). Financial industry 
development is often contingent on the financial system in which it initially operates 
(Rajan and Zingales 2003). There are several suggestions about what constitute necessary 
elements of a developed financial system (Ferguson 2002; Rajan and Zingales 2003).  
The operations of the finance industry were initially more geographically limited, 
but through advances in technology and communications, financial flows are less limited 
(Eichengreen 2008). Nonetheless, those technologies must be available to industry actors 
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seeking to take advantage of them; advanced, industrialized economies have an 
advantage in acquiring new technologies and communications. 
Countries have begun to shape regulatory standards to attract investors and win 
the approval of industry, rather than try to win the approval of international regulatory 
bodies. This is a form of regulatory competition between national jurisdictions to attract 
investors and financial firms. In the case of the securities industry, corporate 
reorganizations in the 1980s favorable to financialization of businesses29 led to 
substantial growth in the US and United Kindom (UK) securities sectors (Walter and 
Smith 1998, 85). During this period, the securities sector developed several new 
innovations and products. Recognizing the potential of the securities sector to contribute 
to growth, OECD countries began to deregulate. Emerging market economies began to 
follow suit, even “leapfrogging the reforms seen in the traditional market-economy 
nations” (Walter and Smith 1998, 85). Before the Asian financial crisis of 1997, 
economic liberalization was a strategy employed by emerging market economies to avoid 
regulatory arbitrage making them unattractive to developed financial firms (Eichengreen 
2008, 135). The desire of US policymakers to maintain US network centrality in the 
global financial system and the corresponding potential for finance-led growth have 
contributed to the creation of a transatlantic financial regulatory regime. 
Since the UK is an EU member state, the nexus of US-UK financialized, market-
model capitalism, headquartered in New York and London—the two top global financial 
centers—directly connected to the considerable power the US and UK enjoy in the 
context of regulation setting in both the EU and international regulatory regimes (Wojcik 
                                                
29 Specifically recapitalization of firms, during which equity is replaced by debt. 
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2013). Chapter 3 will address the UK’s centrality in the global financial network and the 
corresponding power it enjoys within the context of EU regulatory regime. 
Relationship of Regulators to Industry 
 In the US financial regulatory regime, the close relationship of regulators to 
industry is marked by the ideological, or deep capture of policymakers by 
financialization. The relationship of the regulated to the regulators in the US financial 
regulatory regime is one impetus behind the change in the transatlantic regulatory regime 
after the financial crisis.  The federal policymaking process in the US is designed to allow 
several opportunities for input from stakeholders. American democratic policymaking 
relies on the principle of pluralism in which interest groups compete to influence policy. 
In a typical policymaking cycle, the opportunity to influence comes before a policy is 
enacted; interest groups may try to change public opinion or directly influence legislators. 
However, the regulatory policymaking process may afford interest groups additional 
opportunities to influence outcomes. Interest groups may lobby a regulatory agency after 
a law has been passed by the US Congress but before it is implemented and there are 
often public comment periods dedicated to this purpose.30 Additionally, industry actors 
are in a “privileged position” to influence regulatory policymaking if there are significant 
economic implications of regulation (Lindblom 1977, 175-180). Other groups can still 
influence the policy, but business may have more direct access or influence. In the case 
of the US financial regulatory regime, this privilege is so great it amounts to regulatory 
capture. 
                                                
30 If there are state-level implications for administering the regulation, interest groups may also seek to 
lobby at that level as well. 
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 Several critiques of the close relationship of US regulators to the regulated have 
been made by the news media, citizen interest groups and scholars (Crotty 2009; Baxter 
2011). The US employs former industry officials as regulators. After their turn as 
regulators, some individuals do return to the finance industry leading to charges of a 
“revolving door” (Crotty 2009, 577; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 2009, 2; Baxter 2011, 197; Johnson and Kwak 2011, 93). This regulatory 
capture has been pronounced following the financial crisis (Baker 2010, 652-653). In his 
first-hand account of the attempt to reform Wall Street, former Sentator Ted Kaufman’s 
Chief of Staff Jeff Connaughton notes the large number of former regulators who lobby 
for the finance industry because it is seen as a way to career advancement (Connaughton 
2012). 
 Secondly, individual financial firms and financial industry actor groups typically 
have ample access to regulatory policymakers. Though one branch of scholarship asserts 
that this lobbying is another form of regulatory capture, (Hardy 2006; Baker 2010) 
financial industry representatives are unique in that they are embedded in the regulatory 
process because of the financialization narrative (Johnson and Kwak 2011, 90-95).  
Johnson and Kwak assert that the financialization narrative captured regulators 
through group-think: 
“Between the revolving door and the competition for regulatory 
‘business,’ there was a confluence of perspectives and opinions between 
Wall Street and Washington that was far more powerful than emerging- 
market-style corruption. Wall Street's positions became the conventional 
wisdom in Washington; those who disagreed with them […] were  
marginalized as people who simply did not understand the bright new 
world of modern finance. This group-think was a major reason why the 
federal government deferred to the interests of Wall Street repeatedly in 
the 1990s and 2000s” (Johnson and Kwak 2011, 95). 
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In his detailed analysis of capture in the US financial regulatory regime, Baxter 
explains the current privileged position of financial industry: 
“[Capture] turns out, however, to be very relevant in the context of 
contemporary financial regulation for two distinct reasons. First, the overt 
conduct of the industry and various high regulatory officials appears to 
demonstrate the kind of extreme situation in which one of the regulated 
interests—namely the very large financial institutions—have secured such 
dominant influence that it may be said that they have captured the 
regulators, the regulatory process, and the regulated outcomes, to the 
disregard of many other important interests” (Baxter 2011, 181). 
 
 Baxter goes on to cite the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve, and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) as having adopted regulatory interpretations that 
aid corporations, and banks in particular, in evading existing restrictions. He 
dismisses the “shallow concept of visible capture” as insufficiently representing 
the current state of financial regulation and elaborates his own concept of deep 
capture to explain the extent to which capture is “embedded within the financial 
regulatory system” (Baxter 2011, 182). His concept suggests that the American 
“financial and economic public policy process has been systematically captured 
by large-scale financial interests” through significant access, the revolving door, 
and lobbying efforts (Baxter 2011, 182, 191). 
 During the financial crisis, chief executive officers of banks were given 
privileged access to the President, cabinet, and members of Congress. Former and 
current CEOs as well as former government officials have given first-hand 
accounts of their encounters. Former Barclays CEO Bob Diamond suggests that 
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he was summoned to a meeting with Senators to suggest regulation.31  
Regulators sought out the input of those they were regulating in order to craft 
regulation because of the hegemony of the financialization ideology. “Most important, as 
banking became more complicated, more prestigious, and more lucrative, the ideology of 
Wall Street — that unfettered innovation and unregulated financial markets were good for 
America and the world — became the consensus position in Washington on both sides of the 
political aisle” (Johnson and Kwak 2011, 5). Financialization is an accepted ideology for 
both Democrats and Republicans, and it is a norm that regulation should serve 
financialization. With complex financial products and fast-paced innovation that means 
allowing bankers to design the regulations to which they will be subject. 
Conclusions 
This chapter presents evidence that after the financial crisis there was a 
reorganization of the US financial regulatory regime through the creation of new policies 
and institutions, and the addition of responsibilities to existing institutions. However, the 
ideas behind the regulatory regime did not change nor did the goal: to encourage 
financial-led growth and secure the stability of financialized-capitalism. The high degree 
of financialization in the US economy and social sphere led to political securitization of 
financial institutions and deep ideological capture of policymakers by the financial 
industry. This supports the project’s assertion that the financial crisis was a critical 
juncture in the US financial regulatory regime and provides a basis for comparing the EU 
and US financial regulatory regimes.  
 
                                                
31 “Soon after the financial crisis of 2008 I was at a meeting in Washington with a group of US senators. 
They had invited me to provide a point of view on new regulation; regulation aimed at ensuring we never 










Chapter 3: EU Financial Regulatory Regime 
 This project argues that the financial crisis was a critical juncture not only in the 
US and EU financial regulatory regimes but also in the international financial regulatory 
regime. The reverberations from the domestic and international levels have led to 
institutional changes in the transatlantic regulatory regime. This chapter will use the 
method of process tracing to identify the ideology, policies, institutional structures and 
processes of the EU financial regulatory regime before and after the financial crisis to 
demonstrate that the crisis was a critical juncture in the regime. The institutional 
procedures and structures, and policies of the regime have become centralized under the 
new European Systemic Risk Board but the policymaking process in the EU has allowed 
ideological, deep regulatory capture of EU policymakers. This chapter will use network 
analysis of financial centers to explain how after the financial crisis of 2007-2009 
finance-led growth and financialization are dominant ideas in the EU financial regulatory 
regime. These ideas impact the relationship of the regulated to the regulators, notably in 
the EU Commission, and at the transatlantic level it privileges the access and input of 
industry actors and groups. In turn, and as will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, alignment 
in the EU and US financial regulatory regimes is essential to explain the emergence of 
the transatlantic financial regulatory regime after the financial crisis. 
 
Before and After the Financial Crisis 
 This section will establish the antecedent conditions in the EU financial 
regulatory regime and identify the changes to the regime during and after the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009. This will demonstrate that the financial crisis was a critical juncture 
in the EU financial regulatory regime and partially explain why there have been changes 
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to the transatlantic regulatory regime. Before the financial crisis, efforts to extend the 
single market to financial services were prompted by the belief that it would lead to more 
competitive services and products. But creating a single market in financial services 
required building an EU regulatory regime with some coordination of national regulatory 
standards and processes. In 1999 the European Union endeavored to create a single 
market for services and goods, but because of financial flows’ geographic peculiarities 
and the differences in the varieties of capitalism practiced by member states, some 
financial services and products were not subject to EU level regulation until the financial 
crisis. Other pieces of the parallel international financial regulatory regime, for example 
the Basel process in the banking sector, pre-empted potential EU level regulation 
(Quaglia 2007).  
Responding to requests by the Council and by the Economic and Financial Affairs 
Council (ECOFIN), the Council formation of member state economic and finance 
ministers, the Commission created a Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) that outlined 
areas for harmonization. In 2001 the Lamfalussy process, so named after Alexandre 
Lamfalussy who headed the high level advisory committee, created a four level 
implementation scheme responsible for framework goals and specific recommendations 
to add flexibility to national securities legislation (Raptis 2012, 61-62). The Lamfalussy 
process resulted in three committees that were responsible for coordination between 
member state’s supervisory authorities in the banking, pensions, and securities sectors; 
these were the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), Committee of 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS), and the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR). Figure 8 maps the institutions of 
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the regulatory regime in the European Union and their responsibilities before the 
financial crisis. The committees were independent authorities in the European Union and 
could offer advice to the member state supervisory authorities and the European 
Commission. 
Figure 8: Pre-Crisis EU Financial Regulatory Regime 
 
Source: Author generated. 
  The FSAP was slowly implemented through the Lamfalussy process until 2004, 
but following the financial crisis there was a renewed desire to address some of the more 
speculative financial risks. The German and French governments supported a financial 
transaction tax of 0.1 percent of share and bond trades and 0.01 percent of derivative 
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transactions. This proposal was in contrast to the UK and US preference for a levy on 
financial firms to create a bailout fund for the future. 
 Germany has considerable influence over economic and monetary issues in the 
European Union and its Bundesbank design and principles were the inspiration for the 
European Central Bank (Kaltenthaler 2005). German economic stability, fiscal prudence, 
and stable growth have given German positions on economic issues in the EU a moral 
salience. Within the Eurozone, the German government has a near veto since analyses 
suggest the Euro currency would flounder without Germany’s continued participation in 
the currency (Steinherr 2012). However, Germany has had little influence compared to 
the UK in the area of the financial transaction tax (discussed below) because of London’s 
network salience in finance and the EU’s consensus-oriented decision-making process 
which will be discussed later in the chapter. 
 In 2011, the European Commission proposed a financial transaction tax (FTT) on 
“financial instruments between financial institutions when at least one party to the 
transaction is located in the EU” (European Commission 2011). After it became obvious 
that the FTT was a policy that would not be universally approved by EU member states in 
ECOFIN, ten member states are opting in using the enhanced cooperation procedure. 
Many of the member states have declined to participate in the FTT explicitly because the 
UK is not participating. Without UK participation in the FTT, the FTT will divert 
companies and financial activity from member states participating to the UK. The UK has 
refused to implement the FTT unless it is global, recognizing that Tiebout’s theory of 
regulatory competition posits that without universal adoption there will be competition 
between jurisdictions. According to Tiebout’s theory, the EU, and specifically the UK, 
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will lose financial service providers. The assumption of mobility inherent in the 
regulatory competition model is especially applicable to the financial services industry 
because of the ageographical nature of financial flows. Most financial services firms can 
work from any geographic location. 
 Despite the UK government’s position, public opinion polls have generally been 
in favor of the FTT—even in financialized economies including the UK. The EU 
Commission’s DG for Communication conducted a poll in April and May 2011 and 
asked respondents if they in principle would favor a financial transaction tax (Directorate 
General for Communications 2011). The results show that Austrians (80%) and Germans 
(71%) are those most in favor while Malta (44%), Slovenia (39%) and Poland (36%) 
have the highest percentages of those opposed. Those countries with high percentages of 
GDP contributed by finance surprisingly show majorities in favor of the FTT: 
Luxembourg (65%), Netherlands (58%), Ireland (55%), UK (65%). Appendix 3 details 
the percentages for each member state. The poll also revealed the reasons why people 
were in favor. Of those across the EU in favor, 41% believed the FTT would combat 
excessive speculation and help prevent future crisis while 35% rather believed it would 
make financial players contribute to the costs of the crisis. 
 Of those opposed, 22% selected a decrease in competition as their reasoning and 
26% believed the FTT would only be effective if enacted at the global level. An 
additional 22% suggested that they were opposed because it would only make European 
financial players contribute to the costs of the crisis (Directorate General for 
Communications 2011, 13). These responses would indicate that EU citizens desired to 
have the costs of the financial crisis be shared with the financial industry, avoiding moral 
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hazard, but that they also are sensitive to the interdependent nature of multilevel financial 
regulatory regimes. The results do not demonstrate political securitization of finance. 
That is, the public is not concerned with the competitiveness of the EU financial industry. 
The full results of the poll are available in Appendix 3. 
 The financial transaction tax is a delayed response to the speculative investments 
that contributed to the financial crisis but the immediate responses to the crisis were not 
coordinated within the EU (Darling 2012). National ministries did what was necessary to 
shore up their domestic financial institutions and protect their domestic investors and 
depositors. One compelling account of the unfolding of the financial crisis comes from 
the memoirs of Alistair Darling who served as UK Chancellor of the Exchequer from 
2007-2010 (2012). When Ireland took the unprecedented step of guaranteeing all 
liabilities in Irish banks on September 30, 2008, Darling called his counterpart, Irish 
Finance Minister Lenihan to complain. Noting that Ireland’s guarantee put them in an 
“impossible position” since savers could shift their money from UK to Irish banks, 
Darling bemoaned the lack of coordination (Darling 2012, 148). When there were reports 
that Germany had followed suit he found it particularly “surprising because the Germans 
set much store on announcements being made by Europe as a whole rather than by 
individual states” (Darling 2012, 148). Though Germany’s blanket guarantee turned out 
to be merely a rumor, Darling lamented that his poor working relationship with the 
German Minister of Finance impeded his ability to coordinate at the European level. 
The Chancellor also objected to a potential sale of Lehman Brothers to Barclays 
because it could lead to UK taxpayers bailing out a US bank. Darling had been working 
on a plan to recapitalize UK banks since September 26, 2008 but on Tuesday, October 7, 
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2008 the collapse of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) precipitated a face-to-face with 
the major bank CEOs. On October 7, the Chancellor was attending an ECOFIN meeting 
in Luxembourg. He excused himself several times to receive updates on the stock price of 
RBS. Flagged down from the corridor, Darling searched for a place to take a phone call 
from the RBS chairman after trading of RBS shares had been suspended. His staff 
demanded Kim Darroche, UK Permanent Representative to the EU, leave a small 
anteroom so he could use it to make calls. It became obvious to him that the capital 
needed to be issued immediately. 
At 7:30pm that evening the CEOs of major UK banks met in Darling’s office, 
opposite Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, Adair Turner, Chairman of the 
Financial Services Authority, and Treasury staff. In contrast to the nearly jubilant 
behavior of most of their American counterparts when offered a similar deal, British 
bankers questioned the capital they are being offered and whether they in fact needed the 
amounts they were being forced to accept. “The bankers [were] exiled to a room next 
door (‘Can they hear what we’re saying?’ Darling asks) while the officials in the 
Chancellor’s office discuss what to do. As Darling told the bankers when he sent them 
next door: this is the deal, there is no other deal, they had better get used to it or ‘God 
help us all’ ” (Martin 2013, 24). However, the CEOs continued to argue until 2:30 in the 
morning when they finally agreed to the capital. The next day the government announced 
that 50 billion pounds would be injected into UK banks. 
Though the immediate response to the crisis occurred at the national level, many 
long term changes were made at the EU level. In 2011 the European Union changed the 
institutional structure and processes of its financial regulatory regime. As part of the new 
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European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), the EU created the European Banking 
Authority (EBA), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). These institutions replaced the 
committee system that existed before the financial crisis. Collectively, they are 
responsible for macro-prudential oversight of the financial system. The European 
Commission initiated the reform following the recommendations of a Committee of Wise 
Men and supported by the European Council and Parliament. The European Parliament 
had been pressing for some time for a “move towards more integrated European 
supervision in order to ensure a level playing field for all actors at the level of the 
European Union and to reflect the increasing integration of financial markets in the 
Union” (Regulation (EU No 1093/2010), 12). The centralization of supervisory agencies 
under the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in the post-crisis EU financial 
regulatory regime is documented in the Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: Post-Crisis EU Financial Regulatory Regime Map 
 
Source: Author generated. 
 
  EIOPA and the European Commission have also changed EU pension policy by 
seeking to establish a pan-EU private retirement account scheme (Ellison 2012, 319). The 
EU has used the open method of coordination policymaking style for pensions and other 
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elements of social inclusion and protection. In the open method of coordination the 
Council sets policy goals and guidelines but member states are allowed to voluntarily 
transpose these guidelines into their national legislation and tailor their implementation. 
Member states then meet to share best practices and learn from each other. In 2003 the 
European Commission adopted what is commonly referred to as the European Pensions 
directive (officially the Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision directive, 
Directive 2003/41/EC) in an effort to allow firms to provide pan-European service.32 In 
2014, the Commission revised the directive to allow cross-border activity as well as 
require additional supervision and professional management (European Commission 
2014). 
The European Commission action in pensions following the financial crisis is also 
an attempt to further integrate financial services: “The European Commission following 
the 2007/2008 financial crisis considered that there needs to be further regulation of EU 
occupational pension plans; it has therefore reviewed the present IORP Directive, 
abolished CEIOPS [Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Supervisors] and introduced a new regulator with material powers, EIOPA [European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority]” (Ellison 2012, 319).  
The Commission has tasked EIOPA with creating a single market for private 
pensions. EIOPA is calling this product a “pan-European Personal Pension Product 
(PEPP)” (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 2015). Commission 
support for a European-level private pension system is an example of ideological capture 
                                                
32 “[P]ension funds can manage occupational pension schemes for companies established in another EU 
country, pan-European companies can have a single pension fund for all their subsidiaries throughout 
Europe” (European Directive 2003). 
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at the European level. The financialization of the social sphere section will address the 
significance of this development in the context of member state retirement account 
schemes. 
Though the EU financial regulatory regime is still fragmented by member state 
variance in some policy areas, this is similar to the federalist approach to regulation in the 
US. After the financial crisis, the EU introduced new financial regulatory institutions, 
proposed a pan-EU private retirement account scheme, and also proposed an FTT 
supported broadly by EU citizens if not national politicians. The significant breaks with 
the antecedent conditions were in policies and institutional processes and structures, with 
a general trend towards centralization of oversight at the EU level. 
Financialization 
 The previous chapter documented that a high degree of financialization in the US 
economy and in the US social sphere led to political securitization of financial 
institutions and regulatory capture of financial regulators by the financial industry. In this 
chapter the level of financialization in the EU and its impact on the EU financial 
regulatory regime are addressed. By establishing the degree of financialization in the EU 
and the relationship of the regulated to the regulatory regime one uncovers the motivation 
and influence of EU participation in the transatlantic financial regulatory regime. This 
section of the chapter will focus on the structure of the financial industry in the EU, its 
contribution as a percentage of GDP, and the role of financialization in the economic and 
social sphere.  
The level of economic financialization varies across the member states but is most 
pronounced in the UK (Baker 2010, 648). The Anglo-American market model dominates 
in the UK and clashes at the EU level with the German or Continental model that is 
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favored in Germany and France, which is more closely tied to the real economy. 
Financialization of the social sphere in the EU varies by member state, both because of 
the presence of both the Anglo-American and Continental models and because of 
different social welfare models. 
Much like the US, some EU member states have significant contributions by the 
financial sector to their gross domestic products. Some member states even have financial 
sector contributions that are larger as a percentage of GDP than the contributions made 
by the financial sector to UK GDP. According to Drezner (2007), this suggests that 
financial industry actors’ regulatory preferences should be a priority for these states at the 
EU level but that the small size of their economies makes those preferences less relevant 
than those of the UK. The UK has often been a standard-setter in financial regulation at 
the EU and international level because of its network centrality. This centrality, in turn, 
has contributed to the creation of the transatlantic financial regulatory regime, which will 
be discussed in the network salience section. 
Financialization of the Economic Sphere 
 The financial sector contributes most significantly to the economy of Luxembourg 
compared to other EU member states, as indicated in Figures 10 and 11. Figure 10 
presents the contributions of financial and insurance activities as a percentage of EU 
member state GDP in 2013 and Figure 11 presents the same figures for 1995, 2009 and 
2013. Luxembourg is a microstate that relies on finance and has status as an offshore 
financial center. The EU is host to other offshore and onshore financial centers, including 
Dublin and The City of London (Levin 2002). Though Ireland and Luxembourg both 
have large contributions to their GDP from the financial industry, they do not necessarily 
have the same political power in influencing regulatory outcomes, which will be 
 93 
discussed in the network salience section. This section will instead focus on the role of 
financialization narratives in three of the most powerful EU states: Germany, France, and 
the United Kingdom. This focus is because of the pivotal roles they play in the EU 
regulatory regime. 
Figure 10: Financial and Insurance Activities as a Percentage of EU Member State 
GDP, 2013 
 Source: OECD Dataset, 1. Gross domestic product. Data for Ireland is from 2012, as 

























Figure 11: Financial and Insurance Activities as Percentage of EU Member State 
GDPs, 1995, 2009, 2013 
Country 1995 2009 2013 
Austria 5% 4% 5% 
Belgium 6% 5% 6% 
Czech Republic 3% 4% 4% 
Denmark 4% 6% 6% 
Estonia 2% 4% 3% 
Finland 4% 3% 2% 
France 4% 4% 4% 
Germany 4% 4% 4% 
Greece NA 4% 4% 
Hungary 4% 4% 4% 
Ireland* 8% 10% 9% 
Italy 4% 5% 5% 
Luxembourg 20% 23% 23% 
Netherlands 6% 7% 8% 
Poland 2% 3% 4% 
Portugal 5% 6% 5% 
Slovak Republic 6% 3% 4% 
Slovenia 5% 4% 4% 
Spain 5% 5% 4% 
Sweden 4% 4% 4% 
United Kingdom 7% 10% 7% 
Average 5% 6% 6% 
 
Source: OECD Dataset, 1. Gross domestic product. *Figure for Ireland is from 2012 as 
data for 2013 are not available.  
 
Some EU member states have tailored their taxation policies and incentives in 
order to attract financial sector firms and activities, adhering to policies that encourage 
finance-led growth. Though London had become a premier Eurodollar financial center in 
the 1960s and 1970s, Ireland and Luxembourg moved towards the financial sector in the 
late 1980s at the height of neoliberalism. Changing taxation policies and liberalizing 
finance in the 1980s and 1990s was viewed not only as an overall growth strategy, but in 
the case of Ireland was also pursued specifically as a way to create jobs (Kelly and 
Everett 2004; Levin 2002, 50). Ireland established the International Financial Services 
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Center (IFSC) in 1987 amid a rapid growth of global financial activities in an attempt to 
attract some of the industry actors to its jurisdiction.  
 The United Kingdom embraced neoliberalism as Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher led the charge towards deregulation and privatization (Ayres and Braithwaite 
1992; McDonough and Kotz 2010, 94-95). This included a deregulation of the banking 
sector (Jessop and Stones 1992). The UK government has since relied on finance to fuel 
growth and has resisted attempts to tax the financial sector on the grounds that it would 
lead to a lack of competition and loss of GDP. Policymakers in the United Kingdom have 
also politically securitized financialization, warning that a financial transaction tax, 
proposed by the European Commission, would threaten pension funds, investment, job 
creation and growth in the UK (Crump 2013). Former Prime Minister David Cameron 
politically securitized finance repeatedly in his fight against the transaction tax, noting, 
“[t]here were good innovative ideas that can help growth in Europe, but frankly there 
were some bad ideas too. A financial transaction tax is a bad idea. It will put up the cost 
of people's insurance, put up the cost of people's pensions, it would cost many, many 
jobs, and it would make Europe less competitive and I'll fight it all the way” (AFP 
2012).33 Cameron’s remarks connect the economic sphere to the social sphere. He is 
asserting that by adopting the FTT the UK would lose its perceived competitive 
advantage in the financial services industry and this would lead to losses for average 
citizens.  
Leaders in other EU member states, however, have challenged the desirability and 
sustainability of the financialization of the economy. The financial crisis was a turning 
                                                
33 This position is shared by the Labour Party, whose Shadow Business Secretary Chuka Umunna has said 
that Labour will not support a financial transaction tax unless it applies to Wall Street as well (Coates 
2013). 
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point that crystallized the opposition to financialization in countries adhering to the 
German model.  The German model maintains close ties between the banking and 
industrial sectors of the economy and limits securitization. Opposition to financialization 
manifested in Germany and France, which follow the German model. The German and 
French banking systems became susceptible to not only the financial crisis but also the 
subsequent sovereign debt crisis because of increased trading and exposure to risk 
through trading activities and internationalization (Hardie and Howarth 2009). However, 
the German and French economies are still dominated by banks rather than non-bank 
financial institutions, the latter of which took on more risk through securities and fared 
less well during the financial crisis. Therefore, German and French resistance to 
securitization and the “limited extent of financialization of the German economy” 
complies with the German model (Engelen et al. 2008, 622). 
The resilience of Germany during the crisis is attributed to the cautious German 
approach to growing the economy (Artus 2010; Caplen 2014; Rickards 2014). The 
German economy began its process of financialization in the 1990s, later than the US and 
many EU member states, and the share of rentier income composing GDP steadily 
increased (Dunhaupt 2012). Despite this, the financial sector is not a large contributor to 
GDP. The European confidence in this model and its seeming vindication during the 
financial crisis have led German politicians to assert a firmer and “unilateral” voice in the 
post-crisis international regulatory regime (Schneider 2010).34 
In 2008 amid the onslaught of the financial crisis German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel assigned blame for the financial crisis squarely to the US and UK and 
                                                
34 In the network section the role that Germany plays in the EU financial regulatory regime will be 
addressed. 
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distinguished their approach to financial regulation from that of Germany. “Merkel 
criticised the fact that despite impending dangers, the financial markets had been allowed 
to continue operating in a ‘free-range’ and ‘matter-of-fact way’, and were ‘supported by 
the governments in Britain and the US’[…] ‘We did what we were supposed to do’ ” 
(Quoted in Connolly 2008). In the same article Joachim Poss, a member of her coalition 
party, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), was quoted as saying, “ ‘[t]he 
Americans cannot hold Germany responsible for its [sic] own failure and arrogance.’ ” 
The SPD spent political capital on the creation of the third German grand coalition in 
2013 to prioritize the financial transaction tax (FTT) at the EU level (Jennen and Parkin 
2013).35  
Strong rejection of financialization and the lack of financial regulation also came 
from French President Nicholas Sarkozy. In an address in September 2008 he explained 
the financial crisis to the French public: 
“Basically, a certain idea of globalization is biting the dust with the end of 
a financial capitalism which had imposed its rationale on the whole 
economy and contributed to corrupting it. The idea of the all-powerful 
market which wasn’t to be impeded by any rules or political intervention 
was a mad one. The idea that the markets are always right was mad. For 
several decades we created conditions in which industry operated with the 
aim of achieving short-term profitability. The growing risks people were 
forced to take to obtain increasingly exorbitant profits were concealed. 
Remuneration systems were put in place which drove dealers to take more 
and more absolutely reckless risks. People pretended to believe that by 
pooling the risks they made them disappear. Banks were allowed to 
speculate on the markets instead of doing their job which is mobilize 
savings for economic development and analysing the credit risk. The 
speculator rather than the entrepreneur was financed. The rating agencies 
and speculative funds were left totally unsupervised. Firms, banks, 
insurance companies were forced to write down the value of their assets in 
                                                
35 The term grand coalition (or GroKo in German parlance) in Germany refers to a coalition government 
between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) with the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Social 
Democrats (SPD). The CDU/CSU and SPD are the two largest parties in Germany. The two contemporary 
coalitions lasted from 2005-2009 and 2013 to the present (A.K. 2013). 
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the accounts at market prices which go up and go down at the whim of 
speculators. Banks were subjected to accounting rules which provide no 
guarantee on the proper management of the risks but which, in the event of 
a crisis, contribute to exacerbating the situation instead of cushioning the 
shock. It was a madness for which we’re paying the price today! […]We 
must find a new balance between the State and the market when public 
authorities the world over are being compelled to intervene to save the 
banking system from collapse. A new relationship must be established 
between the economy and politics through the development of new 
regulations. Self-regulation as a way of resolving all problems is finished. 
Laissez-faire is finished. The all-powerful market which is always right is 
finished” (Sarkozy 2008). 
 
 Sarkozy cautioned against blaming capitalism itself but rather considered 
speculation and financialization as a perversion of capitalism. This rhetoric from the head 
of the Union for a Popular Movement, a center-right party, was intended to fend off a 
turn in public opinion against capitalism and towards socialism. Though he calls for a 
new organization of the relationship of politics and the economy through new regulation, 
he presumes the same securitization of the financial system and its connection to ‘main 
street’ as his counterparts in financialized states:  “Savers who have trusted our banks, 
companies, our country’s financial institutions won’t see their trust betrayed. They won’t 
pay for the possible errors of the executives and possible imprudence of the shareholders. 
The State is here and the State will do its duty. I make a solemn promise this evening: 
whatever happens, the State will guarantee the security and continuity of the French 
banking and financial system” (Sarkozy 2008). The leader of a country following the 
German model proposed a solution to the consequences of the financial crisis was to 
double-down by shoring up domestic financial institutions. After the crisis, EU member 
states pursuing finance-led growth and EU member states not pursuing finance-led 
growth had similar reactions to the financial crisis. This led to a centralization of 
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authority under the new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the pursuit of 
financialization at the EU level. 
Financialization of the Social Sphere 
 The previous section documented the political commitment in the EU to protect 
financial-led growth after the financial crisis. This section will show that though there has 
been uneven financialization in homeownership and retirement accounts in the EU, there 
is a general trend towards centralization and financialization in the social sphere.  
The European Union is composed of 28 states and cannot credibly be treated in 
this or any analysis as having a unified, singular social sphere. However, this analysis 
does use the same indicators as the OECD to measure financialization. The indicators for 
the 28 member states and EU averages are compared, and then compared with those of 
the United States. This project also considers trends across member states. The 
Continental social model has also credibly been contrasted with the Anglo-American 
model by other scholars, both as varieties of capitalism and as parallel models of social 
welfare (Hall and Soskice 2001; Ebbinghaus and Manow 2004; Hyman 2011; Schröder 
2013). These models obviously impact the degree of financialization in homeownership 
and retirement systems. 
 Continental western European states have fuller social welfare systems than the 
US system. Social insurance comes in the form of unemployment support, welfare 
support, and universal health insurance. The Open Method of Coordination, an EU 
regulatory policymaking mode in which broad outlines are set at the EU level and 
specific policy choices are made at the national level, is now being applied to social 
welfare policy (Scharpf 2002). Boeri and Sapir have developed a typology of European 
social models which attempts to categorize the policies of each member state (Boeri 
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2002; Sapir 2006). The UK has a place notably apart from the continental states, either as 
the epicenter of the Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American model (Coates 1999). The 
following sections will consider the same two indicators as the US chapter: 
homeownership and retirement. 
Homeownership 
 Member states in the European Union have not prioritized home ownership 
incentives and mortgages tend to have higher initial capital requirements and longer 
terms for repayment than US mortgages (European Central Bank 2009). In the past 
twenty years however, the trend has been for increasing loan to value ratios and 
increased rates of home ownership in some EU member states.  
 The chart below presents the percentage of homeownership for the current 28 EU 
member states in 2013. 
Figure 12: EU Homeownership, 2013 
 

























































































































































EU Homeownership Percentages, 2013 
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 Homeownership rates vary greatly across EU member states, peaking in Romania 
(95.6%) and Lithuania (92.2%) and at the nadir in Germany (52.6%). The EU average is 
70%. The high percentage of homeownership in Romania stems from two waves of 
privatization in which renters of state owned apartments were offered extremely low 
prices to buy their apartments (Constantinescu 2011). Privatization is one government 
policy which has led to differences in rates of EU homeownership across the EU. The UK 
has only recently experienced an uptick in homeownership rates, prompted by selling 
property to tenants in the 1980s. “It is clear that in the new member countries of the EU, 
privatisation of the housing stock has also been a very important and in some of these 
countries home ownership levels are very high. Indeed the highest rate of owner 
occupation appears to be in Hungary, where 90% of the stock is owner occupied. But 
depending in how the privatisations were dealt with rates can be much lower. In the 
Czech Republic and Poland the rates are below the weighted average for the EU15 of 
64% at 47% and 55% respectively” (Earley 2004, 28). 
The trend towards increased homeownership has also been constant across nearly 
all EU member states. The chart below from Demographic Change and Housing Wealth: 
Home-owners, Pensions and Asset illustrates the changes since the postwar period. Only 
Greece and Slovakia have experienced decreased home ownership rates as a percentage 
of total housing stock in the period between 2002 and 2006-2009. 
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Figure 13: Post-War Growth of Homeownership Percentage Share of Total Stock by 
Year
 
Source: Doling et al. 2012, 27. 
 However, these figures obscure some of the detail about the relationship between 
homeownership and financialization; homeownership does not necessarily correlate with 
the use of financial products or services. Not all member states have high percentages of 
participation in the mortgage markets. Participation in the mortgage markets is highest in 
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the Sweden (61.4%), the Netherlands (60.3%) and Denmark (49.2%), showing some 
convergence across the two dimensions of the social sphere as they are also among the 
top six states with highest participation in private pension schemes. (Eurostat 2013) The 
average of EU member state homeownership rates with a mortgage is only 27.2%. 
Figure 14: EU Homeownership Percentages With and Without Mortgages, 2013 
 
Source: Eurostat 2013. *Ireland figures are for 2012 as 2013 data are not available. 
 
Loan to value (LTV) ratios for home ownership in EU member states have been 
increasing but most are lower than the LTV ratio in the US. The first figure below, Figure 
15, demonstrates the breadth of typical LTV ratios in the Euro area and the second, 
Figure 16, demonstrates the maximum LTV ratios allowed in the advanced member state 






























































































































































Figure 15: Typical Loan to Value Ratio for First-Time Euro Area House Buyer, 
2007
 
Source: European Central Bank 2009, 27. *Euro area includes only those states for which 
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2007 
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Figure 16: US, EU Maximum Loan to Value Ratio, 2008 
US, EU Maximum Loan to 














Source: IMF 2011: 117 
 
 Loan to value ratios are highest in those EU economies dominated by the Anglo-
American model of capitalism. The Netherlands has a typical lending rate of 101% 
despite a maximum possible ratio of 125% before the financial crisis; in 2011 the 
Netherlands lowered the LTV to 110%. In 2010, Sweden also lowered its maximum LTV 
from 100% to 80%. The UK and Ireland also allow over 100% lending, in line with the 
US.  The US, UK, and Ireland have not altered their maximum LTV ratio after the 
financial crisis. 
In European Union member states the deregulation of the mortgage markets and 
innovations in loan products have served some of the same functions as FHA policies in 
the US: expanding home ownership to low-income households.  
“While each country moved to a more liberalized system, there is a large variation 
in what their systems offer. Overall, however, the innovations have increased the 
availability of mortgage loans, including changes in the type of the interest rate 
(such as variable rate mortgage and interest-only mortgages) and modifications of 
repayment structure and terms of the loan (such as introducing 30 years loans). A 
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consequence of these changes has been to make loans affordable for a wider range 
of households including those with low incomes who could not afford owner 
occupied housing earlier” (Doling et al. 2012, 34). 
 
 Government support for home ownership is also less prevalent in EU member 
states than in the US. In an IMF index formulated to measure government participation in 
the housing finance markets, the support offered in tax breaks to middle and low income 
individuals as well as subsidies or grants to new homeowners is considered.  The index, 
available in Appendix 4, assigns points in several categories of government support, such 
as subsidies to first-time homebuyers. The sixteen EU member states included are 
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and the UK. 
The findings indicate that out of these EU member states and the US, the US had the 
strongest overall government participation in the housing market and was an outlier in a 
number of indices, including tax breaks, subsidies, and loan guarantees. Though it is 
paradoxical that European welfare-oriented states have less government support for home 
ownership than the US government, one potential explanation is that the US government 
has encouraged broad use of financial products to increase homeownership rates as a way 
to grow the economy.  Carliner asserts that in the US “[m]any of the policies supporting 
homeownership were created as economic stimulus measures in response to the 
depression and subsequent recessions” but remained in place after the cyclical economic 
problems ended and “evolved into supports for home ownership” (Carliner 1998, 318). 
This suggests the government supported lending to stimulate the economy in order to fuel 
finance-led growth, a move that is consistent with financialization ideology. Encouraging 
home ownership in the US, coupled with low LTV ratios, provides the finance industry 
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with fodder for new financial products. Explicit US government support for home 
ownership in the 1990s developed alongside securitization. In the EU, domestic and 
global securitization markets were smaller than those in the US and there was lower 
issuance of structured products (European Central Bank and the Bank of England 2014, 
10). Simply put, securitization was not as common a practice in the EU as it was in the 
US. In the US, securitization relied on the continued issuance of mortgages—even bad or 
‘subprime’ mortgages. In the EU there was no continued demand for mortgages to 
securitize. 
Retirement Accounts 
  Differences in European social models can account for some of the differences 
across EU member state retirement policies. Public pension systems are a vital part of the 
social welfare system in countries following the Continental model and traditionally 
replace a high percentage of retiree’s pre-retirement earnings (Legros 2013, 1). This is in 
stark contrast to countries following the Anglo-American model, which charge lower fees 
for public pensions but also replace less pre-retirement income (Sun and Hu 2014, 59). 
Notably some states supplement their public pension schemes with mandatory private 
retirement accounts. This is a form of state mandated financialization, not unlike the 
myRA accounts being promoted by the US government. The states with mandatory 
private retirement accounts are Denmark, Estonia, Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden.36 
These mandatory private retirement accounts are one indicator of a strong government 
commitment to financialization of the social sphere. 
                                                
36 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) distinguishes between public, 
mandatory private and voluntary pension schemes. 
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 Figure 17 shows the percentages of wage replacement rates from public and 
private pensions in several EU member states as well as the US. “The gross replacement 
rate is defined as gross pension entitlement divided by gross pre-retirement earnings. It 
measures how effectively a pension system provides a retirement income to replace 
earnings, the main source of income before retirement. This indicator is measured in 
percentage of pre-retirement earnings by gender” (OECD 2016, (Gross pension 
replacement rates (indicator)). 
  The EU average, based on the 27 member states as of 2013 omitting current 
member state Croatia, does not include a measure of private accounts. Retirees rely more 
on private accounts than public pensions for retirement income in the Netherlands, 
Denmark, and the UK and rely on them for significant percentages of their income in 
Ireland, the Czech Republic, the US, Sweden, Slovak Republic, Estonia, and Poland. 
Those states without government mandated private accounts but large reliance on private 
accounts are the UK and Czech Republic.   
 Public pensions in most EU member states account for a much larger percentage 
of retiree income than they do in the US and it may be for this reason that fewer people 
participate in private pension plans in the EU. Despite fundamental differences in the role 
of public pensions in the Anglo-American and Continental models, in nine EU member 
states private pensions account for at least 24% of retiree income replacement. 
Economists promoted private retirement accounts as a safer alternative to public pensions 
since public pensions could be cut during public debt crises (Bovenberg and van Ewijk 
2011). Some states mandated contributions to private pensions as a way to “boost” capital 
markets (Matlack 2015). This reliance on private pensions, and especially mandatory 
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private pensions, demonstrates that there is moderate financialization in the area of 
retirement accounts in some EU member states.  
Figure 17: Gross Replacement Rate from Public and Private Pensions, 201337
 
Source: OECD 2013, Pensions at a Glance. 
                                                
37 Data retrieved from Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Statistics, Pensions at a 
Glance 2013. Notably, these figures may fluctuate with the markets; in years with higher returns from 
private financial accounts payouts to retirees may increase and therefore increase the percentage of 
replacement from private accounts. 
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However, there is not a clear trend toward financialization of retirement schemes 
in the EU. A review of retirement account schemes reveals disjuncture across member 
states. Some member states have strong support for financialization, while other member 
states have made it more difficult for individuals to maintain private pension accounts. 
 After the financial crisis, support for financialized pension schemes changed in 
many member states and at the EU level. This response varied not only across member 
states, but between member states and the EU.  
Member States Retirement Account Response 
Since the financial crisis several European states have faced public debt crises and 
have targeted retirement counts as a way to cut their budgets. Hungary enacted a series of 
reforms in 2010 to “force” citizens who had assets in mandatory private retirement 
accounts to convert back to using the public pension system (Feher 2010). The 2010 
reform allowed Hungarians to elect to stay in the private retirement accounts but in doing 
so they would forfeit their public pensions to which they had also contributed. Only 
around 100,000 people elected to stay in the private schemes and those who did not had 
their funds “transferred” to the public fund (Krzyzak 2014). The Hungarian government 
used the transferred money from the private retirement account funds to pay budget 
shortfalls. In 2014 a new reform was introduced that would close the private funds and 
transfer the assets to the public pension funds unless 70% of Hungarians participated in 
and paid fees to private pension funds; this was an impossible hurdle as only 10% of 
Hungarians continued to pay private pension funds following the 2010 reform (Dunai 
2014). In 2014 Poland moved half of the assets in its private pension scheme to the public 
pension program and told contributors to the private accounts that their benefits would be 
paid by the public pension program (Matlack 2015; Sebastian 2015). In 2012 and 2015 
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Slovakia introduced reforms to allow people to opt out of previously mandatory private 
retirement accounts, citing the accounts’ poor performance (Matlack 2015; Krzyzak 
2015).  
 The Hungarian, Polish and Slovakian governments have made efforts to reduce 
their citizens’ reliance on private retirement accounts managed by financial firms. Instead 
they have nationalized private retirement account funds and created incentives for 
citizens to rely increasingly on public retirement schemes.  
European Union Retirement Account Response 
 While Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have implemented reforms to move away 
from the financialization of retirement accounts, the European Union is moving towards 
the financialization of private retirement accounts. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, 
the European Commission has simultaneously instructed EIOPA to manifest a pan-
European private retirement account system. The Commission laid out this task in a 2012 
White Paper. In the White Paper the Commission explains that a greater reliance on 
private retirement accounts is desirable partially because, “[…] there is a need to improve 
the quality of financial products for individual retirement savings not linked to 
employment, such as third pillar schemes and other financial products used to supplement 
the incomes of the elderly. Improving consumer information and protection is necessary 
to enhance workers' and investors' confidence in financial products for retirement 
savings” (European Commission 2012, 13). This demonstrates strong EU support for 
private retirement accounts exists despite some member states removing them from their 
national social welfare systems. The Commission proposes improving consumer 
confidence in and reliance on financial products as the solution to insecurity in public 
retirement schemes, demonstrating that it is doubling down on financialization of the 
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social sphere after the financial crisis. In contrast to the response by Hungary, Poland, 
and Slovakia, this indicates the EU has been captured by financialization ideology. 
EU member state reliance on private retirement accounts varies significantly. The 
evidence indicates that there is a divide between member state governments who support 
financialization in retirement accounts and those who do not support financialization in 
retirement accounts. This divide and the way it is settled at the EU level are central to 
explaining why a transatlantic financial regulatory regime has emerged. The pursuit of 
Anglo-American financialization at the EU level is not the result of a bottom-up, 
consensus of member states. It is the result of an intergovernmental negotiation in which 
some member states are more powerful than others. The European Commission 
instructed EIOPA to establish a pan-European private retirement account. EU 
participation in a transatlantic financial regulatory regime is predicated on shared 
transatlantic interests and desired outcomes. However, especially in the social sphere and 
retirement accounts, the EU is not monolithic. A transatlantic financial regulatory regime 
with harmonized or common standards can only emerge if Anglo-American financialized 
capitalism is pursued as a growth strategy at the EU level.    
The next section will explain how Anglo-American financialized capitalism is 
pursued at the EU level despite the varying levels of member state support for 
financialization. 
Network Salience 
This section will address how the financial regulatory regime is created at the EU 
level, and the EU financial regulatory regime’s relationship to the international regulatory 
regime. This section uses network analysis to identify the salience of the individual 
member states to the EU regulatory regime and the salience of the EU regulatory regime 
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to the international regulatory regime. Salience in this context is a product of financial 
activity, financial flows and interactions between states. This analysis indicates that 
financial regulation in the EU generally favors the Anglo-Saxon model of financialized 
capitalism and this is because of the United Kingdom’s position as the preeminent 
financial global center and a culture of consensus in decision-making. This will support 
this project’s argument that the transatlantic regulatory regime is being created to allow 
the EU and US to pursue finance-led growth strategies and to stave off competing 
regulatory regimes.  
There are two regimes to consider in order to determine which member states are 
most salient to the creation of financial regulation, the domestic EU regulatory regime 
and the international regulatory regime. At the first level in the EU regime, member states 
compete to attract financial activities and influence regulation produced by the European 
Council and European Commission. EU member states in engaging in these regulatory 
conflicts are usually divided into those practicing the Anglo-Saxon model and the 
German model.  At the second level, the European Union, alongside its member states, 
competes to set financial standards and attract financial activity. As a result of its network 
salience in the international financial regulatory regime, the United Kingdom plays a 
crucial decision-maker role in the EU financial regulatory regime.  
The United Kingdom is a hub of financial service firms and financial flows and 
this gives its government network salience (Oatley 2013, 141-142). London is currently 
the top financial center in the world, followed by New York (Global Financial Centres 
Index 2015). London was also the only financial center in the EU to crack the top ten. In 
2014, Frankfurt fell from 9th to 11th place while Luxemburg rose from 11th to 12th place.  
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This position in the hierarchical network of global finance gives it power in the EU and 
international financial regulatory regimes.  
The neighborhood in which most financial institutions operate in London is even 
called ‘the City’, a nickname for the county named The City of London. The Lord Mayor 
of The City of London, “supports and promotes the City as the world leader in 
international finance and business services” (The Lord Mayor 2012). The CityUK is a 
powerful organization that lobbies for financial industry interests located within London 
and the United Kingdom. It publishes reports about the concentration of the financial 
services sector in The City, financial services’ contribution to the UK and EU member 
state economies, and submits public comments to calls for suggestions on harmonization 
or regulation of financial services.  Through its government and interest group, the 
financial services industry in The City has influenced the content of the regulatory regime 
at the UK and EU level and sought to play a role in the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership to influence the transatlantic regulatory regime (Hilary 2014, 26).  
Because of London’s status as a global financial center, the government of the 
United Kingdom is consulted about standards in financial regulation in the international 
financial regulatory regime and other states defer to the United Kingdom within 
international organizations on financial regulatory issues (Baker 2010, 650-651). Their 
deference is because the government of the United Kindgom has more experience with 
the most recent innovations in global finance and should therefore make greater 
contributions to global standards as a result of that experience. The United Kingdom is a 
“pace setter” in financial regulation and its influence in previous EU negotiations on 
financial regulation “was underpinned by the size of its insurance market; the expertise 
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and effective coordination of national policymakers, and a state-of-the-art domestic 
regulatory model” (Quaglia 2011, 100). This is similar to the role that the United States 
government plays in the international regulatory regime (Baker 2010, 650-651).  
London’s prominence and The City’s high level of organization as a civil society 
actor gave the UK government considerable influence at the EU level in the content of 
financial regulation. The strength of the German model and the corresponding power 
Germany wields in economic and monetary policy should have theoretically challenged 
the influence of the UK in financial regulation. However, London’s status as a financial 
center and the importance of the UK in the international financial regulatory regime 
overwhelmed Germany’s influence.  
In order to assess the role played by the UK government within the EU regulatory 
regime and the potential contribution of the EU regulatory regime to the transatlantic 
regulatory regime, a discussion of EU policymaking is required. 
EU Policymaking 
While in the US until the financial crisis there was a seeming consensus in 
national political organs on the ideal of financialization-friendly regulation, in the 
European Union, member states and the Commission compete to influence the scope of 
EU policy and the content of financial regulation. The EU is not a state and a credible 
analysis of EU public policy cannot treat the EU as if it were a state. Understanding how 
EU financial regulatory decision-making takes place will support this project’s assertion 
that Anglo-American financialized capitalism is a dominant impetus behind the 
transatlantic regulatory regime.  
The European Council, the EU political organ composed of the heads of member 
state governments, is responsible for deciding political priorities of the EU as well as 
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extending new EU competences, while the European Commission, the technocratic 
executive departments, is responsible for implementing regulation through directives and 
legislative suggestions in ‘Community’ or supranational policy areas. The European 
Parliament, the legislative body of the European Union, does not possess the power of 
legislative initiative and can only amend and vote on legislative proposals made by the 
European Commission in Community policy areas. In intergovernmental policy areas, 
meaning areas in which exclusive competence has not been extended from member states 
to the EU, the Council is responsible for legislation. In the trade agreement process, the 
Parliament is kept fully informed during negotiations, has the right to consent to the 
agreement, and implements any legislation necessary to carry out the agreement. 
In the European Council decision making is formally by qualified majority vote 
(QMV) which is a weighted system based on population. However, in practice many 
decisions in the Council are taken by consensus. This makes policymaking in the EU 
reliant on the agreement of every member state, which can privilege the preferences of 
outliers.  
Consensus itself is an institution in the Union, a process with intrinsic value apart 
from the outcome. “The EU’s ‘culture of consensus’ is the result of the 40-year history of 
negotiations among the same partners and the acculturation of new members to those 
norms” (Heisenberg 2005, 68). With consensus as a common cultural norm, the tendency 
towards agreement is greater. At the Council meetings, member state representatives tend 
to discuss an issue until a consensus emerges even if there is an indication that a qualified 
majority vote would pass. Despite the increasing prevalence of qualified majority voting 
as the formal voting requirement on EU issues, consensus continues as the informal 
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practice. Furthermore, consensus has come to characterize the policy formulation process 
as well as the decision making process.  
The practice of consensus in intergovernmental decision making ostensibly began 
with the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise. French President Charles de Gaulle objected so 
strongly to proposals for the extension of QMV by Commission President Walter 
Hallstein that de Gaulle held up the reauthorization of the Common Agriculture Policy 
(CAP), had the French representative to the European Economic Community recalled, 
and boycotted meetings for nearly six months. The “empty chair crisis” was only 
resolved when the Council decided that a decision to be taken under QMV would be 
postponed if a member state felt its important issues were at risk (Ginsberg 2007, 75-77). 
“The Luxembourg Compromise […] represented the first major informal norm in EU 
decision-making procedures. […] Although the Single European Act in 1986 curtailed 
the already limited use of Luxembourg Compromise and extended QMV into many other 
areas of EU legislation, the informal norms spawned by the Luxembourg Compromise 
persist to this day. Most decisions continue to be made by consensus rather than by 
voting” (Heisenberg 2005, 68). 
Currently, consensus is still present by practice in the decision-making phase and 
culturally and procedurally in the policy formulation phase. 
Consensus in the Decision Making Phase  
 In supranational intergovernmental decision making, the Council practice of 
consensus is significant because it breaks from the formal requirement of qualified 
majority voting. Another feature of the EU consensus-based system that takes place in 
earlier stages of the decision making is accommodation politics. Based on the 
accommodation model of compensation to the ‘losers’ of a proposal, the reiterated games 
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of EU Council conferences have built enough trust and enough opportunities for the 
‘losers’ to be promised either compensation or concessions on another issue or later 
conference (Bogaards and Crepaz 2002). These ‘accommodations’ facilitate consensus on 
otherwise thorny issues, and are not that different from traditional bargaining within a 
normal democracy’s legislative branch. What is unique is that this takes place on the 
intergovernmental level between member state officials and not between members of the 
legislative branch.  
Consensus in Policy Formulation 
 Therefore the contrast between the rarely used formal decision making 
mechanisms and the practice of consensus indicate that the EU does indeed have a 
‘culture of consensus’ which dominates the entire policy making procedure. An aversion 
to voting, and the absence of dissent in decision making, are contrasted with competition 
in the agenda setting process.  
Since the European Parliament does not have the power of legislative initiative, 
the Commission legislates in supranational, Community issues. Legislative suggestions 
and directives are issued by the European Commission, which is organized by functional 
Directorate-Generals or DGs for short. Actors in the Commission are already meant to be 
devoid of national interests and acting in the name of the Union. They work towards 
common union goals and formulate policy as ‘technocrats’. However, some DGs are 
considered to be biased towards the Anglo-Saxon model, including the former DG 
Internal Market and Services (Quaglia 2007, 278). They also compose and host the expert 
groups which will be discussed in the next section who are consulted on proposed 
regulation. 
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 After a proposal is presented by the Commission and before it reaches the 
Council’s formal decision-making stage, it is wound through the intermediary policy 
process. In the EU, this institutional process is known as comitology.38 The working 
groups and committees hash out initial differences, and the member states’ Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER) settles all but the most important issues before 
the responsible Council formation meets.39 Emblematic of its importance in the formation 
process, COREPER sits in two formations: COREPER I assembles the member states’ 
deputy permanent representatives and settles technical issues while COREPER II consists 
of the permanent representatives who are tantamount to ambassadors and deal with the 
meatier issues—political, economic and institutional questions. These permanent 
representatives are all located in Brussels and maintain regular contact on pressing issues 
which would be otherwise difficult to achieve across 28 geographically-dispersed 
member states. However, this very commitment to the EU may render them agents of the 
Union and not of their member states, and therefore, they may be more committed to 
reaching consensus than defending particular interests of their home countries 
(Moravcsik 1991). Hooghe (2005) has found evidence that time in the European 
Commission socializes European officials to be ‘Europeanized’ and support 
supranationalism. The Commission has proposed more restrictive financial regulation 
                                                
38 “The term ‘comitology’ is shorthand for the way the Commission exercises the implementing powers 
conferred on it by the EU legislator, with the assistance of committees of representatives from the EU 
Member States. [..] ‘Comitology committees’ assist the Commission in executing its implementing powers 
by giving an opinion on draft implementing measures before they are adopted. They include representatives 
from all EU Member States and are chaired by a Commission official” (European Commission 
“Comitology Register FAQ”); “Well over 200 committees have either advisory, management or regulatory 
functions with regard to the powers delegated to the Commission in the Treaty to implement legislation 
enacted by the Council or the Council and the EP [European Parliament]” (Ginsberg 2007, 173). 
 
39 The Council meets in different formations. For example, if the finance ministers of the member states are 
required to address a particular issue the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) will meet; 
ECOFIN is a formation of the Council composed of member state economic finance ministers. 
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than the Council has been willing to adopt. Examples are of this regulation are presented 
later in this chapter. 
National Positions and Multi-level Games 
As individual member states know that they will face the test of achieving 
consensus and not majority at the intergovernmental end stage, their individual positions 
are often ‘self-censored.’  One can contrast this multi-level game process with that of 
inter-state negotiations in trade rounds. In traditional international organization 
negotiations, each state formulates its own ‘win-set’ parameters, forms coalitions with 
states with similar win-sets, and identifies strategies to advance its agenda. These 
different win-sets are pursued in the framework of negotiations. In preparation for EU 
Council conferences, member states also formulate their agendas, however, the culture of 
consensus leads them to only consider win-sets which have a feasible chance of 
achieving consensus. This self-limiting behavior leads to a smaller potential overlap 
among the 28 member state win-sets. The constant temperature-taking amongst EU 
member states in their Permanent Representation delegations allows each member state 
very accurate knowledge of what the potential group compromise, or consensus, will be.  
This is in contrast to states in international negotiations which usually push their own 
favored agendas even if they are ultimately likely to accept an outcome further in the 
‘center’.40 
 This means that initiatives that would regulate financial services deemed too 
strongly in favor of either the German or Anglo-Saxon model can be effectively blocked 
                                                
40 Although the institutional arrangements between member states makes the comparison with states in 
international negotiations problematic, the distinction in the breadth of agendas or solutions initially 
considered is necessary to understand the potential loss that could result from a narrower initial overlapping 
win-set. 
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by any single state. As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, there was very little 
effort before the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) in 1999 to harmonize financial 
services in the EU.  Member states might have anticipated the conflict in desired 
regulatory outcome or preferred their own system and therefore avoided harmonization at 
the EU level. 
 The financial crisis, and subsequent sovereign debt and Euro crises, have altered 
the member states’ calculations and Commission’s suggestions. There is now a 
willingness to engage in conflict in the Council over the content and direction of the EU 
regulatory regime and challenge the dominance of Anglo-American financialization. One 
example on the point is the financial transaction tax discussed in the first section of this 
chapter. The FTT had broad popular support, even in member states with a high degree of 
financialization, and was proposed by the European Commission. Despite this, ministers 
in ECOFIN could not reach a unanimous agreement. As a result, the enhanced 
cooperation procedure was used to move forward with the participation of some member 
states. Without the participation of the UK in the FTT, member states have wavered in 
their commitment to the establishment of the FTT.  
 However, challenges to the dominance of Anglo-American financialization at the 
EU level have been largely unsuccessful. The next section will present evidence that EU 
institutions have been captured by industry interests and actors, and that the crisis has 
allowed for greater penetration of industry actors. 
Relationship of Regulators to Industry 
This project argues that US and EU policymakers are captured by the ideology of 
financialization and that this regulatory capture is related to increased access for financial 
industry actors. This section will demonstrate this capture at the EU level. Before and 
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after the financial crisis scholars and consumer groups have accused the EU institutions 
of promoting financialization and being captured by financial industry actors (Alter-EU 
2009; Petry 2014). The European Union suggests it seeks a broad participation of 
stakeholders and yet it has been assailed by groups like Corporate Europe Observatory 
(CEO) for having a revolving door of regulators similar to the US (Corporate Europe 
Observatory 2014a). There is evidence to substantiate these claims. Officials who take 
jobs in the private sector within two years of leaving the service of the Commission must 
inform the Commission and gain approval. This procedure is supposed to prevent the 
revolving door phenomenon but in 2014 the EU Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, 
investigated 54 files. In 2014 O’Reilly “found deficiencies in how decisions on 
‘revolving doors’ cases are reasoned and documented” that posed a potential ethical issue 
(European Ombudsman 2014). O’Reilly also called for greater transparency by 
publishing the names of officials who take positions in industry after stints in the 
Commission. 
In July 2016, Goldman Sachs, a financial firm, announced it had hired former EU 
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso. His position in London will involve 
advising the firm on the UK’s exit from the EU following a UK referendum to leave the 
EU (Noonan 2016). This is a prominent example of the revolving door at work in the EU. 
As Corporate Europe Observatory notes, “[o]ne in three (9 out of 26) outgoing 
commissioners who left office in 2014 have gone through the 'revolving door' into roles 
in corporations or other organisations with links to big business” (Corporate Europe 
Observatory 2015). One former Commissioner, Siim Kallas, continues as a special 
advisor to current Commissioner Dombrovskis despite industry ties (Panichi 2015).  
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Following the financial crisis, institutional changes to deal with financial 
regulation have not been limited to new policies. The European Commission for 2014-
2019 split the portfolio of the previous DG Internal Market and Services into three 
sections; one of these sections creates a new portfolio of Financial Stability, Financial 
Services and Capital Markets Union. This change indicates that the EU Council perceives 
the integration of financial services and the creation of a capital markets union to be 
priorities worthy of a new Commission post. The Commissioner for the post is Lord 
Jonathan Hill from the UK, a former lobbyist who founded Quiller Consultants which 
served several finance industry clients including TheCityUK and HSBC (Singleton 
2011). His appointment indicates two potential instances of regulatory capture. First, as 
Hill has represented the financial industry, his appointment represents the capture of EU 
financial regulation by the financial industry. Second, as Hill has worked extensively for 
TheCityUK his appointment suggests the capture of EU financial regulation by 
TheCityUK.  
In order to confirm his appointment, EU Commission President Juncker had to 
remove responsibility from his portfolio:  
“In recent private meetings in Brussels, the incoming European Commission 
president has made clear that Lord Hill will have remuneration policy carved out 
of his job as EU commissioner overseeing Europe’s financial sector, according to 
two people familiar with the matter. The decision from Mr Juncker comes as 
Europe’s banking watchdog prepares to clamp down on allowances designed to 
sidestep the EU bonus cap, in an intervention next month that threatens to throw 
pay policies in the City of London into turmoil. […] Mr Juncker’s decision is 
highly political and emerges as Socialist and Green MEPs issue threats to veto 
Lord Hill’s appointment over fears he will bend to City demands” (Barker 2014). 
 
Members of the European Parliament were not merely concerned with 
Commissioner Hill’s involvement in setting bonus caps. Indeed Members of the 
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European Parliament asked Lord Hill about how his home country’s policies and attitudes 
towards finance would impact his activities as Commissioner. On the question of his 
independence from the financial industry, he explained he intends to comply with the 
code of conduct for Commissioners and has no conflicts of interest. Hill affirmed his 
commitment to promote the European interest above his national interest and explained 
he would be would be willing to take action against the UK if necessary: “If a Member 
State does not comply with EU rules, or tries to circumvent them, I will ensure that full 
use will be made of the various enforcement tools available. […] I will promote action by 
the Commission, first through EU pilot procedures, and if necessary with formal 
infringement proceedings. As Guardian of the Treaties I will not hesitate to take recourse 
to these measures should the integrity of the legal framework be at stake” (Hill 2014, 5). 
Conclusions 
Despite the decentralized nature of many aspects of the EU financial regulatory 
regime, after the financial crisis there has been a trend towards centralization in 
supervision and regulation of financial activities. This chapter presented evidence that the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009 was a critical juncture in the EU financial regulatory regime 
that prompted changes in its institutional procedures and structures as well as policies.  
The financial crisis did prompt a sharp confrontation of different member state 
ideas about the role of financialization but the regime has continued to be dominated by 
Anglo-American capitalism and the ideology of financialization. This dominance is 
because of the network salience of London in the EU and international financial 
regulatory regimes and is evidenced by the weak participation of EU member states in the 
financial transaction tax, the Commission pushing EIOPA to establish pan-European 
private retirement accounts, and by regulatory capture in the EU Commission. The 
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alignment of the EU and US financial regulatory regimes and the changes in the 
international financial regulatory regime stemming from the financial crisis prompted 
institutional changes to the transatlantic financial regulatory regime. 
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Chapter 4: The International Financial Regulatory Regime 
and the Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime 
The Financial Crisis as a Critical Juncture in the International Regulatory 
Regime 
 In Chapters 2 and 3 I demonstrated that the financial crisis was a critical juncture 
for both the US and EU that led to changes in the institutional structures and processes 
and policies of their financial regulatory regimes, This restructuring, coupled with the 
ideology of financialization and a strategy of finance-led growth, are the internal drivers 
of change in the transatlantic financial regulatory regime. However, this project argues 
that the international regime changes also caused a change in the institutional processes 
of the transatlantic regime. This chapter will document that the financial crisis was also a 
critical juncture in the international regulatory regime by providing evidence of 
institutional structural and procedural changes in the International Monetary Fund and the 
Group of formations. The increased voice and vote participation of emerging market 
economies posed a threat to the dominance of the US and EU, which further motivated 
them to create a transatlantic financial regulatory regime. Creating this regime required 
the EU and US to overcome divergent regulatory approaches. 
 Financial and subsequent economic crises have been studied as moments 
precipitating policy learning and dramatic policy change. Eichengreen (2002), 
Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) address the repeated 
financial crises as cyclical and representative of a failure by policymakers to learn lessons 
from previous crises and establish enduring policy changes. Gourevitch (1986) also 
studies the cyclical nature of international economic crises and uses an analytic 
framework that considers them as “points of choice” (10). An edited volume, Moments of 
Truth: The Politics of the Financial Crisis in Comparative Perspective, published in 2013 
 127 
contains scholarly contributions which analyze the financial crisis as a critical juncture in 
several institutional and national contexts (Panizza and Philip 2013).  
 The 2007-2009 financial crisis once again demonstrated the principle of 
contagion, the interconnectedness of states’ economies, and the need for global financial 
reform. A crisis that originated in a housing bubble in the US had a ripple effect through 
major financial institutions in other states and impacted global financial markets. 
Increased financial integration contributed to the “amplification and global spread of the 
financial crisis” (Claessens et al. 2010, 1; Ozkan Unsal 2012, 29). 
 The financial crisis was also unlike others in recent memory because it was 
“triggered by problems in the financial system of the mature economies” (Ozkan Unsal 
2012, 5). The crisis spread in the most financialized economies first: the US and UK 
(Ozkan and Unsal 2012, 4). Emerging market economies experienced a “relatively short-
lived” and less dramatic version of the crisis, particularly markets with less exposure to 
financialized assets like mortgage backed securities (Ozkan and Unsal 2012, 29).41 
 The financial crisis presented an opportunity to revise the international financial 
regulatory regime. Much of the international financial regulatory regime was established 
soon after the Second World War. Europe and the US cooperated to establish the Bretton 
Woods system after the Second World War. The Bretton Woods institutions were a part 
of the “postwar liberal democratic order” (Ikenberry 1996, 84). This postwar economic 
system was characterized by embedded liberalism. Embedded liberalism entails support 
for multilateral free trade as long as governments can provide social welfare protections 
and protections against unemployment.  As Ruggie noted, “the essence of the embedded 
                                                
41 European emerging markets were some of the hardest hit because their economic expansion had been 
largely externally funded (Xafa 2010, 479). 
 128 
liberalism compromise [was]: unlike the economic nationalism of the thirties, it would be 
multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, its 
multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic interventionism (Ruggie 1982, 393). 
State intervention was used to “secure domestic stability” (Ruggie 1982, 394). Embedded 
liberalism allowed Europe to develop the welfare state at the same time it benefitted from 
market-opening multilateralism.  Through economic contributions and structural 
governance power, the US and European countries dominated the Bretton Woods 
institutions. 
Before the financial crisis, the United States enjoyed a veto power in the principal 
international financial institution, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and several 
European countries had quota voting shares disproportionately large compared to their 
populations and contributions. The Group of 7, or G7, was an ad hoc group of countries 
that coordinated international financial reform.42 Except for Canada, Japan and the US, 
the members of the G7 are all European Union member states. 
After the financial crisis the IMF altered its voting shares and governance 
structure and the Group of 20 (G20) launched the Financial Stability Board.43 The G20 
was established after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1999 to shore up international 
financial stability but did not play a significant international role until summits were 
established after the financial crisis. 
 The financial crisis revealed the insufficiency of existing monitoring and 
surveillance efforts by the international financial institutions and specifically the IMF. 
                                                
42 The members of the G7 are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. Since 1981, the European Union has also been a nonenumerated member of the G7. (Laub 2015) 
43 The member states of the G20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. 
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First, the IMF’s monitoring efforts were primarily directed towards monitoring the 
developing world or previously unstable economies rather than the West and therefore 
the IMF did not provide an early warning to the crisis in 2007-2009. Second, the 
monitoring system was largely reliant on states’ establishing and accepting IMF 
legitimacy. In 2005 as a senior advisor for the IMF, Peter Isard recommended improving 
the quality and impact of IMF surveillance to shore up the international financial system. 
He recommended linking the ability of countries to borrow to their previous 
implementation of policy recommendations (Isard 2005). Miranda Xafa, a former 
member of the IMF’s Executive Board, summarizes the failures in the existing reporting 
mechanisms meant to ensure global financial stability: 
“The Fund’s Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR), published semiannually since 
2003, assesses key risks facing the global financial system highlighting policies that can 
help mitigate systemic risks and enhance financial stability. In the run-up to the crisis, the 
GFSR warned about rising credit and market risks associated with the growth in 
subprime mortgages embedded in complex, hard-to-price structured products (IMF 2006 
and 2007a). Similarly, the World Economic Outlook (WEO) flagged some early concerns 
about the risks of house price bubbles in the United States and the dangers from large 
current account deficits in emerging Europe (IMF 2007b). However, the focus of this 
advice was not sharp enough to prompt policy action, and policymakers in the still-
booming global economy were less receptive to the warnings. The fact that the crisis 
originated in the advanced countries, normally outside the purview of the Fund’s crisis 
prevention efforts, contributed to complacency. A more evenhanded surveillance would 
have enhanced the Fund’s effectiveness and legitimacy by bringing about a better balance 
between peer protection and peer pressure” (Xafa 2010, 467-7). 
 
Despite warnings about the housing market bubble and current account deficits, 
the US and EU continued their pursuit of growth driven by financialization. Warnings 
were not themselves enough to prompt policy change. During the financial crisis the IMF 
began to provide recommendations to policymakers and regulators.  
 The revision of the IMF’s role, as well as most of the revisions of the Financial 
Stability Board, originated with Group of Twenty (G20) action (Fratzcher and Reynaud 
 130 
2011). Ordinarily the G7 would make these decisions but the G20 was increasingly relied 
on to coordinate a response to the financial crisis of 2007-2009 because of the extent of 
contagion (Smith 2011, 5-6). The G20 group, itself established following the Asian 
financial crisis in the late 1990s, used its 2009 and 2010 meetings to coordinate an 
international response to the financial crisis. The meeting in 2009 was the first time that 
there was a heads of government level meeting of the G20. The financial crisis directly 
resulted in increased membership of the Group of number formation responsible for 
deciding the contours and content international financial regulatory regime. This 
eliminated the previous structural power enjoyed by the US and EU member states as 
members of the more exclusive G7.  
The members of the G20 agreed that the IMF should have a larger role in 
financial stability surveillance and also created a new no-conditionality attached, quick 
loan called Flexible Credit Line for qualified members with strong economies and sound 
policies.44 The IMF redefined its “function in the global financial system” as surveillance 
(Fratzcher and Reynaud 2011, 405). 
In the middle of the financial crisis in 2008 and after a global recession in 2010, 
the IMF embarked on a reform program. The quota share system, which assigns votes to 
states, was reorganized to give more voting power to emerging market economies. In 
2008, the IMF adopted the Quota and Voice Reforms. These reforms increased the voting 
shares for 135 “dynamic countries” for a “cumulative increase in quotas” of 11.5 percent 
(International Monetary Fund 2008). In 2010 the agreed reforms included shifting 6 
                                                
44To qualify a member country “Has very strong economic fundamentals and institutional policy 
frameworks [,] Is implementing—and has a sustained track record of implementing—very strong policies 
[,] Remains committed to maintaining such policies in the future”  (International Monetary Fund 2015). 
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percent of shares from over-represented states to “dynamic emerging market and 
developing” states and making Brazil, China, India, and Russia “among the top ten 
largest members in the IMF” (International Monetary Fund 2016). The structure of the 
executive board also changed to be composed entirely of elected, rather than some 
appointed, board members and “advanced European countries […] committed to reduce 
their combined Board representation by two chairs” (International Monetary Fund 2016). 
Notably the 2010 quota share reform removes the US veto power in the IMF, which it 
held de facto with its large quota share. 
The financial crisis challenged the existing order of power within the international 
financial regulatory regime and the institutional structural and procedural changes to the 
regime threatened the dominance and reduced the structural power of the European 
Union and United States within its institutions. The changes transferred power directly 
from Europe and the US to emerging market economies and developing states (Rato 
2011, 89). They also challenged the “American model of global capitalism” (Oatley et al. 
2013, 134). At the G20 summit in November 2008 “under the pressure of the 
international financial collapse of 2007-2008, and the proximate pressure of the non-G7 
economies in the room, the status quo powers of the United States and Europe agreed that 
additional changes in voice and vote were needed” (Griesgraber 2009, 180).   
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 also impacted the balance of power in the global 
economy. According to Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick, the financial crisis also 
prompted an end to Chimerica. Chimerica is a term Ferguson and Schularick use to 
describe the economic relationship of China and America that created a “world economic 
order that combined Chinese export-led development with US over-consumption” (2009, 
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2). They assert Chimerica threatened Europe’s place in the global economy and the Euro 
(2009, 4, 24, 25). The end of Chimerica was an opportunity for the US and EU to 
collaborate and create a new world economic order. 
Rickards has controversially argued that after the financial crisis the EU is 
actually in a stronger position in the global economy than the US and will become the 
“world’s economic superpower” over the next ten years (Rickards 2014, 136). Rickards 
bases his assessment on the strength of the Euro and the German economic model (2014, 
125-137). This position contrasts sharply with the reality of the Eurozone and fiscal debt 
crises the EU has experienced and his assessment does not consider the potential negative 
economic impact of Brexit on the EU.   
The financial regulatory regime cannot be separated from broader economic 
cooperation because financial services are one of several sectors of the economy 
routinely included in international agreements and dialogues and because financialization 
has been used to grow economies. Financial services have been addressed in international 
trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), bilateral trade agreements, 
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as 
institutions designed to harmonize financial services regulations. The inclusion of 
financial services within international trade agreements follows a neoliberal 
institutionalist logic because the EU and US are establishing institutions with the greatest 
possibility to produce their desired outcomes. The WTO is an established multilateral 
forum with enforcement mechanisms that could address financial services and set global 
regulations. However, the US and EU in particular have ample opportunity to forum shop 
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for a venue likely to produce their desired outcomes.45 Transatlantic cooperation and 
competition in the institutions of the international regulatory regime, and particularly in 
the WTO, have also shaped their joint decision to address financial regulatory policy in 
exclusive transatlantic institutions, such as the Financial Market Regulatory Dialogue 
(FMRD) and the TTIP.  
 The focus on international financial regulatory cooperation within 
intergovernmental meetings about economic cooperation is partially a result of the 
process of financialization. As several industries rely on finance in order to generate 
profits and as governments rely on finance to grow gross domestic product, financial 
regulatory cooperation to avoid arbitrage losses becomes a priority within existing 
institutions designed for international economic cooperation. Industry actor groups and 
multinational corporations are also essential to prioritizing financial regulatory 
cooperation and have existing influence in organizations like the WTO through their 
national advisory committees, such as the U.S. Industry Trade Advisory Committee 
(ITAC). 
Transatlantic Cooperation 
 The first section below will survey the steps taken in institutional building and the 
evolution of EU-US economic cooperation since 1945 because several of these 
institutions can be used to demonstrate the trends in cooperation and competition between 
the US and EU. With different financial regulatory standards, ordinarily the EU and US 
would compete, but after the financial crisis they are attempting to build a transatlantic 
                                                
45 One excellent example is intellectual property rights. The EU and US have forum shopped several 
international organizations in order to find an appropriate venue (Eimer and Philipps 2011). Ultimately the 
EU and US formed the Transatlantic Intellectual Property Rights Working Group (TIPRG) which seeks 
compliance in intellectual property rights cases from third states.  
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financial regulatory regime. The second section will review the differences in the 
transatlantic regulatory regime before and after the financial crisis to demonstrate that the 
financial crisis was a critical juncture that produced a transatlantic financial regulatory 
regime. 
Post-War Transatlantic Cooperation: From Supportive to Competitive	
 The post-war cooperation of Europe and the US was focused mainly on building 
international economic institutions and rebuilding Europe; however, they also cooperated 
bilaterally and within international economic institutions. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, European states and US cooperated to create the Bretton Woods institutions to 
extend a Western liberal democratic order. 
 Following the Second World War the US offered economic aid to Western 
European countries under the guise of the European Recovery Program (ERP), more 
commonly known as the Marshall Plan. This aid was one of many factors that supported 
European integration and institutionalization. The Organisation of European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC) was established in 1948 to supervise the allocation and 
disbursement of the Marshall Plan aid (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development).46 In the fall of 1949, the members of the US administration reconsidered 
the aid program because they were concerned that the money was “insufficiently directed 
towards economic integration” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development). Under pressure from the US, the OEEC made trade liberalization a 
priority and as a result in 1950 60% of private intra-European trade had been freed 
                                                
46 The original members of the OEEC were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and 
Western Germany (represented by both the combined Bizone and the French occupation zone). 
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(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). The OEEC also attempted 
to liberalize capital flows through its Committee for Invisible Transactions. After the 
Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community in 1957, the OEEC was 
retooled and launched as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in 1961.  
 The European Economic Community (EEC), an antecedent to the European 
Union, had a stated goal of integrating the economies of the member states through the 
European Common Market. The United States supported the EEC because of the political 
importance of European economic integration despite the fact that it would lead to 
discrimination against American exporters (Brown 2003, 100). The US also supported 
European economic and political integration as part of the liberal democratic order 
because it offered a powerful counterweight to communism during the Cold War 
(Ikenberry 1996, 88-91). 
 Relations and negotiations between the EEC and the US were central to the other 
pieces of the post-war institutional infrastructure, including the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Signed in 1948, the GATT was a multilateral agreement that 
sought to regulate trade with principles of reciprocity and mutual advantage.  The 
relationship of the EEC to the US was central to the early GATT negotiation rounds. 
“The US Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, for instance, specifically launched the 
so-called Dillon Round in the GATT ‘to keep the Community's common tariff as low as 
possible’ (Dillon, 1957, 914)” (Devuyst 1995, 2).  
 While successive American administrations through the 1960s were largely 
supportive of European economic integration as a means to create geopolitical stability 
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and strong allies, as the European Economic Community began to confront the US in 
GATT rounds the attitudes of the US administration and Congress shifted (Coppolaro 
2013). In the 1970s, the US became sensitive about its trade balance and the EEC was 
increasingly perceived as a closed community providing unfair preferences and subsidies 
to its members (Devuyst 1995, 3). The US support for European project waned and the 
US began to confront the EEC about potential conflicts between EEC regional 
arrangements and commitments to the GATT regime. Following the improvements made 
to the GATT dispute settlement process during the Uruguay Round in the late 1980s, the 
US brought several cases against the European Union.47 Since 1995, the EU and US have 
launched 51 complaints against one another, demonstrated in the chart below (World 
Trade Organization).48 In the dispute settlement cases counted below, the complainant 
(either the US or EU) is the initiator of the dispute settlement procedure and the 




                                                
47 After the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 the European Economic Community became known as the European 
Union and the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 established the legal personality of the European Union, replacing the 
European Communities. The new legal personality allows the European Union to be a treaty signatory and 
to be the named member of international organizations. These successive rebrandings reflect the 
progressive integration and institutionalization in not only economic policy areas but also social and 
judicial affairs committed by member states. 
48 This chapter will not attempt to detail the cases within the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement 
Body between the US and EU as there is already a broad scholarship detailing the challenges to and 
participation of the European Economic Community, then European Community, and then EU within the 
GATT and WTO. See Petersmann and Pollack 2003 and Ahearn 2006. 
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Figure 18: EU-US WTO Dispute Settlement Complaints since 199549 
 Complainant 
European Union 33 
United States 19 
Total 52 
Source: World Trade Organization 2016. “Find disputes cases.” 
These figures are indicative of some significant trends in the transatlantic 
economic relationship. First, the EU and US have used international institutions as fora to 
host competitions between their different regulatory regimes and even regulatory 
traditions. The beef hormone dispute between the US and EU is one such example. 
Following a European Commission health and safety regulation in 1989 banning imports 
of beef treated with growth stimulants, the US brought a complaint against the EU for 
blocking imports of its beef that had been given hormone shots (Johnson and Hanrahan 
2010). The EU decision was followed by several other countries’ also banning meat 
treated by hormones. Many instances of transatlantic regulatory competition manifest 
because of the different regulatory traditions of the EU and US.50 A specialist in the 
Congressional Research Service identified regulatory policy conflict as one of the three 
sources of most trade conflicts between the EU and US, alongside traditional producer 
protection and foreign policy clashes. (Ahearn 2006) The international regulatory regime 
                                                
49 For the purposes of this chart, EU represents both European Community and European Union. This chart 
does not include US complaints brought against specific EU member states. Data retrieved from the World 
Trade Organization. 
50 Michael Rogers of the European Commission’s Bureau of European Policy Advisors summarizes the 
connection thusly: “The US and the EU have disagreed over the regulation of a number of health and 
environmental risks, from genetically modified foods to climate change to beef. Underlying these specific 
controversies has been a larger debate, namely, how regulators should act in the face of uncertainty about 
risk” (Rogers 2002). 
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was used to arbitrate clashes between the EU and US regulatory regimes in the 1990s and 
early 2000s. Regulatory conflicts are embedded in social contexts and are more difficult 
to resolve than traditional tariff barrier clashes, which may explain why the EU and US 
relied on the dispute settlement mechanism rather than transatlantic regulatory dialogues. 
EU and US: Divergent Regulatory Approaches	
The European Union and United States are often characterized as having two 
different regulatory traditions which would make their regulatory cooperation unlikely. 
However, the financial crisis changed the incentives to cooperate by altering EU and US 
power in international financial regulatory regime. This section demonstrates that the EU 
and US overcame divergent regulatory approaches in order to create a transatlantic 
financial regulatory regime. 
The EU regulatory approach applies the precautionary principle and the US is 
generally more responsive to demonstrated negative effects (Vogel 2001). The basis of 
this difference is in an approach to managing risk through regulation. The precautionary 
principle requires goods or practices to be proven safe before they are allowed in the 
marketplace through proactive regulation. The European Commission has issued a 
number of health and environmental regulations on the basis that products may pose a 
risk. One example is the restriction of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). In food 
products, the United States regulates by restricting access once something has been 
demonstrated to pose a risk. However, Wiener and Rogers note that the US has also 
applied the precautionary principle at times, and has a more conservative approach to risk 
management than the EU in certain product areas (2002).  
The other major area in which their regulation differs substantially is cultural 
issues. The European Commission has exclusive competence to negotiate trade in goods 
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and services, meaning the member states are sidelined except for issuing a negotiation 
mandate in the intergovernmental Council. One policy domain in which the Commission 
does not have exclusive competence to negotiate is intellectual property rights. The 
French government insisted on a cultural exception to regulations regarding television 
and radio programming, to preserve what it considers a vital balance between French 
language and foreign language programming. This principle was introduced in the GATT 
Uruguay Round and adheres to French laws that regulate what percentage of 
programming must be French language.51 The French government succeeded in having 
its cultural exception recognized in the EU regulatory regime and several other member 
states have also protected their culture with domestic regulations. Agreements in audio 
visual services have been limited at the multilateral and bilateral levels. In June 2013, EU 
member state trade ministers negotiated for hours over whether audio visual services 
would be on the table in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (AFP 
2013). 
Geographical indicators are another example of cultural protection and US-EU 
regulatory regime divergence. In the European Union, there are three levels of protected 
geographical indicators which essentially limit types of foods products to one origin of 
production: Protected Designation of Origin (PDO), the narrowest distinction, Protected 
Geographical Indication (PGI), second most narrow, and Traditional Specialty 
Guaranteed (TSG), the most broad.52 Parmesan cheese is one example of an agricultural 
                                                
51  In 1993, France introduced a law which requires private radio channels to play at least 40% French 
music (Cohen 1993). 
52 The Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development distinguishes these categories thusly: 
“Protected Designation of Origin - PDO:  covers agricultural products and foodstuffs which are produced, 
processed and prepared in a given geographical area using recognised know-how. Protected Geographical 
Indication - PGI: covers agricultural products and foodstuffs closely linked to the geographical area. At 
least one of the stages of production, processing or preparation takes place in the area. Traditional 
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product given the most stringent classification. Following a twelve-year campaign by the 
Consortium of Parmigiano-Reggiano Cheese, the European Court of Justice decided that 
“only cheeses bearing the protected denomination of origin (PDO) 'Parmigiano-Reggiano' 
can be sold under the denomination ‘Parmesan’ ” (Bodoni 2008; Parmigiano-Reggiano 
2008). Before the ruling, although Parmigiano-Reggiano was distinguished as a PDO, 
German producers used the translation ‘Parmesan’ cheese to evade the origin 
requirement. The consequence is that foreign-produced Parmesan bearing the name 
‘Parmesan cheese’ is banned from the EU market.  
The US also uses geographic indicators but only as qualifications of a general 
product. In the US it would be feasible to have a protected name for Idaho Parmesan, but 
not the term Parmesan alone. In the TTIP negotiations, the EU is attempting to negotiate 
to have the US cheese producers stop using EU protected geographical indicators such as 
Parmesan and instead use labels such as Parmesan-like (Velasco 2014).  
This is evidence that in previous instances of regulatory regime discord the US 
and EU used the WTO to arbitrate disputes over their different regulatory approaches. 
However, the US and EU are instead seeking to collaborate on a transatlantic financial 
regulatory regime and have overcome the tendency to compete because of changes in the 
global economy and the international financial regulatory regime. 
Mid 1990s: Renewing Economic Cooperation	
The 1990s saw an institutionalization of the relationship between the European 
Union and the United States on several levels; more regularized settings were created to 
facilitate the interactions between the EU and US. In 1995, the US and EU launched the 
                                                                                                                                            
Speciality Guaranteed - TSG:  highlights traditional character, either in the composition or means of 
production” (Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development). 
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New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) in part to respond to the concern that with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union the main stimulus for a continuing close transatlantic 
alliance had evaporated. Institutionally, the utility of the main bulwark of the transatlantic 
alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was in question as well. The 
Agenda offered new pillars of the transatlantic regulatory regime. The NTA furthered 
regulatory cooperation in 1997 in several sectors by concluding “an EC/US Agreement 
on Drug Precursors; an EC/US Customs and Co-operation Agreement; and an EU/US 
General Mutual Recognition Agreement covering telecommunications, equipment, 
electromagnetic compatibility, electrical safety, recreational craft, medical devices, and 
pharmaceuticals” (Meyer and Luenen 2008, 13). 
The NTA established several dialogues for different elements of civil society 
alongside governmental interlocutors, including the TransAtlantic Business Dialogue 
(TABD), the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), and the Transatlantic 
Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD). In 2001, the Transatlantic Labor Dialogue (TALD) was 
formed. 
The EU and US further institutionalized their economic cooperation in 1998 with 
the launch of the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP). The goals of the TEP were 
both multilateral and bilateral. Multilaterally, the TEP was to establish a dialogue which 
would take place ahead of WTO negotiations and ministerial meetings to create 
“coordinated positions” and even develop “common positions or elaborate proposals to 
be submitted in multilateral discussions and negotiations” (European Commission 1998, 
1). However, as noted earlier in this chapter, trade disputes between the US and EU 
continued after the TEP. Though the TEP institutionalization “cushioned the blow” it 
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could not prevent a conflicts based on “a classic clash of EU and US economic and 
political interests” (Steffenson 2005, 165). Bilaterally, the EU and US would address a 
number of policy sectors with ministerial and official dialogues. These included technical 
barriers to trade in goods, and notably a dialogue on mechanisms to enhance regulatory 
cooperation. 
The TEP also reaffirmed the desire to coordinate their consultative processes and 
develop opportunities to involve all stakeholders. (European Commission 1998:1) In 
reference to regulatory barriers, the TEP singles out the TransAtlantic Business Dialogue 
(TABD) as a stakeholder with an interest in regulatory dialogues (European Commission 
1998, 5). However, after the burst of activity in the 1990s, the TABD and other dialogues 
were less active. 
Since 2008: Emergence of a Stronger Transatlantic Regulatory Regime	
Origins of Regulatory Cooperation 
The US and EU have different approaches to timing of regulation as well as 
preferences for institutional settings. As demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3, there are 
significant differences in the EU and US financial regulatory regimes. The previous 
section demonstrates that the EU and US would ordinarily compete but after the financial 
crisis changes in the international financial regime spurred their cooperation. However, 
the nature of finance also creates incentives for the US and EU to cooperate and create 
one regime. 
Regulatory conflicts between the US and EU can lead to competition to influence 
global standards, as noted by Drezner (2007). In All Politics Is Global, Drezner postulates 
that the US and EU will compete over regulatory standards with two rival standards if 
their preferences diverge until third countries choose one set over the other. This model 
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assumes that regulation is necessary to capture gains, which does not necessarily apply to 
finance. Some states avoid regulating or deregulate elements of finance in order to 
capture gains, particularly activity from industry actors using arbitrage. But harmonized 
transatlantic finance standards, tied to preferential access to their markets in multilateral 
trade agreements, would help the EU and US eliminate competition from states that cater 
to financial industry firms using arbitrage. 
Of the three types of trade disputes mentioned earlier in the chapter, regulatory 
competition has the most direct effect on producers and business bears the cost of 
compliance more often than consumers or countries. Therefore at the international level, 
the desire to harmonize regulatory standards is purely to cater to business, not to improve 
government trade balances or aid consumers. But harmonizing financial regulation has 
the added bonus of contributing to gross domestic product because of financialization of 
profits.  
 Regulatory and trade analysts are quick to suggest that mutual recognition 
agreements are a way to avoid the conflict and distributional gains of harmonizing 
regulatory standards while insuring that there is no risk posed by a foreign product. 
Mutual recognition agreements are a formal legal agreement between two parties that sets 
out a process to accept each other’s domestic standards as equivalent. For certain 
regulatory issues, like which agricultural products can be labeled organic, this is a 
sufficient solution. But for financial regulatory standards mutual recognition agreements 
can have potentially destabilizing consequences and do not adequately address the 
dynamic and ageographical nature of financial services.  
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 Most mutual recognition agreements concern the flow of goods, which are easily 
stopped at borders. Financial flows and products are not as easily contained. For example, 
international structured products, domestic products traded on global markets, can be an 
amalgam of diverse products. Policy conditions in one country can impact the value of 
the structured products held by a bank in another state. Recognizing a foreign state’s 
regulation of the sale or formation of structured products as equal to domestic standards 
in order to allow those instruments to be held by domestic financial institutions rests the 
stability of domestic financial institutions on policy choices of another state that affect 
the value of those products.  
 Structured products allow investors to hedge risk through a combination of 
products. “There are structured products linked to interest rates, foreign exchange rates, 
commodities, credit risk, inflation, carbon, insurance, hedge fund returns and many other 
underlying variables, as well as hybrid products that combine some of these variables into 
a single product” (Bennett 2013, 19). One prominent example of structured products from 
Chapter 2 is mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
and collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), each generally containing several 
mortgage-backed securities, are packaged in a complex way that obscures the true risk of 
the mortgages within them. US government mortgage regulations, including government 
guaranteed loans, and unemployment trends can impact the value and stability of these 
products, which in turn can affect the balance sheets and stability of foreign financial 
institutions and investors who hold these products. Deficiencies in US regulation of 
mortgage lending contributed to a global recession because many foreign institutions held 
these products. Mutual recognition agreements in most areas of finance will not lower or 
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control risk posed by complex financial products. Finance requires a distinct regulatory 
regime. 
 Harmonizing or establishing common regulatory standards in a transatlantic 
regulatory regime is also the only option for EU-US cooperation after the financial crisis 
because of reforms made to the US and EU regulatory regimes. Reforms in both the EU 
and US made to support stability of their economies and financial institutions could 
possible be evaded or eroded by mutual recognition agreements. Two examples of areas 
with such a complication are asset risk weights and capital requirements. 
 Individual states and banks themselves create a system of asset risk weights for 
bank and non-bank financial institutions to calculate the true risk of items on their 
balance sheets. Risk weights are meant to measure assets or exposure on firms’ balance 
sheets according to potential risk. The higher the percentage of risk weight, the riskier the 
asset. “The models used to gauge the riskiness of a loan book were once provided by 
regulators, with fixed weightings for categories such as business credit or loans to other 
banks. But an update to the global regulatory guidelines, known as Basel II and adopted 
just before the financial crisis, encouraged banks to come up with their own risk models. 
After all, bankers should know better than bureaucrats how risky any given loan might 
be. These home-made models have since been used to determine how much capital a 
bank needs” (The Economist 2015). For example, government bonds from Greece would 
be assigned a higher risk weight, perhaps 100%, compared to bonds from the US, 
traditionally assigned 0% by US banks. The total of these weights is used to calculate the 
capital adequacy ratio.  
Following the financial crisis, the EU and US have changed their risk weighting 
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systems. The US has much stricter rules, particularly in the way mortgage-backed 
securities are weighted (Shearman and Sterling LLP 2013). The new EU guidelines 
assign loans secured by residential property a 35% risk weight while the new US 
guidelines assign either a 50% or 100% risk weighting depending on the quality of the 
mortgage (Article 125 of Regulation (EU) No/2013; Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation 2016; Shearman and Sterling LLP 2013, 25). Previously the US regulation 
did not account for the quality of residential mortgages when assigning a risk weight. The 
new regulation is considered more risk sensitive than the previous regulation or EU 
regulation for this reason (Saunders and Allen 2010, 294). The US also has higher risk 
weights than the EU for claims secured by commercial property, exposures in default, 
unsettled securities or commodities transactions, and retail and consumer loans. Member 
state regulatory authorities can assign additional risk weight to mortgage-backed 
securities. 
Additionally, the European Central Bank has assigned a risk weight of zero to 
sovereign debt, which has been criticized as underestimating risk by, inter alia, the 
European Political Strategy Centre, “the European Commission’s in-house think tank” 
(European Political Strategy Centre 2015). According to the Centre, “Zero-risk weighting 
of sovereign debt in the EU, as well as the exemption from existing large exposure 
requirements, are a source of vulnerability. This does not reflect a global regulatory 
constraint – as the global Basel framework does not prescribe zero-risk weight for bank 
exposures to sovereigns – but a regulatory choice made at [the] European and global 
level” (European Political Strategy Centre 2015). As Sascha Steffen, Head of the 
International Finance and Financial Management Research Group at the Center of 
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European Economic Research, notes zero weighting sovereign debt is a political decision, 
“I think the sovereign debt regulation was an issue of helping countries refinance. It was 
a political choice. It’s also a political choice not to do anything to change it right now. 
[…] You cannot just change the rules from one day to the other. The banks simply don’t 
have enough capital. […] A change to reflect sovereign debt as having something other 
than a zero risk would be an important issue for banks in the peripheral countries in the 
EU because they hold a lot of their countries’ risky debt. They are basically the only ones 
holding bonds of these countries at the moment” (Steffen 2014).  
Sweden has already required that its banks assign a weight to sovereign debt and 
the Basel Committee is reviewing the issue of how to risk weight sovereign debt. Andres 
Dombret, a Bundesbank board member, has indicated that the anticipated revisions of the 
Third Basel Accord will require sovereign debt to be assigned a risk weight (Groendahl 
and Black 2016). For many EU banks, this would mean dramatically increasing their 
capital. 
If the US were to sign a mutual recognition agreement with the EU that covered 
asset-backed securities or risk weighting generally, this could pose a serious risk to US 
investors and financial firms because the EU underappreciates the risk of default 
compared to the US.  
 Both the EU and US have changed capital requirements for banks after the 
financial crisis to comply with regulations from the international regulatory regime. 
Increasing capital requirements is considered a way to ensure stability of financial 
institutions and protect investors. After the financial crisis, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision decided in the Third Basel Accord to raise capital requirements and 
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introduced a leverage ratio and liquidity requirement. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision is an informal forum in which representatives from central banks and 
supervisory authorities develop standards and guidelines for banks. These standards are 
then approved by the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision and 
voluntarily implemented by the Committee’s member states.53 The capital requirements 
of the Third Basel Accord are even higher for institutions deemed systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs), or those ‘too big to fail.’ Increasing capital requirements 
and leverage coverage ratios are strategies to ensure stability of financial institutions and 
protect investors. EU bank leverage ratios are laxer than the reformed US rules (Wright 
2014). 
 Harmonization achieved through a single regulatory regime is the only choice if 
the EU and US are intent on jointly regulating finance because of the nature of financial 
activities and the international pressures. This is a partial answer to this project’s second 
research question of why the regulatory regime has changed after the financial crisis.  
As we will see later in this chapter, American policymakers have been concerned 
that seeking any form of cooperation in financial regulatory standards with the European 
Union will dilute the content of hard fought regulations in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the US rules adopted to carry out the Third 
Basel Accord. But the input from industry has consistently suggested that harmonized 
standards would attract all other actors to comply.  
                                                
53 The current states with institutional membership on the Basel Committee are Argentina, Australia, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States (Bank for International 
Settlements, “Basel Committee Membership”). 
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Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime After the Financial Crisis 
The pre-existing transatlantic regulatory regime revolved largely around low-level 
regulatory dialogues and coordinating positions within international organizations. The 
financial crisis prompted the EU and US to upgrade several elements of the transatlantic 
regime. These upgrades manifest in several ways: level of cooperation, frequency or 
consistency of dialogue or meetings, scope of content of cooperation, and permanence of 
outcomes of cooperation.   
In order to demonstrate how the transatlantic regime has changed, I created an 
index rating the major transatlantic financial institutions in 2006, 2007, and 2015 across 
two dimensions: activity and institutionalization. 
The activity of each institution is rated on an index with two factors: the 
frequency of meetings and the number of outcomes or deliverables. Frequency of 
meetings is used as a measure of activity. Meetings are an important indicator of activity 
for institutions. This is because institutions use iterated games to achieve cooperation in 
game theory. In order to achieve cooperation, and concessions from some actors, all 
actors must expect that they will meet again. 
The number of outcomes or deliverables is used as the other indicator to measure 
activity. This indicator does not attempt to assess the nature of the deliverables because 
the diversity of the institutions and their outcomes makes this nearly impossible. For 
example, while as an intergovernmental organization the Transatlantic Economic Council 
is able to create new transatlantic institutions, as a civil society organization TABD and 
TACD are not. Counting the number of deliverables is an equalizing measure of 
productivity. 
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The second dimension, institutionalization, is measured by two indicators: 
existence and size of permanent staff and number of members. Permanency of staff is one 
way to measure the degree of institutionalization and formality of an organization (Volgy 
et al. 2008). However, nongovernmental institutions such as councils in particular may be 
institutionalized with a sizeable membership but fewer staff.  
Ideally, other dimensions such as influence over transatlantic regulation, could be 
measured as directly. However, there are no clear deliverables at this stage of the 
transatlantic financial regulatory regime to be counted and attributing any regulatory 
outcome solely to the institutions below is problematic.   
 The full measurements for Figures 19, 20, and 21 are available in Appendix 5.  
Figure 19: Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime, 2006 
  Institutional Dimension 
Functional Dimension Weak Moderate Strong 




Moderate   TABC/D*   
Strong       
*Information about the TABC/D and the TACD staff was unavailable. 











Figure 20: Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime, 2007 
  Institutional Dimension 
Functional Dimension Weak Moderate Strong 
Weak   TLD, 
TALD 
  
Moderate   TEC, 
FMRD 
  
Strong   TACD* TABC/D 
*Information about the TACD staff was not available. 
Source: Author generated. 
 
Figure 21: Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime, 2015 
  Institutional Dimension 
Functional Dimension Weak Moderate Strong 
Weak TALD  TLD   
Moderate   TEC, 
FMRD 
  
Strong     TTIP, 
TABC/D, 
TACD 
Source: Author generated. 
 
 
US-EU Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue (FMRD), Trans-Atlantic Business 
Council (TABC), TransAtlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), Transatlantic Consumer 
Dialogue (TACD), Transatlantic Labor Dialogue (TALD), Transatlantic Legislators’ 
Dialogue (TLD), Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
 
In 1995 the US and EU launched the New Transatlantic Agenda and a series of 
advisory transatlantic civil society organizations. The TransAtlantic Business Dialogue 
(TABD) was established as a formal channel for industry actors to provide their “unique 
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and indispensable perspective on trade liberalization” (Transatlantic Business Council). 
However, following this period in the mid 1990s the activity in the TABD declined 
because cooperation between the EU and US was not a priority (Meyer and Luenen, 17). 
Planned meetings were scaled down or cancelled (Corporate Europe Observatory 2001). 
The TABD has been revitalized in order to continue to offer its “business driven vision of 
transatlantic trade and investment” (Vargo 1997). The Dialogue has changed to the 
Trans-Atlantic Business Council (TABC) and represents individual firms and trade 
associations representing businesses or entire industries. The TABC regularly has 
stakeholders’ meetings ahead of official US-EU Transatlantic Economic Council 
meetings. Members of the executive level Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), 
within the TABC, are C-suite level members (Chief Executive Officers, Chief Financial 
Officers and Chief Operating Officers) who serve in an official advisory capacity to the 
state-led Transatlantic Economic Council and have regular meetings with relevant EU 
and US officials.  
The Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) was established in 1998 in 
order to offer a voice to the consumer groups of civil society in EU-US government 
dialogues and negotiations during the launch of the New Economic Partnership. Its 
members are the consumer advocacy organizations and non-profits in the EU and US. 
The Transatlantic Labor Dialogue (TALD) was established in 2001 but has not 
had the robust cooperation that was anticipated. Knauss and Trubek (2001) addressed the 
failings in the structure of the TALD, which was a “government-sanctioned” dialogue of 
the two primary union representatives of the most prominent American union 
organization, the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
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Organizations) and in the EU, ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation) (235). The 
formal structure of the organization never took shape, regular meetings were not created, 
and the organization is all but officially disbanded. This explains its movement in both 
the institutional and functional dimensions from Figure 20 to Figure 21. 
The Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue (TLD) has not had the productive 
dialogue desired either. Only members of the House of Representatives are eligible to 
participate as representatives of the US Congress. Furthermore,  
“other than the appointment of the Chair and Vice-Chair by the Chairman and 
Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, there is no formal 
nomination of any other USTLD member. While many Members have 
participated in past meetings, participation in the USTLD often seems to be on an 
ad hoc basis, involving little continuity of participants and, in some instances, 
largely dependent on the ability of the Chairman to convince Members to attend 
the annual meetings. Observers believe this has led to an inability on the part of 
the TLD to attract and maintain a broad group of Members willing to participate 
on a permanent basis” (Ahearn and Morelli 2008, 10).  
 
The TLD discussed financial services in 2011 and 2012 (Archick and Morelli 
2013).  However, those serving on the TLD were not sure that financial services were 
within their jurisdiction and they deferred to the HLWG and FMRD. 
The creation of the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) reorganized the work 
of the civil society and industry channels: the TABD, TACD, and TLD became official 
advisors to the TEC. In Chapter 5, the connections between these channels and the TEC 
will be mapped. 
The indices reveal that both the TABC/D and the TACD got stronger following 
the financial crisis, both in terms of activity and membership. The TALD has never 
officially disbanded, but is not producing or meeting. The explanation for these changes 
in activity and membership will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter presents evidence of voice and vote changes in the IMF and G20 
after the financial crisis. These changes to the international financial regulatory regime 
shifted power away from the US and EU and to emerging market economies and 
developing countries. This evidence supports this project’s assertion that the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009 was a critical juncture in the international financial regulatory 
regime. 
The challenge to EU and US leadership in the international financial regulatory 
regime was an external pressure which encouraged them to collaborate and create the 
transatlantic financial regulatory regime. This chapter also presents evidence that the 
transatlantic regulatory regime changed after the financial crisis. 
The evidence documents an increase in the institutional strength of the TABC/D 
and the TACD from 2007 to 2015. It also documents an increase in the functional activity 
of the TABC/D, TACD during the same period. The evidence also indicates a change in 
the institutional and functional intensity of the TALD, which is effectively disbanded in 
2015. The evidence of TABC/D and TACD activity and the contrast with the TLD 
supports that industry actors are driving regulatory cooperation. The introduction of the 
TEC, FMRD, and the TTIP further strengthened the transatlantic financial regulatory 
regime. 
 The aggregate of this evidence supports the project’s claim that the financial 
crisis was a critical juncture that precipitated changes in the transatlantic regulatory 
regime that specifically addressed finance. The movement of both the TACD and 
TABC/D also indicates that the civil society and industry institutions have become more 
active and institutionalized than their intergovernmental counterparts, with the exception 
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of the TTIP. The limitations of the evidence presented are the inability to document all 
internal institutional processes and activity and the missing staff data for the TABC/D 
and TACD. 
The next chapter will map the relationships between the institutions of the 
transatlantic financial regulatory regime and explain the way that civil society, and 




Chapter 5: The TTIP: Reorienting the Transatlantic 
Regulatory Regime 
The previous chapter provided evidence that the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was 
a critical juncture in the international and transatlantic regulatory regimes. This chapter 
will explain that the EU and US reacted to the international regulatory regime changes 
not only by intensifying their regulatory cooperation in existing for a, but by establishing 
a transatlantic financial regulatory regime. This chapter will demonstrate that the EU and 
US established the transatlantic financial regulatory regime both to respond to the 
demands of industry, and to continue to dominate the international financial regulatory 
regime. The chapter will do so by using the research method of process tracing to 
document the developments in the run-up to the TTIP negotiations and by mapping the 
connections of the institutions of the transatlantic financial regulatory regime. This 
mapping will reveal industry’s privileged access and input into the regime. 
The transatlantic relationship has sought to influence global regulatory standards 
using a variety of strategies. Notably, the EU and US have used international 
governmental organizations including the World Trade Organization and International 
Monetary Fund to pursue their regulatory agendas. However, recently the EU and US 
have eschewed the traditional regulatory forums in favor of a comprehensive 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). A leaked TTIP draft first 
revealed that financial services would potentially be included in the free trade agreement 
(Pinzler 2014). More recently the European Commission confirmed that there is a chapter 
on financial services being negotiated (Directorate General for Trade 2016). This is 
despite the Obama administration’s demonstrated reluctance to include financial services 
in the agreement (Johnson and Schott 2013; Bracken 2014). However, in the run-up to 
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negotiations policymakers in the EU and US have privileged the input of industry by 
creating institutions for industry to meet, organize and steer government action. Industry 
associations and large firms have used these institutions to push for a transatlantic 
financial regulatory regime that will primarily benefit multinational corporations and 
financial institutions. The EU and US hope that by benefiting industry and the finance 
industry that they will continue to dominate the international financial regulatory regime 
and enjoy finance-led growth. 
Steering and Rowing 
Scholars have analyzed regulation of essential services at the state level by 
examining the interaction between the activities of the state and civil society. In 
Reinventing Government, Osborne and Gaebler assert that in an ideal division of 
responsibilities the government is steering and civil society is rowing (1992). The term 
steering refers to directing and guiding activities and rowing refers to entrepreneurial 
activities and service provision. By steering the state would ensure essential service 
provision but not necessarily provide the services itself; the service provision or rowing 
would be left to civil society actors and industry.54 Their book discusses ways to 
introduce market mechanisms in government that will inspire competition and choice in 
public service provision. The division of tasks between steering and rowing is associated 
with the larger movement in neoliberalism to privatize government services.  
Braithwaite considers this particular division of labor part of the contemporary 
regulatory state, which emerged in the 1980s with neoliberalism, but notes that other 
                                                
54 This analysis includes industry in civil society because the transatlantic financial regulatory regime treats 
industry as a part of civil society. however many other authors categorize industry separately from civil 
society. In the paradigm of the regulatory state, there are only two categories of actors: the state and all 
other actors.   
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models have preceded this one (Braithwaite 2000). From the nineteenth century until the 
1930s, the Nightwatchman state saw civil society both steer and row, with a state role in 
the background.55 In the postwar period, the state used Keynesian principles to play both 
roles, directing and providing services. It is important to note that the Nightwatchman 
and Postwar state have been developed with the US and UK as cases. The regulatory state 
has been applied more broadly including to the European Union. Though these terms may 
be applied to other countries, it might require altering the time periods. 
The new regulatory state has been heralded by several policy scholars (Majone 
1996; Moran 2002; Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). Though neoliberal tenets favor free 
market solutions such as deregulation and privatization, regulatory competition allowed 
both neoliberalism and the regulatory state to develop simultaneously. Jurisdictions alter 
their regulatory regimes in order to attract households, businesses and industries in 
Tiebout’s regulatory competition model. Through this model, scholars have explained the 
growth of the regulatory state (Majone 1996). The United States and the European Union 
are the subjects of the majority of the scholarship on the regulatory state because of 
ability of their domestic regulatory regimes to influence international regulatory regimes 
and because the multilevel governance which characterizes their domestic regulatory 
regimes allows for regulatory competition among different regulatory regimes. 
However, the concept of the regulatory state fails to capture some of the external 
pressures on domestic regulatory regimes that arise as a result of globalization and 
particularly the globalization of civil society and industry. Although competitive 
regulatory regimes arise as a result of globalization since firms and households have 
increased mobility and access to information about regulatory regimes, the regulatory 
                                                
55 Figure 1 illustrates these eras. 
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state should still be steering the entrepreneurship and service provision. Scholars have 
noted that transnational phenomena such as financial services and flows are not easily 
constrained by traditional state-based regulation and that globalization has therefore 
precipitated global governance arrangements in a number of policy areas (Sinclair 2001; 
McGrew and Held 2002; Porter 2005). The negative externalities of these transnational 
phenomena may be partially managed by individual states but the regulatory state is not 
necessarily equipped to steer transnational activities unless it completely exports its 
domestic regulatory regime. In the EU and US, civil society and industry actors are adept 
at navigating and interacting with the domestic regulatory regime and global civil society 
and industry actors interact with the international regulatory regime.  
Industry as a Part of Civil Society? 
 This project does not seek to limit the definition of civil society to industry-
related interests. Rather, this project argues that the transatlantic regulatory regime is 
privileging industry actors as representatives of civil society and demonstrates that 
industry actors are the most frequent participants in consultations and stakeholder 
presentations that are open to all civil society. Despite the fact that much of political 
science literature that treats civil society as a distinct category from industry and the state, 
this project includes industry groups in civil society because the regulatory state literature 
does and because the transatlantic regulatory regime includes industry actors in the 
institutions created for civil society. 
 The most organized groups related to a regulatory issue can represent the most 
influential elements of civil society in a pluralist system. Gilens and Page (2014) have 
found evidence that at the US level “economic elites and organized groups representing 
business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while 
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average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence” 
(564). Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004) assert that a high degree of organization will make a 
group play a more prominent role on behalf of civil society. Lindblom (1977) reveals that 
when there are economic interests at stake, business has a privileged position in domestic 
policymaking. However, none of these observations about the domestic level account for 
the organization of transnational civil society and industry groups at the transnational 
level. 
 Industry interests are often the most organized on the transnational level, 
especially in the case of financial regulation, and have the opportunity to effectively 
capture—or take over—the steering of international regulatory regimes. Koppell 
documents this process in several global governance organizations, namely the World 
Health Organization, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, the 
International Telecommunications Union and the World Intellectual Property Rights 
Organization (2006). He finds that interest actors are more effective if they have the 
ability to mobilize their constituencies at the transnational level, are formally represented 
in the decision-making processes, and can provide desired information to the process. 
According to Koppell, transnational interest groups are more influential in global 
governance than interest groups in a domestic context because they are often “direct 
participants” in the policymaking which follows a “corporatist” rather than pluralist 
model; this means that the bargaining takes place “between the state and ‘peak 
associations’ representing key sectors of society” (Koppell 2006: 1-2). The financial 
industry is considered a key sector of society in the transnational financial regulatory 
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regime and industry actors have been granted a formal, privileged role in the policy-
making process by advising the Transatlantic Economic Community.  
 Financial industry actors, by which this project refers to financial firms and 
financial industry associations, have successfully organized on the transnational level and 
effectively preempted some state and international level regulation because of the process 
of financialization discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. If policymakers prioritize financial 
growth by continuing to create regulation deemed friendly to the financial industry, it 
would indicate that the financialization growth narrative is operationalized as if the direct 
relationship between finance and GDP exists.  
 This narrative has operated to privilege the financial industry actors, and indeed 
industry actors generally,56 above other civil society actors in the course of formulating a 
transatlantic regulatory regime. In the transatlantic regulatory regime, industry actors 
were granted institutionalized channels to the policymaking or harmonization process that 
the labor groups were not, and participate more frequently than their counterparts in the 
open consultations. The transatlantic financial regulatory regime has begun to conflate 
civil society with industry actors. Including industry as a representative of civil society is 
indicative of an ideological bias in favor of finance-led growth. The regime’s usage of the 
term civil society has caused significant opposition to TTIP in the EU. 
In April 2007 the EU and US launched the Transatlantic Economic Council 
(TEC). The TEC is a high-level governmental organization that meets at least once a 
year. It is chaired by one US official and one EU official and the other members are 
officials from the European Commission and the US executive branch. The TEC is tasked 
                                                
56 Many industry actors net a greater share of their profits from financial activities than manufacturing or 
their other traditional ‘main street’ activities. 
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with identifying and advancing new areas of economic cooperation and even “ economic 
integration” (US Department of State 2009). The TEC has revitalized the civil society 
dialogues that advise it. It has also formed a formal Group of Advisors composed only of 
the directors of the Trans-Atlantic Business Council, Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue, 
and Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue (Jancic 2014). Notably, it excludes the 
Transatlantic Labour Dialogue, which has been functionally disbanded. 
After the financial crisis of 2007-2009, one of the early opportunities for civil 
society participation in the transatlantic regulatory regime was the High-Level Working 
Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG). In the aftermath of the global recession from 
2008-2010, the EU and US formed the HLWG during the November 2011 US-EU 
Summit designed to identify and report measures which would stimulate trade and 
investment between them, increase their competitiveness, harmonize regulation where 
possible, and create jobs. The HLWG was an advisory, governmental body to the 
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) and was chaired by the US Trade Representative 
(USTR) and the EU Trade Commissioner. The primary domestic motivations for the 
creation of this institution were the immense existing trade and investment linkages 
between the EU and US, and the similar positions of the US and EU in the global 
economy (White House 2011). The financial crisis and recession was unsettling to the 
industrialized countries because they disproportionately affected them compared to 
developing countries and emerging market economies.57 This led to changes in the 
institutional structures and procedures of the international financial regulatory regime that 
                                                
57 This is particularly true in the case of growth rates, which have been diverging for some time. See 
D.Willem te Velde, ‘The global financial crisis and developing countries’, Overseas Development Institute 
Background Note, October 2008 and ‘Emerging markets and recession: Counting their blessings’, The 
Economist, 30 December 2009. 
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removed some of the power of the US and EU. The shift in power towards global and 
emerging market economies posed a challenge to the dominance of the EU and US and 
pushed them to work together to make the foundations of global governance in financial 
regulation. The EU and US overcame their differences to compete and be rule makers 
rather than rule takers in financial regulation. The goal of the transatlantic financial 
regulatory regime is to reassert dominance in the international financial regulatory 
regime. 
For the European Union and United States it was a strategic decision to identify 
ways to further integrate their economies as a counterbalance to the emerging market 
economies’ new power in the international financial regulatory regime. The HLWG held 
a series of public consultations that were crucial in deciding potential areas for 
cooperation and the submissions to the public consultations are presented in the next 
section.  
Other civil society actors have also participated in the transatlantic regulatory 
regime through institutionalized channels created by the EU and US but have been 
allowed limited opportunities for formal participation compared to industry 
representatives. The chief way civil society has been organized is into sector specific 
dialogues. Figure 22 charts these dialogues as well as the intergovernmental processes 






Figure 22: Transatlantic Regulatory Regime by Sector, 2006 and 2015 
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One of the dialogues, the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD), has been 
an active critic not only of the way negotiations have been conducted thus far but also of 
the emergence of the a transatlantic regulatory regime. Members include Public Citizen, 
                                                
58 In April 2007 during the EU and US summit the TEC was launched, however work did not start in most 
areas until 2008. 
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the Center for Food Safety, Citizens Advice, Consumer Reports, Consumer Watchdog, 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the European Association for the Coordination of 
Consumer Representation, Privacy International, and The European Consumers’ 
Organisation. Despite the impetus behind for the creation of the TACD, representatives 
of TACD have complained about the lack of access and transparency in the TTIP 
negotiations. TACD US Co-Chair Ed Mierzwinski noted that the advisory group to the 
US Trade Representative includes 600 representatives of industry and only one of 
consumers. (TACD responds to USTR announcement)  The TACD has, however, 
managed to secure a position in the Group of Advisors to the TEC. The TEC established 
a Group of Advisors composed of the chairs or directors of the major existing 
transatlantic dialogues who would be representing stakeholders. The “major” transatlantic 
dialogues represented in the Group of Advisors are the TABC/D, TACD, and TLD; the 
three directors are the only members of the Group of Advisors (Jancic 2014). 
The Transatlantic Labor Dialogue’s input to the TEC process has been naught 
compared to the privileged access of the Trans-Atlantic Business Council. The 
Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue has been welcomed into the group of advisors and 
revitalized by this inclusion. Unlike the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, the 
Transatlantic Labor Dialogue has been excluded from the Group of Advisors to the TEC. 
The European Trade Union Confederation’s (ETUC) made a contribution to DG Trade’s 
public consultation as a part of the High Level Working Group in September 2012. The 
response iterates the group’s frustration with a lack of labor access to the TEC and the 
lack of substantive input it has been allowed: “The Transatlantic Business Dialogue has 
been given pride of place in the relationship, notably in advising the TEC, while the 
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European Trade Union Confederation and AFL-CIO, de facto constituting the 
Transatlantic Labour [sic] Dialogue, have been given little access. The agenda has been 
restrictive and non-strategic” (European Trade Union Confederation 2012). 
 US and EU labor groups, who are relatively organized members of domestic civil 
society and whose endorsement of trade agreements is generally important in the 
ratification process, have also noted that despite formal though not privileged 
participation in the process, they do not feel they are being heard. In testimony to the 
European Union Committee in the House of Lords of the United Kingdom Parliament on 
the TTIP, Damon Silvers, Director of Policy at the American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL- CIO), noted that he had spoken to the USTR 
Michael Froman:  
“ ‘about as many times as most people in the policy-making process in the 
United States’. He suggested that it was not the case that the American labour 
movement is radically isolated from the policy-making process, but rather that, 
‘you can be talked to without genuinely participating.’ He noted that having 
formal standing in the process did not mean being part of policy formulation, 
and that the only way to be included in the policy formulation process was to 
have a process that was sufficiently broadly open that you could marshal allies 
in the conversation. The civil society participants invited to join the TTIP 
process are almost entirely industry representatives” (House of Lords 2014, 85).  
  
The complaints from labor and consumer groups about the advisory process led to 
changes in the USTR’s advisory structure, but these were symbolic changes that 
reinforced a two-tier system of access for members of civil society and industry. 
Responding to broad criticism regarding the advisory process that led to the inclusion of 
copyright and patent-holder friendly intellectual property provisions in drafting of 
another trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, the USTR office 
announced in February 2014 that a Public Interest Trade Advisory Committee (PITAC) 
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would be formed. Negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership were conducted at the 
same time as the TTIP negotiations and both agreements have faced criticism after their 
perceived bias towards industry preferences.  
The new PITAC was formed in response to a refusal of the influential Industry 
Trade Advisory Committees (ITAC) to allow representatives of the public interest to 
attend their meetings. Indeed, this institutionalization marginalized and “segregate[d]” 
representatives of the public interest (Flynn 2014).  
 The corollary advisory group in the EU was convened by the EU Commission. It 
convened a TTIP Advisory Group composed of stakeholders who represent broader 
interests than the USTR advisors. These include representatives from consumer affairs 
and environmental affairs, and labor groups (Directorate General for Trade 2014a).59 The 
creation of the group was announced in January 2014 and the group’s first meeting took 
place in March 2014, after three rounds of negotiations had been completed. If 
negotiations had been completed on ‘one tank of gas’, as desired by both the EU and US 
because of the timing of the US elections and the formation of the new Commission, the 
Advisory Group may have not been formed (Froman 2013). The European Commission 
Directorate-General for Trade (DG Trade) has also initiated public consultations about 
aspects of the TTIP, US-EU economic relations and transatlantic regulatory issues, 
among them two joint consultations with the US, to target all stakeholders. However, 
most have garnered responses from business associations and large firms.   
Figures 23, 24, and 25 map the connections between the major institutions in the 
transatlantic regulatory regime before and after the financial crisis, indicating the 
                                                
59 These EU-level advisors are also joined by the member state-level advisors, who influenced member 
state government positions ahead of the Commission negotiation mandate, but this project will focus on 
groups who have influence over the ongoing process. 
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centrality of some institutions and the amount of input from advisory institutions. A solid 
arrow denotes input and advice from one institution to another. The thickness of the 
arrows signifies the amount of input that the institutions have.  
 
Figure 23: Transatlantic Regulatory Regime Map, 2006 
 
Source: Author generated. 
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Figure 24: Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime Map, 2007 
 
Source: Author generated. 
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Figure 25: Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime Map, post 2007 
 
Source: Author generated. 
 The maps above demonstrate that centrality of the TABC/D in the transatlantic 
financial regulatory regime and its particular input into the HLWG and TTIP processes. 
The TACD also maintains a strong connection to the TEC but has not participated as 
frequently in advising the TTIP process. The input of labor actors is missing completely 
from the regime as the Transatlantic Labor Dialogue has functionally disbanded. Though 
the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue regularly meets, as discussed previously the group 
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has achieved very little and is not functionally contributing to the TEC group or the other 
institutions in the regime. 
The TTIP negotiations are conducted in relative secrecy and do not reveal drafts 
of the agreement to governments and the public for comment, unlike WTO trade 
agreements.60  Since the European Commission has exclusive competence to conduct 
trade negotiations, the Council of Trade Ministers have agreed on a negotiation directive 
(mandate) which gives instructions to the Commission regarding the content and 
direction of negotiations (European Council 2013). While EU member state governments 
and select European Parliament officials have access to EU texts, at the request of the US 
they do not have access to US draft texts (House of Lords 2014, 10). DG Trade published 
its initial negotiating positions; the US has not. 
In the context of the TTIP, civil society and industry actors have been deliberately 
organized by the US and EU in efforts to give a directing voice to industry. This voice 
has begun to eclipse other voices in influencing the transatlantic regulatory regime and 
has begun demanding service from domestic regulatory bodies; industry actors are 
steering and the state is rowing by providing a new form of service: institution building. 
In the dogma of mainstream international political economy, the role of the state has been 
eroded by the processes of globalization. In the transatlantic financial regulatory regime, 
the state has moved beyond the provision of traditional services and instead has a new 
role building institutions for industry actors. These institutions are infrastructure that will 
allow industry to compete globally. This is a paradigm shift in international political 
economy. 
                                                
60 There is evidence that significant developments in WTO negotiations take place outside of formal drafts, 
but in the TTIP process EU member state governments have access to neither. See Jawara and Kwa 2004.  
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Institutionalization of Industry as Civil Society 
 
Mobilizing industry in an official advisory capacity is a significant piece of the 
EU-US strategy to support the establishment of international regulatory regimes that 
allow industry actors to contribute to the EU and US GDPs.  
As mentioned in Chapter 4, members of the TABC have regular meetings with 
officials in the TEC. Industry actors have voice opportunity at these meetings and are 
encouraged to express the issues they face and the regulatory regimes they would like to 
see established. 
The TABD played a crucial role in the 1990s in “quadrilateral” negotiations 
between the EU and US on regulatory issues and established breakthroughs towards 
mutual recognition agreements (Cowles 2000). In testimony to the US House Committee 
on International Relations, US Acting Assistant Commerce Secretary Franklin J. Vargo 
made the following comments about the role of the TABD: 
“What it has done is to focus business attention on the transatlantic marketplace 
and to enable businesses on both sides of the Atlantic to agree on what the most 
important remaining barriers are and to agree on a joint course of action to 
recommend to the U.S. Government and the European Commission.It is difficult 
to overstate the effect the TABD has had on trade liberalization. No other forum 
has risen so rapidly to become as effective as the TABD. It has become the single 
most important channel through which business can influence the bilateral 
trade and commercial agenda of the U.S. Government and the European 
Commission. The European Commission's Sir Leon Brittan summed up the 
process well when he said, ‘whenever our two business communities can agree 
jointly that an action is in the mutual interest of our two economies, it is 
incumbent upon us to seek to implement their recommendation -- or at the 
very least to sit down with them and explain why we cannot, and to try to work 
out another approach’ ” (Vargo 1997, emphasis added). 
 
Vargo’s testimony identifies the steering role played by the TABD in the mutual 
recognition agreements between the EU and US; representatives of business identified 
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areas for cooperation and then the US and EU followed by implementing their solutions.  
The TABD did this not only by serving as direct interlocutors with representatives from 
the US Department of Commerce, European Commission, and EU and US regulatory 
agencies but also by organizing to influence domestic politics and opinions (Cowles 
2000). 
In the previous section this project has demonstrated that after the financial crisis 
the connections between civil society groups and the transatlantic regulatory regime 
changed. Next the project will review the quantities of submissions to the regulatory 
regime.  
The aforementioned High-Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG) 
conducted a series of public consultations, in 2012 through DG Trade and then a joint 
consultation with the USTR that allowed EU and US-based business organizations, 
public authorities, firms, non-governmental organizations, and individuals to make 
suggestions about the direction of EU-US cooperation. Below the responses to the 
consultation are coded to see who “sets the agenda” of the TTIP talks since the HLWG 
was tasked with doing so. Fahey and Curtin (2014) have recently asked “Who did the 
HLWG listen to?” and partially answer their question by citing a private Commission 
non-paper,  “It is based on ideas put forward by EU and US industry and builds on 
existing cooperation between EU and US regulators in this area” (Fahey and Curtin 2014: 
217). It is beyond the scope of the authors’ analysis to identify who those industries are 
so this project seeks to identify three factors from the submissions to the HLWG.  
The responses to the public consultations are coded first by category of 
organization: business, trade association representing business, trade union or 
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organization representing trade unions, consumer protection agency or representative, 
government institution or regulator authority, other non-governmental organization, 
academic/research institution, citizen, and other. The purpose of counting frequency is to 
determine which civil society actors have the most input into the process. These category 
codes were created by DG Trade in this Second Consultation from September 2012 but 
have been applied in this project to each consultation. The submissions are then coded if 
they are supportive of including financial services or products in an agreement between 
the EU and US.  
Then each actor submitting a response is coded if the financial industry is 
represented by the actor. Financial services industry or firms must be explicitly 
mentioned by the organization in the membership description. In order to investigate the 
transnational character and breadth of the support for the EU-US agreement, joint 
submissions are also coded. Joint EU-US submission refers to a submission on behalf of 
at least one industry, regulatory or consumer protection group from the EU and at least 
one from the US. Finally, the results were coded to count the frequency of support for the 
inclusion of finance in an EU-US agreement. The responses coded “supportive of 
including finance in trade agreement” include language that does not merely mention 
financial services or products but suggests they should be included in a trade agreement. 








Figure 26: Agenda Setting Consultations 
Organization Subject Closing Date 
High Level Working Group Areas to cooperate April 2012 
DG Trade Future of EU-US trade and 
economic relations 
September 2012 
DG Trade-DG Enterprise and 
USTR/OIRA 
Solicitation on Regulatory 
Issues 
October 2012 
Source: Author generated. 
Figure 27: EU-US Public Consultation Results 
Legend 
Indicator Code 
Supportive of including finance in trade 
agreement 
SIF 
Joint EU-US Submission J 
Finance industry represented in group/business FIN 
 
April 2012 Consultation 
Code # SIF FIN J 
Business 7  1  
Trade association representing business  34 9 4 1 
Trade union or organization representing trade 
unions 
    
Consumer protection agency or representative     
Government institution or regulator authority 2    
Other non-governmental organization 3    
Academic/research institution 1    
Citizen 1    
Other     






DG Trade Public Consultation September 201261 
Code Self-Report # SIF FIN J 
Business 28 13 2   
Trade association representing business 47 42 5 1  
Trade union or organization representing trade 
unions 
8 3 2   
Consumer protection agency or representative      
Government institution or regulator authority 3 1 1   
Other non-governmental organization 5 6 1   
Academic/research institution 1 1    
Citizen 8 6 1   
Other 14     
Total 114 72 12 1 0 
 
 
Joint EU-US solicitation on regulatory issues issued by DG Enterprise/DG  
 
Trade and OIRA/USTR October 2012 
Code # SIF FIN J 
Business 8 2 1  
Trade association representing business 78 10 8 14 
Trade union or organization representing trade 
unions 
    
Consumer protection agency or representative 2    
Government institution or regulator authority 1    
Other non-governmental organization 5   1 
Academic/research institution     
Citizen     
Other     
Total 94 12 9 15 
Source: Author generated. 
                                                
61 Of 114 responses, 77 selected to make their submissions public. Duplicates have been removed to reveal 
the total of 72. DG Trade asked that organizations self-report, however several associations 
misappropriated codes. The full coding completed for this project is available in Appendix 5. Consultation 
conducted by DG Trade closing September 2012. 
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Figure 28: Responses to Public Consultation as Percentages, 2012 
 
Source: Author generated. 
The public consultation submissions were overwhelmingly in favor of a bold free 
trade agreement between the EU and US and the key priorities were summarized as, 
“trade in goods, trade in services, investment, public procurement, intellectual property, 
rules of origin, the digital economy, access to raw materials, visa procedures and in 
particular ‘21st century’ trade issues such as regulatory cooperation and non-tariff 
barriers. Additionally, enhanced cooperation in relation to third countries and the 
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importance of preserving the role of the WTO multilateral system has been highlighted” 
(Directorate General for Trade Executive Summary, 2). 
There are five developments in the public consultations relevant to this project. 
First, industry associations and business together comprised 85 percent of the responses 
to the calls. Second, sixteen groups of EU and US trade associations and 
nongovernmental organizations replied with joint statements. For example, two large 
automotive industry groups, AAPC (American Automotive Policy Council) and ACEA 
(European Automobile Manufacturers Association) and the European Chemical Industry 
Council (CEFIC) and American Chemistry Council (ACC), issued joint replies to the 
joint solicitation on regulatory issues which was closed in October 2012. Those groups 
that responded to the regulatory call replied with areas of regulations which could be 
harmonized. Occasionally, groups also identified a way regulations could be harmonized 
without distributional costs and providing benefits to industry actors on both sides of the 
Atlantic. This directs DG Trade and the USTR to ways that they can provide service to 
firms and industries by harmonizing regulation. It also supports this project’s assertion 
that domestic civil society and industry actors are organizing at the transatlantic level, 
which may increase their influence in the transatlantic regulatory regime. 
Third, industry actors unrelated to finance made a push for finance to be included 
in a trade agreement. In total thirty-three responses requested that financial services be 
included in the agreement. The Chamber of Commerce organizations, some of which 
represent finance organizations, were nearly universally supportive of the inclusion of 
financial regulatory issues. Furthermore individual businesses (like Intel), labor unions, 
and citizens also suggested financial regulation be included in a trade agreement. The 
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push from non-financial industry actors and associations to include financial services in 
TTIP signifies an alignment of interests between general industry and the financial 
industry. Because of financialization, corporations rely on financial products and 
activities to make profits and give returns to their shareholders.  
Fourth, the finance industry seemed to be surprised by the call and was 
unprepared to contribute to it. (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
2012) Initially, the American Chamber of Commerce to the EU (AmChamEU), suggested 
that in financial services, “[t]he volume and complexity of the issues to be addressed in 
the financial services sector are better suited to a bespoke process amongst EU and US 
rule-makers than an FTA. However, we believe that a set of key principles for regulatory 
cooperation and convergence applying to all sectors, including financial services, should 
be an integral element of an FTA, even if their application needs to be delivered through 
sector-specific mechanisms” (AmChamEU 2012). However, since AmChamEU has 
changed its position and requested regulatory cooperation on financial services be 
included in TTIP (AmCham EU 2015). 
Fifth, Latvia, Denmark, and the Administrative Conference of the US also 
submitted responses to the public consultations.62 This suggests that government actors 
also feel the need to reorganize at the transatlantic level in order to influence the 
decision-making process directly.  
                                                
62 “The Administrative Conference of the United States is an independent federal agency dedicated to 
improving the administrative process through consensus-driven applied research, providing nonpartisan 
expert advice and recommendations for improvement of federal agency procedures. Its membership is 
composed” (Administrative Conference 2016). A chairperson and ten council members are appointed by 
the President. Members are both private citizens and members of government. 
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Few submissions addressed global competition as an impetus for the EU and US 
to cooperate. However the Transatlantic Business Dialogue in its own contribution to the 
April 2012 public consultation summarized quite well the impetus for the EU and US to 
leverage their collective power to influence third countries: 
“The notion is mistaken that we can ‘go it alone’ in trying to convince other 
countries to reject protectionist trade policies, forego discriminatory industrial and 
regulatory policies, and provide adequate and effective intellectual property 
protection. This can also lead to serious missed policy opportunities for the 
United States and the EU to raise the bar in terms of setting international norms 
and standards. Strengthening transatlantic bonds is important not only in terms of 
how Europeans and Americans relate to each other, but how we can harness the 
potential of the transatlantic partnership to open markets in other countries, 
especially the emerging growth markets, and strengthen the international 
economic system” (Transatlantic Business Dialogue and the Business Roundtable 
2012, 3). 
 
 Preserving the influence of the “core market economies” on the international 
regulatory regime is indeed a major impetus behind the new spate of transatlantic 
regulatory regime building. The HLWG final report conclusions suggested that the EU 
and US “reach bilateral agreement on globally relevant rules, principles, or modes of 
cooperation” in several sectors of the economy (EU-US High Level Working Group on 
Jobs and Growth 2013, 6). The next step in establishing “globally relevant rules” was to 
initiate negotiations.  
 During each TTIP negotiation round, negotiators listen to presentations by 
registered stakeholders and then update them on the progress of negotiations in a briefing. 
The negotiation rounds alternate between being hosted in the European Union and in the 
United States. The host institution keeps the records of stakeholder presentations and 
registration for the briefings. In the case of the EU, these records are disseminated by DG 
Trade and in the case of the US these records are made available on the USTR’s blog, 
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Tradewinds.63 The presentations and registered participants for the eight rounds of 
negotiations are coded using the categories applied to the public consultation responses.  
There have been eight rounds of negotiations through March 2015 but there are only data 
for six of the stakeholder sessions. The second round of negotiations and stakeholder 
presentations, scheduled for October 2013, was postponed until November 2013 because 
of the United States federal government shutdown. Though the stakeholders briefing took 
place on November 15, 2013 no schedule of presentations was made available publicly. 
A list of registered participants is available however without voice participation. The 
seventh round of stakeholder presentations, which took place on October 1, 2014, is not 
publicly available either. This round was hosted by the United States but the record of 
stakeholder presentations is not available on the USTR blog.64  
Figure 29: TTIP Stakeholder Presentations Coding 
Category First Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Eighth Total 
Academic or Research Institution 3 2 3 6 2 0 16 
Business 6 5 1 2 0 1 15 
Consumer Protection Agency or 
Representative 
5 5 5 5 4 2 26 
Government Institution, State 
Representative or Regulatory 
Authority 
1 2 1 4 1 1 10 
Other Non-governmental 
Organization 
7 10 13 12 11 16 69 
Other 0 0 1 1 3 3 8 
Trade Association or Cross-sector 
Business Association 
27 28 60 43 46 55 259 
Trade Union or Organization 
Representing Trade Unions 
1 1 7 3 5 3 20 
Total 50 53 91 76 70 81 421 
Source: Author generated. 
                                                
63 USTR, “Tradewinds” https://ustr.gov/tradewinds 
64 These records have been requested but are not currently available. 
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Figure 30: TTIP Stakeholder Presentations, through March 2015 
 
Source: Author Generated. 
The stakeholder presentations are consistent with the findings of the public 
consultation responses in one regard: trade associations and cross-sector associations 
dominate the responses. There is a notable uptick in government participation in two 
rounds hosted in the US, round three with two presentations and round five with four 
presentations. Of these, three presentations were by US state and regional trade 
promotion offices (Vermont, Maine, and Virginia-Washington DC) that promote 
domestic state businesses in other US states and internationally in economic 
paradiplomacy.  
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There are four points of interest in the stakeholder presentations. First, industry 
representatives composed sixty-one percent of the total stakeholder presentations. While 
this figure is less than the seventy-two percent of the HLWG public consultations, it is 
still a significant majority compared to the participation percentages of the other 
stakeholder groups.  
The second point is the lack of diversity in some of the civil society categories. 
Consumer protection representatives gave six percent of presentations, but most of these 
were given by one organization on several different topics. Public Citizen gave eleven of 
the twenty-six presentations in the consumer protection agency or representative 
category. Consumer protection agencies and representatives are lacking in diversity of 
voice at the transatlantic level.65 This is a stark contrast to the industry, which often has 
two or three associations per industry giving presentations. This is despite the 
organization of a Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, which was created as a counterpart 
to the TABD/C. The voice of consumers in the TTIP is monotone. Of course, there is a 
disparity in resources available to consumer advocacy groups and business and industry 
groups and this disparity is likely reflected in their participation. 
Third, there were only five joint EU-US stakeholder presentations in all six 
stakeholder presentation sessions. Furthermore, the five joint presentations were all by 
the same group of industry organizations: American Automotive Policy Council (AAPC), 
European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (Association des Constructeurs 
Européens d'Automobiles or ACEA) and, on all but one occasion, the Alliance of 
Automobile Manufacturers (Auto Alliance). AAPC and ACEA also submitted a joint 
                                                
65 Corporate Europe Observatory is very active in advocacy regarding the TTIP, but has not contributed as 
extensively to the stakeholder presentations as Public Citizen. 
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response to the joint EU-US public consultation on regulatory issues in October 2012. 
This may indicate that the automotive industry is well organized at the transatlantic level 
and has a high convergence in regulatory preferences compared to other industries. Since 
the joint code is only applied to organizations with one domestic EU organization and 
one domestic US organization, it does not represent the transnational and transatlantic 
organizations that gave presentations. These include the Trans-Atlantic Business Council 
and the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue as well as worldwide non-governmental 
organizations. 
Fourth, non-governmental organizations presentations largely account for the 
increase in non-industry participation compared to the public consultations. Non-
governmental organizations increased their participation by eleven percent. Most NGOs 
who participated in the consultations were environmental and animal welfare groups. In 
fact, animal welfare groups participated in a joint response. However, the internal 
composition of groups responding to the consultations did not change much over time. 
Part of this increase may be attributable to the issue of sequencing and time. Negotiations 
and stakeholder presentations have been held over nineteen months compared to the short 
seven-month period in which the three consultations coded herein were conducted. Trade 
negotiations also gain momentum and public attention and interest increases. 
Nongovernmental organizations may also be more accustomed to participating in 
stakeholder presentations organized around trade agreements than public consultations 
conducted jointly by regulatory authorities and trade regulators. 
The HLWG and TTIP consultations and stakeholder presentations attempt to elicit 
direction from civil society and industry on the shape and content of the transatlantic 
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regulatory regime. Industry actors participate more frequently than all other civil society 
actors put together in both of these settings.  
The HLWG and TTIP followed another successful transatlantic institution that 
sought to determine and serve industry actors in a regulatory regime. In 2005 the US-EU 
Intellectual Property Rights Working Group was established and has since been renamed 
the Transatlantic Intellectual Property Rights Working Group (TIPRG). The high-level 
working group has regular meetings and reports both to the Transatlantic Economic 
Council and US-EU summits.  
The commonalities in EU and US intellectual property rights (IPR) domestic legal 
protections, the strength of knowledge-based industry in both of their economies, the 
importance of securing intellectual property for sectors of their economies, and the 
significant threat of international infringement of existing domestic IPR were impetuses 
for the creation of the group.66 The TIPRWG Action Strategy is described as focusing on 
three areas, “engagement on IPR issues in third countries, customs cooperation, and 
public-private partnerships” (Transatlantic IPR Working Group Description).  
The TIPRG has also sought to directly serve industry actors to help them 
compete. In 2010 the Working Group developed web-based technology for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) to access existing resources to address violations of IPR by 
actors in third countries. The TransAtlantic IPR Web Portal brings together resources and 
information in the form of “country kits” for smaller firms to more readily counter 
violations of their IPR (TransAtlantic IPR Portal). This addressed the largest failing of 
existing enforcement mechanisms which was the significant financial commitment 
                                                
66 The U.S. Commerce Department refers to these sectors of the US economy as “IP intensive industries” in 
a report which underscores the importance of secure property rights to the gross domestic product (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 2012, ii). 
 186 
required to pursue IPR on the global level that allowed only large firms or coordinated 
industries to be able to take advantage of foreign legal remedies or inspire a World Trade 
Organization dispute. 
The EU and US sought to provide services to intellectual property owners, 
catering specifically to small and medium enterprise owners who have a difficult time 
enforcing their intellectual property rights abroad unlike their large multinational 
counterparts. This is indicative of the shift in regulatory roles for the state and for 
industry in order to encourage regulatory competition which continues in the TTIP. 
Government Support for a Transatlantic Financial Regulatory Regime 
Financial services are currently addressed by a draft chapter in the TTIP 
agreement. European Union officials have been clear that they prefer financial services 
be included, as it is a stated priority of negotiations for France and the United Kingdom. 
The EU Commission intends the chapter on financial services only to address the 
coherency of the recent wave of post-crisis financial regulation, which is already in the 
process of implementation in both the EU and US. In his written response to the 
European Parliament about his priorities as Commissioner, EU Commissioner Jonathan 
Hill named only the US in a section about the “international dimension” and explained 
how the EU and US would seek to service financial industry actors: “I will seek to 
deepen regulatory cooperation with the US on financial services, in particular to avoid 
companies [sic] having to comply with two sets of similar but not identical rules” (Hill 
2014, 4). In a speech at the Brookings Institute, Commissioner Hill explained exactly 
how that enhanced regulatory cooperation would work to cement the positions of the US 
and EU in the international financial regulatory regime: 
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“Given the volume of business done between the EU and the U.S., it makes sense 
for transatlantic cooperation to go into greater detail than the level currently seen 
in international fora. Enhanced cooperation should allow us to consult each other 
at an early stage in the regulatory process. And, importantly, our consistent 
implementation of international standards and close supervisory cooperation would 
mean that the EU and the U.S. would be able to rely on each other's rules. So the 
benefits of transatlantic cooperation are clear. We'd provide a larger and more 
efficient marketplace for financial firms, giving them greater capacity to provide 
finance for the economy. Early troubleshooting and greater supervisory 
cooperation would mean we could maintain financial stability more efficiently, and 
we would solidify the leading role of the EU and the United States in financial 
regulation” (Hill 2015, 10). 
 
The US has a fragmented position. The Treasury Secretary, Jack Lew, and Office 
of the USTR have articulated their position that the US position is willing to include 
market access issues but not regulatory harmonization efforts, while members of 
Congress, including both Republicans and Democrats, would like to see financial 
services included in the TTIP (House of Lords 2014). In a meeting with former EU 
Commissioner of Internal Market and Services Michel Barnier, in July 2013 Secretary 
Lew reportedly emphasized that “prudential and financial regulatory cooperation should 
continue in existing and appropriate global fora, such as the G-20, Financial Stability 
Board, and international standard setting bodies, consistent with existing ambitious 
international timelines” (Fairless and Trindle 2013).  
American government resistance to including financial services in the TTIP 
comes from several quarters. First, US officials reiterate that there is an ongoing bilateral 
dialogue on harmonizing financial services regulation, via the Financial Market 
Regulatory Dialogue (FMRD) which was established in 2002, as well as a multilateral 
process through the Financial Stability Board (Atlantic Council 2014). Second, there is a 
perception amongst government officials in the US that EU financial regulations are 
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weaker than American regulations.67 Despite the fragmented position of US 
governmental actors, the TTIP contains a chapter on financial services (Directorate 
General for Trade 2016). This is an indication that the unified industry support for the 
inclusion of financial services is driving the institutionalization of a transatlantic financial 
regulatory regime. 
The Atlantic Council, a nonpartisan think tank, has followed suit in developing a 
call for deeper cooperation on financial services and involves domestic policymakers in 
its call. The Council in partnership with Thomson Reuters published a report on The 
Danger of Divergence: Transatlantic Cooperation on Financial Reform in October 2010. 
The report co-chairs were Sharon Bowles, Member of the European Parliament and Chair 
of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee in the European Parliament, then 
Senator Chuck Hagel, who was serving as the Chairman of the Atlantic Council, and 
Senator Mark Warner, member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs. The taskforce assembled to create the report included seven members of 
the financial services industry, eight ambassadors, four academics, two representatives of 
the Atlantic Council, two representatives of Thomson Reuters, and a rapporteur from the 
Brookings Institute. This report does not mention cooperation with other foreign powers 
other than two references to global competition as threats.68 Both references support the 
assertion that international regulatory competition is driving transatlantic cooperation.  
                                                
67 See pages 143-146 for the discussion about this perception, and specifically about the differences in 
regulations on risk weights and capital requirements. 
68 “There is a real possibility that US, or even Asian, remuneration packages will become significantly 
more attractive to top bankers and traders than those available to workers in The City or other financial 
centers in the EU. This could lead to a shift in financial market share away from the EU as other markets 
find it easier to attract and retain top talent. Arguably, this is a form of economic competition that is 
healthy, allowing different nations to take alternative approaches which eventually allow global best 
practices to develop. However, it seems quite possible that excessive differences between the approaches 
on the two shores of the Atlantic could create unnecessary disruptions of the existing financial system” 
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In December 2013, the Council and Thomson Reuters were joined by TheCityUK 
and assembled a task force of government officials, academics, lawyers and bankers to 
address “The Danger of Divergence: Financial Reform and the G20 Agenda.” The co-
chairs of the report were Sharon Bowles, still a member European Parliament, Senator 
Christopher Murphy, then Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee 
on European Affairs, US Senate and the report was prepared by Dr. Chris Brummer, C. 
Boyden Gray Fellow on Global Finance & Growth at the Atlantic Council and Professor 
of Law at Georgetown University. The foreword in December 2013 notes that: 
“As the United States and Europe continue to work to secure their 
financial markets after the crises of 2008-10, they also face new and 
growing challenges in a rapidly evolving global economy. Countries such 
as China, India, Brazil and other emerging markets are outpacing 
growth rates in the transatlantic economies, and new investment 
opportunities are arising around the world. […] [This report] calls on 
leaders to work collaboratively to ensure the future stability and vitality 
of the global financial system. We have come together to highlight a set 
of crucial ongoing issues with transatlantic financial regulatory reform, 
and offer an approach to addressing these. At the heart of the report is a 
call for enhanced and more effective cooperation on this key 
international challenge. We believe this is not only an economic and 
financial imperative for our countries, but also of great international 
strategic importance. Our two economies must continue to set the 
global standard for financial regulation and recognize the significant 
value in doing so” (Atlantic Council 2013, 1, emphasis added). 
 
The Atlantic Council and policymakers politically securitize finance’s role in the 
global competition facing the EU and US. The report demonstrates that state support for 
the transatlantic financial regulatory regime is a response to international competition in 
finance-led growth, that finance-led growth is the strategic goal of the regime, and that 
                                                                                                                                            
(Atlantic Council 2010, 17-18); “The global nature of the markets that use these bodies makes it imperative 
that regulators coordinate their approaches, even though harmonization may require that national 
institutions face real global competition” (Atlantic Council 2010, 35). 
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the transatlantic financial regulatory regime is seeking to impose its standards on the 
international financial regulatory regime. 
Government support for the transatlantic financial regulatory regime is clear in 
the EU. In the US, despite a disjointed government position, the government has 
participated in creating a transatlantic financial regulatory regime. This is indicative of 
the steering role played by transnational industry actors in the transatlantic oarsmen 
cooperative. 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
 The TTIP negotiations formally launched in July 2013. While traditional trade 
agreements are generally as narrow, one-off agreements on traditional tariff barriers to 
trade, the TTIP is substantively distinct from these and is one of a new class of free trade 
agreements. First, the TTIP will principally tackle non-tariff barriers to trade. As the EU 
and US are service economies with few remaining tariff barriers between them 
remaining, a primary goal of the TTIP is to address regulatory issues, including barriers 
to market access. Second, the TTIP is an attempt to create a free trade area and, by 
establishing a transatlantic regulatory regime in several sectors, integrate the transatlantic 
economy. Studies that project significant economic benefits of the TTIP rely heavily on 
this comprehensive approach. Third, the TTIP is reactive to the lack of progress in the 
Doha round of negotiations in the WTO and attempts to position common EU-US 
standards as those perpetuated by the international regulatory regime. This may either be 
pursued by seeking the ‘multilateralization’ of these standards through inclusion in a 
WTO agreement or through attractive power marked by the large percentage of global 
trade, foreign direct investment, and gross domestic product for which the EU-US 
economic relationship accounts (House of Lords 2014). Finally, the TTIP is being drafted 
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to be a living agreement. That is, not just a trade agreement but rather one that establishes 
mechanisms to provide continuing regulatory harmonization and settle potential disputes 
over future regulatory developments—an ongoing transatlantic regulatory regime. One of 
these mechanisms is a “Horizontal Chapter” which will establish a regulatory council to 
resolve ongoing regulatory inconsistencies with the goal of avoiding WTO disputes 
(Alemanno 2014). 
One of the most controversial living elements of the TTIP is the investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) clause. Investor-state dispute settlement clauses are included in 
some free trade agreements. The clauses give legal standing to foreign investors in the 
host state in case they face barriers that violate the host state’s treaty obligations. A 
dispute can be settled in arbitration proceedings or in host state domestic courts. If the 
ISDS clause is included in the TTIP and the US or EU passes regulation which imposes 
compliance costs on the other party’s firms or changes their market access, the foreign 
firms can sue. Though settlement usually involves an international court or arbitration 
procedure, the TTIP appears to be mimicking the Chapter 11 provision in the North 
Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), such that its ISDS clause would allow injured 
firms to bring a suit directly against the offending state.  Consumer advocates and anti-
corporation groups suggest that this can lead to a lowest common denominator approach 
to future regulation. If the US and EU avoid onerous regulation because it would invite 
lawsuits from multinational firms, they would be left with the lowest common 
denominator of regulation (Fielder and d’Imécourt 2014; Corporate Europe Observatory 
2014a). This clause is one example of service provision by the state to industry actors as 
it would effectively thwart new regulations. In financial regulation domestic regulators 
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have created different rules for domestic and foreign institutions. The ISDS could prevent 
regulators from applying discriminatory rules in the future.69 DG Trade opened a public 
call in 2014 to address ISDS but the USTR did not. The EU and US stand firm that it will 
be included. 
Recognizing that the TTIP chapter negotiations were being perceived as a 
“corporate wishlist” and ruled by the interests of large multinational corporations, the 
USTR and DG Trade made efforts to convince small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
that the TTIP would benefit them as well (Brad Markell, Executive Director of the AFL-
CIO in House of Lords 2014, 84). SMEs are often less likely to be able to afford the cost 
of navigating and overcoming regulatory barriers to entry compared to multinational 
corporations with larger budgets and compliance departments. For this reason, the USTR 
and DG Trade launched a campaign of public consultations to identify the obstacles faced 
by SMEs and then provide information about how they may be overcome by the TTIP. 
The result is a colorful brochure called the TTIP Opportunities for SMEs, joint-issued by 
the USTR and DG Trade, that explains how the TTIP would help small businesses 
(Directorate General for Trade and the U.S. Trade Representative). The US International 
Trade Commission (USITC) also released a report which catalogues the “trade-related 
barriers that U.S. small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) perceive as 
disproportionately affecting their exports to the European Union (EU) relative to large 
                                                
69 The banking sector is the most impacted by the domestic/foreign distinction. The Federal Reserve has 
adopted new capital requirements for foreign banking organizations as well as annual stress tests. “The new 
rules were approved unanimously by the U.S. central bank but fanned a long-running spat with the 
European Union, where most of the affected banks are based. […]Michel Barnier, European commissioner 
for the internal market, said in a statement: "We will not be able to accept discriminatory measures which 
would have the effect of treating European banks worse than U.S. ones." […] Foreign banks have criticized 
the move as exporting U.S. rules overseas, saying the requirements could conflict with home-country 
regulations and force them to withdraw from the U.S. European banks have been considering measures to 
get around or mitigate the rules, including moving parts of their U.S. businesses or, like Dutch lender 
Rabobank, shrinking them below the Fed's asset threshold” (Armour and Tracey 2014). 
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exporters to the EU” (United States International Trade Commission 2014, iii). There 
may be a chapter included in the agreement on SMEs, which would shore up domestic 
support for the agreement. The inclusion of this chapter is an example of the US and EU 
providing services to industry on industry’s terms.  
 Industry actors have had an overwhelming influence over the agenda, content and 
direction of the TTIP negotiations and are now steering two regulatory states on the 
international level. Industry actor guidance has been cultivated through a formal 
transatlantic channel established by the EU and US and their domestic industry actors 
have reorganized at the transatlantic level; the state-level process has encouraged and 
provided an industry-level process as an official advisor. Their input has been crucial in 
deciding what mechanisms and sectors should be included in the TTIP. Industry is 
steering the creation of global governance institutions. Following the example of robust 
transatlantic regulatory cooperation in intellectual property rights, the US and EU have 
begun to provide service to firms seeking to compete on the international stage through a 
transatlantic financial regulatory regime. 
Conclusions 
This chapter analyzed the connections between the institutions in the transatlantic 
financial regulatory regime. The evidence presented indicates that compared with other 
civil society actors industry enjoys a privileged position in the process, participates more 
frequently in open consultations, and has an agenda-setting power. Mapping the input and 
formal advisory roles between institutions revealed that the TABC/D has the most 
connections to the other institutions and that industry is overrepresented in the USTR and 
DG Trade advisory groups. Analyzing the frequency of the contributions to the HLWG 
public consultations and the TTIP stakeholder presentation sessions, there is a clear 
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predominance of industry actor participation. The industry desire to have finance 
included in the TTIP is contrasted with TACD, Corporate Europe Observatory, Public 
Citizen, the USTR and US Treasury Secretary who argue that regulatory harmonization 
of financial services should be excluded.  
The next chapter will argue that the empirical evidence presented in this chapter 
indicates that a new stage of the relationship between the state and industry is emerging 





Chapter 6: Conclusions 
The Transatlantic Oarsmen Cooperative 
 In this chapter the theoretical departure point is the regulatory state and the 
division of labor between the state and civil society. The empirical evidence from the 
previous chapter indicates that a new stage of the relationship between the state and civil 
society is emerging in the transatlantic financial regulatory regime. In this stage, industry 
actors cast in a role as civil society are steering and the state is rowing. The changes to 
the international regulatory regime posed a challenge to the dominance of the EU and US 
in the international economic system. The threat incentivized industry to leverage the 
significant transatlantic investment relationship and seek a transatlantic solution.  I call 
this the transatlantic oarsmen cooperative and propose the oarsman state to explain this 
division of labor.  
Transnational financial industry actors are now seemingly united in wanting 
financial services to be addressed by the TTIP. Under scrutiny in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, the industry has been active through transnational lobbying groups and 
these groups are consistent respondents to public calls and consultations. A coded list of 
these groups replying to each of the consultations appears in Appendix 6.  
The upgrade of financial services cooperation from the Financial Markets 
Regulatory Dialogue (FMRD) to the TTIP is an example of oarsmen cooperative service 
to industry. The financial industry considers the FMRD a failure, often citing the lack of 
progress and lack of high-level political participation in the dialogue. (House of Lords 
2014) “While there exists a ‘Financial Services Regulatory Dialogue’ led by DG Markt 
[Internal Market and Services Directorate General] and the US Treasury, which brings 
together financial services regulatory authorities and central banks, it is not within the 
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ambit of the TEC. Furthermore, these dialogues are not producing, so far, binding 
results” (European Services Forum 2012, 3). The US Chamber of Commerce and DG 
Internal Market and Services have also supported the view that the FMRD is not working 
(House of Lords 2014, 34; Calvino 2013). However, the FMRD itself is an example of 
the US and EU trying to provide services to the financial industry. The FMRD is being 
outpaced by industry activity lobbying to upgrade collaboration on financial services 
regulation from the dialogue to the TTIP. 
Some consumer protection groups suggest that the financial industry sees the 
TTIP as an opportunity to renegotiate and reduce the financial regulation which was 
passed after the financial crisis (Corporate Europe Observatory 2014c). This is a 
particular concern in the US because several provisions of the Dodd-Frank act have yet to 
be implemented and financial industry actors are still lobbying the executive and 
independent agencies responsible for the details of implementation.70 
 The voice of financial firms has been clearer and more organized within the larger 
group of industry actor advisors to the TTIP process but has not been isolated. Non-
financial industry actors have also requested that regulation of financial services be a 
priority in the negotiations. Large multinational corporations, such as General Electric 
and Intel, are non-bank financing companies who face many of the same regulatory 
challenges as banks. As the Global Director of Trade and Investment Policy for Dow 
Chemical explains, “[…] as large-scale manufacturers, a lot of other companies had also 
been weighing in on [financial services in the TTIP], as access to capital is crucial to run 
                                                
70 Much of this lobbying is completed as public comments on calls for public input published by the 
agencies in the interest of transparency. For example, an ongoing SEC call for public input on the “SEC 
Regulatory Initiatives under the Dodd-Frank Act” details the many proposed regulations and allows 
comments on each has been open since 2010 (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). 
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their operations” (House of Lords 2014, 91). Financialization is critical to corporate 
operations and profit and this shared industry ideology has spurred an alliance of 
financial and non financial industry actors in the transatlantic regulatory regime. 
 DG Trade has revealed that financial services is tackled by a draft chapter in the 
TTIP agreement, despite US government and civil opposition. This demonstrates that 
industry is directing the institutionalization of the transatlantic financial regulatory 
regime. If financial services are included in a completed agreement and—as proposed by 
industry associations—establish not merely coherent but retooled harmonized financial 
services regulations, it would be a clearer indication that the state is no longer steering by 
providing the content of the regime. The existing bilateral channel for EU-US regulatory 
cooperation on financial services, FMRD, will be upgraded so that the state can provide 
greater service to the financial industry. Many elements of civil society, including labor 
organizations, consumer protection agencies, and environmental groups have opposed 
TTIP because it is perceived as putting industry in the driving seat. This opposition has 
been more organized and vocal in the EU.  
 Civil society played a dual steering and rowing role in the early 1900s in the 
absence of a state with regulatory expertise and bureaucracy. Prominent scholars see the 
development of neoliberalism as congruent to the rise of the regulatory state (Jordana and 
Levi-Faur 2004), however this project demonstrates that financialization, regulatory 
competition and economic interdependence have heralded a new role for 
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 According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, an oarsman is, “a person who rows 
a boat especially as a member of a racing team” (Merriam-Webster). The European 
Union and United States are attempting to create a team provide services to industry in 
order to compete globally; they are attempting to form a transatlantic oarsmen 
cooperative. A cooperative is an organization “organization that is owned and run jointly 
by its members, who share the profits or benefits” (Oxford 2016b). The EU and US 
conjointly run and benefit from the transatlantic regulatory regime, befitting the term 
cooperative. Each, as an oarsman state, creates domestic regulations that will support and 
attract industry. In the cooperative, they collaborate to provide the service of institution 
building to transnational civil society; most institutions are constructed to serve industry 
actors.  
 One prominent feature of the oarsman state is the nature of the service it provides 
civil society, and mostly industry, through rowing. In the aftermath of the financial crisis 
the oarsman state has gone beyond traditional service provision and is building 
institutions and architecture at the international level for different groups in civil society. 
This project has documented that the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was a critical juncture 
in the international financial regime that resulted in the US and EU altering the 
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transatlantic regulatory regime to continue to compete with a strategy of finance-led 
growth. The institutions the transatlantic oarsmen cooperative is building are intended to 
help industry, and specifically the finance industry, compete globally. In the transatlantic 
regulatory regime, the EU and US have created transatlantic institutions dedicated to 
allowing transatlantic civil society to organize and direct state activity. The TABC, 
TALD, and TACD are designed to give civil society a directing role and their input 
guides the activity of the TEC. The other institutions created by the EU and US provide 
more traditional service to industry, such as the TIPRG, which provides centralized 
access to intellectual property enforcement tools to SMEs. 
 This new dimension of service provided by the state to industry and the 
emergence of the phase of the oarsman state are connected to larger changes in the role of 
the state. International relations literature has questioned the autonomy of the state as 
global governance institutions give power to institutions, civil society, and other states.  
The oarsman state empowers civil society by (i) creating institutions for global civil 
society to organize, (ii) creating institutions for domestic industry to compete globally, 
and (iii) giving members of civil society advisory groups a steering role in the regulatory 
regime.  
 The oarsman state takes direction from civil society on which institutions are 
needed and what services should be provided. The transatlantic oarsmen cooperative is 
being steered directly by industry actors representing civil society. This project has 
documented that in the transatlantic regulatory regime the High Level Working Group on 
Jobs and Growth was steered to certain policy areas for regulatory cooperation by 
contributions to consultations by industry. Future research could also investigate the role 
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states or cooperatives have played in creating settings for other elements of transnational 
civil society, such as environmental dialogues and forums, to communicate their 
preferences, for state action. 
The oarsman state is a concept which offers new insights into the prevalence of 
different forms of regulatory regimes, such as public-private partnerships and private 
regulatory authorities. Private industry actors seek representation in public-private or 
private regulatory authorities to set the agenda of regulatory cooperation between states.  
 Industry enjoys privileged status in the TTIP and other global governance 
arrangements because globalization has increased pressure on jurisdictions to attract 
industries and corporations through regulatory competition. Tiebout’s model of 
regulatory competition suggests that the US and EU are harmonizing their regulations to 
compete as one jurisdiction. Some regulations impose clear costs on business activity; for 
example, the proposed financial transaction tax. However, some regulations have unclear 
implications for business activity and the costs of compliance for consumers and 
businesses. Jurisdictions may prefer to have the costs of regulation be as clear as possible 
to attract, or repel, an industry. For example, jurisdictions publicize tax breaks for film 
production in an attempt to lure film productions to their jurisdictions. One strategy 
governments can utilize to understand the unforeseen costs of regulation is ask the 
regulated what the costs might be.  
Regulatory competition is therefore a process that enhances the incentives for 
governments to listen to business about the unintended consequences of regulation. In the 
case of US and EU financial regulatory regimes the governments should be especially 
clear about consequences that would lead to slow or no GDP growth. The EU and US are 
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both facing incredible regulatory competition from jurisdictions with lower regulatory 
standards for several industries and higher growth rates. Their competition strategy is to 
harmonize transatlantic regulatory standards to dominate international regulatory 
standards. They are capable of creating these club standards because of the large size of 
their collective economic footprint (Drezner 2007). To be successful this choice of 
strategy requires the EU and US to understand what regulations are hampering growth 
and shaping industry and firm locational preferences. It requires the EU and US to 
collect, privilege and address the opinions and desires of industry. The transatlantic 
regulatory regime has created several institutions designed to collect this input. 
Regulatory competition is perhaps never a higher-stakes game for the EU and US 
than it is in the area of the financial industry. Financialization has led countries to 
increasingly depend on the financial industry for growth. Financial regulation seen as 
hostile to the industry could lead to lower growth if industry actors vote with their feet 
and move to jurisdictions with regulation they prefer. Therefore in the oarsmen 
cooperative, the EU and US may continue to allow the financial industry to steer 
regulation that policymakers believe will increase the growth of their economies and 
provide service by creating dedicated, institutionalized bilateral channels. The TTIP is 
indicative of the new era of the oarsman state. 
Broader Implications of the Oarsman State 
The empirical findings of this project are that several aspects of the transatlantic 
financial regulatory regime have changed after the financial crisis, and more surprisingly 
some endure. The regime has reorganized and added a trade negotiation and economic 
council to its decision-making structures. The regime has politically securitized the 
finance industry and this has led to an increase of the salience of financial industry actors 
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to the regime. The regime’s new decision-making procedures are giving industry actors a 
privileged position compared to the other civil society groups not only in the pre-existing 
institutionalized channel of the TABC but also through advisory groups to the TTIP 
process. The goal of creating a new harmonized set of rules is to compete against other 
jurisdictions. The norms and ideology of the regime remain constant: financialization and 
finance-led growth is ideal to compete. The original empirical contribution of this project 
is demonstrating that after the financial crisis the reverberations from EU, US, and 
international regulatory regime changes prompted the US and EU to create a transatlantic 
financial regulatory regime to compete in the international financial regulatory regime. 
 Civil society actors at all levels are reacting to the rupture in the regimes after the 
2007-2009 financial crisis and some are contributing their preferences to shape them. 
Domestic civil society actors, such as AAPC and ACEA, are organizing at the 
transatlantic level with joint responses to public consultations and stakeholder 
presentations. Multinational corporations and broader industry actors, such as Intel and 
General Electric, have supported the financial industry actors’ demands for a harmonized 
transatlantic financial regulatory regime to lower compliance costs and facilitate financial 
flows. The institutionalized transatlantic dialogues, with the exception of the defunct 
Transatlantic Labor Dialogue, are advising the Transatlantic Economic Council and 
analyzing developments in TTIP. Industry actors are the most frequent participants in the 
regime, but consumer advocacy groups are mobilizing against what they consider the EU 
and US pursuing a corporate wishlist in TTIP. Civil society participating in international 
regulatory regimes could continue to be dominated by actors with the infrastructure, 
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access, information, and financial resources to organize at the transnational level: 
business associations and multinational corporations.  
This constellation of civil society might be aided, as it is now by the transatlantic 
regulatory regime, by states and global governance organizations privileging industry’s 
input and creating institutions for that purpose. The EU and US are casting industry in a 
role as civil society. This may be an attempt to legitimize the creation of a transatlantic 
regulatory regime that results in regulation in the interest of the regulated.   
 The transatlantic regulatory regime is allowing civil society, and specifically 
industry actors in the TABC/D, EU Expert Group, USTR ITAC, HLWG public 
consultations, and TTIP stakeholder presentation sessions, to steer and the EU and US 
governments are rowing to provide the services that would suit industry preferences. This 
empirical finding supports the concept of the oarsman state, an extension of the theory of 
the regulatory state to a new stage. The oarsman state has been precipitated by 
competition between regulatory regimes and in the case addressed in this project by an 
intensification of competition after the financial crisis.  
 One major implication of this new stage in the relationship between civil society 
and the state is that regulatory regimes will be steered by the civil society actors who are 
considered most vital to winning regulatory competition amongst jurisdictions. In many 
types of regulatory regimes, this civil society actor will be industry actors, including 
multinational corporations and industry associations. Industry actors may direct the 
content of regulation in regimes formulated at the international level through new 
dynamic trade agreements and technocratic dialogues. As trade agreements like the TTIP 
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are developed to not only enhance trade but also promote investment, financial industry 
actors will steer. 
Traditional trade agreements have a direct connection to labor and citizens 
because of tariffs and their overt and politicized distributional consequences, but an 
agreement like the TTIP that focuses on mostly non-tariff barriers to trade that are 
regulatory in nature may be more difficult for the public to relate to. The EU has made an 
effort to make its negotiating positions and the general trade process more transparent, 
but there is no evidence that the US is taking similar steps. For advanced service 
economies such as the EU and US, trade agreements will increasingly target regulatory 
incompatibility rather than tariffs and thereby lead industry to play a steering role. This 
new mode of trade regulatory policy could prove more challenging to stimulate broad 
civil society participation than in traditional trade agreements that publics and other civil 
society actors are familiar with because their input is deemed less valuable and less 
relevant. DG Trade and the USTR have responded to calls for greater civil society 
participation in a number of ways, but this study reveals that it has not dramatically 
broadened the participation of civil society actors in existing fora.71 
 There are also broader consequences for not just the transatlantic regulatory 
regime but also other international regulatory regimes. Domestic civil society actors and 
domestic regulatory actors both may face challenges related to the new level of 
regulatory activity. Domestic civil society, and especially labor and citizen groups, will 
need to consider organizing at the transatlantic level and participating in the channels 
                                                
71 DG Trade has responded by creating a TTIP Advisory Group with civil society participants and 
maintaining a Civil Society Dialogue, the members of which meet with negotiators after every two rounds 
of negotiations. The USTR announced in February 2014 it would create a Public Interest Trade Advisory 
Committee (PITAC). 
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available to them to challenge the regulatory capture established by industry. This will 
likely require them to pool their limited resources. For example, Public Citizen and 
Corporate Europe Observatory could present on each other’s behalf at the TTIP 
stakeholder presentations that take place outside of their jurisdictions. Additionally 
domestic regulatory agencies and members of the legislative branch must prepare to face 
international challenges to existing domestic regulatory regimes. 
The consequence of international regulatory regimes that are formulated to 
service industry actors organized at the international level and to win regulatory 
competition among jurisdictions is domestic regulatory regimes that cater to a transient 
elite. Multinational corporations and other civil society actors with financial resources are 
able to change jurisdictions to enjoy more favorable regulations. With the mobility and 
means to cross jurisdictions and with their perceived importance to GDP, global financial 
firms can shape the content of the international regulatory regime. Corollary industries 
may potentially also be politically securitized, creating a basis for future research. 
The oarsman state also raises the more traditional concerns about supranational 
organizations. Domestic policymakers and consumer protection groups have warned 
against the rise of autocratic policymaking meant to serve industrial interests (Nader 
1999; Chandler and Mazlish 2005). The centralization of regulatory policymaking 
removes it from domestic, democratic accountability mechanisms. 
An Epilogue: Brexit 
 This dissertation was written before the Brexit referendum. On June 23, 2016 a 
referendum was held in the United Kingdom on UK membership in the European Union. 
By a margin of 3.78%, voters indicated their desire to leave the European Union. It is 
likely in the next year that the UK will invoke Article 50 of the Treaty of the European 
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Union and begin the process leaving the EU. The process of negotiating the separation of 
an EU member state can last up to two years after Article 50 has been invoked.  
 In September 2016, the UK Parliament will consider a petition requesting a 
second referendum on EU membership.  The future of the UK’s membership in the EU is 
unclear. 
 If the UK does leave the EU, there could be repercussions for the EU, 
transatlantic and international financial regulatory regimes. Without the UK driving 
financial regulation at the EU level, member states that favor more restrictive financial 
regulation, for example Germany and France, might prevail. Finance firms are already 
seeking to move their London operations. The London-New York nexus might not drive 
preferences at the transatlantic level without the UK as a party to TTIP and a member of 
the other EU-US institutions. However, the ideological and shallow capture of EU 
policymakers by financialization ideology might be so significant that the oarsmen 
cooperative will continue to build the regime even without the UK as a party to it. 
Another viable possibility is that because of the London-New York nexus the UK 
and US will sign an agreement on financial regulation and create a separate regulatory 
regime. An Anglo-American financial regulatory regime would likely become the de 
facto international regulatory regime because of New York and London’s importance as 
financial hubs. It would also eliminate the need for an EU-US financial regulatory 
regime. If without the UK in the EU the US and EU do not pursue a transatlantic 
financial regulatory regime, this will confirm this project’s assertion that the London-
New York nexus was crucial to the buildup of the transatlantic financial regulatory 
regime from 2008-2016. This project has explained the transatlantic response to the 
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financial crisis. If Brexit does become a critical juncture it could position the UK and US 






























































































Saver’s Credit Amounts 
The amount of the credit is 50%, 20% or 10% of your retirement plan or IRA 
contributions up to $2,000 ($4,000 if married filing jointly), depending on your adjusted 
gross income (reported on your Form 1040 or 1040A). Use the chart below to calculate 
your credit. 
2013 Saver's Credit 
Credit Rate 
Married Filing 
Jointly Head of Household All Other Filers* 
50% of your 
contribution 
AGI not more than 
$35,500 
AGI not more than 
$26,625 
AGI not more than 
$17,750 
20% of your 
contribution 
$35,501 - $38,500 $26,626 - $28,875 $17,751 - $19,250 
10% of your 
contribution 
$38,501-$59,000 $28,876 - $44,250 $19,251 - $29,500 
0% of your 
contribution 
more than $59,000 more than $44,250 more than $29,500 
*Single, married filing separately, or qualifying widow(er) 
2014 Saver's Credit 
Credit Rate 
Married Filing 
Jointly Head of Household All Other Filers* 
50% of your 
contribution 
AGI not more than 
$36,000 
AGI not more than 
$27,000 
AGI not more than 
$18,000 
20% of your 
contribution 
$36,001 - $39,000 $27,001 - $29,250 $18,001 - $19,500 
10% of your 
contribution 
$39,001-$60,000 $29,251 - $45,000 $19,501 - $30,000 
0% of your 
contribution 
more than $60,000 more than $45,000 more than $30,000 






EU Public Opinion Polling on the Financial Transaction Tax, 2011 
 
 











EU Home Ownership Interest Rate Tax Advantages 2008 
 












Index of Transatlantic Institutions, institutionalization and activities 
Methodology 
To assess the internal dynamic of the changes I categorize the two dimensions of function 
and institutionalization in the relevant transatlantic institutions as weak, moderate or 
strong in 2006, 2007 and again in 2015.  For the dimension of function the activity of 
each institution is rated on an index with two factors: the frequency of meetings and the 
number of outcomes or deliverables. The degree of institutionalization is rated on an 
index with two factors: the number of staff and the number of members. 
 
I counted the documents produced by each institution as well as the staff listed in official 
documents and on the organizations’ websites. An asterisk denotes a figure was not 
available to the author. 
 
Totals 
0 to 2 Weak 
3 to 4 Moderate 





 Less than annually 1 
 
0-1 annually 1 
Annually  2 
 
2-5 annually 2 
More than annually 3 
 





 No members 1 
 
No staff 1 
Less than 10  2 
 
Less than 10 secretariat 2 
More than10  3 
 
More than 10 staff 3 
 
 
Index of TA Institution Activities 2006 
 Frequency Outcomes Total  
TTIP NA NA  NA 
TABC/D 2 2 4 Moderate 
TACD 1 1 2 Weak 
TLD 1 1 2 Weak 
TALD 0 0 0 Weak 
TEC NA NA  NA 
FMRD 2 1 3 Moderate 
 
Index of TA Institutions Institutionalization 2006 
 Staff Members Total  
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TTIP NA NA  NA 
TABC/D NA 3 3 Moderate*NA 
TACD NA 3 3 Moderate*NA 
TLD 1 3 4 Moderate 
TALD 2 1 3 Moderate 
TEC NA NA  NA 






Index of TA Institution Activities 2007 
  Frequency Outcomes Total   
TTIP NA NA   NA 
TABC/D 3 3 6 Strong 
TACD 3 3 6 Strong 
TLD 1 1 2 Weak 
TALD 1 1 2 Weak 
TEC 1 2 3 Moderate 
FMRD 2 2 4 Moderate 
 
Index of TA Institutions Institutionalization 2007 
  Staff Members Total   
TTIP NA NA   NA 
TABC/D 3 3 6 Strong 
TACD NA 3 3 Moderate*NA 
TLD 1 3 4 Moderate 
TALD 1 2 3 Moderate 
TEC 2 2 4 Moderate 
FMRD 1 3 4 Moderate 
 
Index of TA Institutions Activities 2015 
  Frequency Outcomes Total   
TTIP 3 3 6 Strong 
TABC/D 3 3 6 Strong 
TACD 3 3 6 Strong 
TLD 1 1 2 Weak 
TALD 0 0 0 Weak 
TEC 1 3 4 Moderate 
FMRD 2 2 4 Moderate 
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Index of TA Institutions Institutionalization 2015 
  Staff Members Total   
TTIP 3 2 5 Strong 
TABC/D 3 3 6 Strong 
TACD 3 3 6 Strong 
TLD 1 3 4 Moderate 
TALD 1 1 2 Weak 
TEC 2 2 4 Moderate 





Coding of High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth Public Consultations  
In this section I code the responses to the three public consultations conducted by the 
High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth in 2012. The categories applied to each 
respondent are adapted from those applied by DG Trade to the April 2012 submissions. 
The additional coding identifies a submission from an organization or business that 
represents the financial industry; a submission from both an EU and US organization; and 
a submission with content that is supportive of including financial services in an 
agreement between the EU and US. 
 
In order to be coded as “financial industry represented in group/business”, the financial 
services industry or individual financial firms must be explicitly mentioned by the 
organization in the membership description.  
 
The responses coded “supportive of including finance in trade agreement” include 
language that does not merely mention financial services or products but suggests they 




Trade association representing business  TASSC 
Trade union or organisation representing trade 
unions 
TRUN 
Consumer protection agency or representative CPA/R 
Government institution or regulator authority GOVT 
Other non-governmental organisation NGO 






Supportive of including finance in trade 
agreement 
SIF 
Joint EU-US Submission J 




Initial Joint Public Consultation April 2012 SIF Joint Code FIN 
Alstom      BIZ   
American Chamber of Commerce to the European 
Union (Amcham EU)  
SIF   TASSC   
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American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) 
International 
    NGO   
Aromics      BIZ   
Association of German Banks  SIF   TASSC fin 
Association of German Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry (DIHK)  
SIF   TASSC   
BMW Group      BIZ   
BT Group     BIZ   
BusinessEurope-U.S. Chamber of Commerce joint 
submission  
    TASSC   
Cecilia Siddi     ACA/R   
Confederation of British Industry (CBI)  SIF   TASSC   
Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK)      TASSC   
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise     TASSC   
Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE)      TASSC   
Danish Agriculture & Food Council     TASSC   
Denmark      GOVT   
Ernst & Young     BIZ fin 
EUCOLAIT- European Association of Dairy Trade     TASSC   
EuroCommerce      TASSC   
European Apparel and Textile Confederation 
(EURATEX)  
    TASSC   
European Chemical Industry Council (Cefic) and the 
American Chemistry Council (ACC) 
    TASSC   
European Food and Drink industry 
(FoodDrinkEurope)  
    TASSC   
European Fresh Produce Association (Freshfel 
Europe)  
    TASSC   
European Generic Medicines Association (EGA)      TASSC   
European Services Forum (ESF)      TASSC   
European Sugar Producers Association (CEFS)     TASSC   
European Telecommunications Network Operators' 
Association (ETNO)  
    TASSC   
European-American Business Council (EABC)      TASSC   
European-American Business Organization (EABO)      BIZ   
Federation of German Chemical Industries (VCI)      TASSC   
Federation of German Industries (BDI)      TASSC   
Food and Drink Federation      TASSC   
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Foreign Trade Association (FTA)      TASSC   
Futures and Options Association (FOA)  SIF   TASSC fin 
German Engineering Federation (VDMA)      TASSC   
Global Financial Markets Association (GFMA) The 
Financial Services Roundtable, the International 
Banking Federation (IBFed), and the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) 
SIF J TASSC fin 
International Chamber of Commerce United 
Kingdom (ICC UK)  
SIF   TASSC   
La Asociación Española de Fabricantes de Juguetes 
(AEFJ) 
    TASSC   
Latvia     GOVT   
Noël Scauflaire     CITZ   
Orgalime - The European Engineering Industries 
Association 
    TASSC   
Plateforme contre le transatlantisme      NGO   
The Association of European Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry (EuroChambers) 
    TASSC   
TheCityUK  SIF   TASSC fin 
Trade Commission of Spain     TASSC   
Transatlantic Animal Welfare Council (TAWC)      NGO   
Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD)  SIF   TASSC   
UVAX Concepts     BIZ   
 Total 9 1   5 
2. DG Trade Public Consultation September 2012 SIF J Code FIN 
Alliance For Intellectual Property     TASSC   
American Chamber of Commerce in Germany SIF   TASSC   
American Chamber of Commerce to the European 
Union (AmCham EU) 
SIF   TASSC   
Association le Crunch     TASSC   
Association Nationale Pommes Poires (France)     TASSC   
Association of European Airlines     TASSC   
Association of German Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry (DIHK)  
    TASSC   
Associazione italiana commercio estero (AICE)     TASSC   
Belgium citizen     CITZ   
Bösch Boden Spies     BIZ   
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Romania 
(CCIR) 
    TASSC   
citizen     CITZ   
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citizen France     CITZ   
COCERAL is the European association of cereals, 
rice, feedstuffs oilseeds, olive oil, oils and fats and 
agrosupply trade. 
    TASSC   
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) SIF   TASSC   
Consultiaa     BIZ   
Contined b.v.     BIZ   
Conservation of employeers and industries of Spain 
(CEOE) 
    TASSC   
Danish Agriculture & Food Council     TASSC   
Deron     NGO   
Dienes Werke GmbH & Co. KG     BIZ   
DGLOM SIF   NGO   
EUCOLAIT - European Association of Dairy Trade     TASSC   
Eurometaux     TASSC   
European-American Business Organization, Inc SIF   BIZ   
European Apparel and Textile Confederation 
(EURATEX)  
    TASSC   
European Automobile Manufacturers Association     TASSC   
European Branded Clothing Alliance     TASSC   
European Chemical Industry Council (Cefic)     TASSC   
European Community Shipowners' Association 
(ECSA) 
    TASSC   
European Dairy Association     TASSC   
European Dredging Association     TASSC   
European Federation of Origin Wines (EFOW)     NGO   
European Feed Manufacturers' Federation (FEFAC)     TASSC   
European Generic Medecines Association (EGA)     TASSC   
EU Member State SIF   GOVT   
European Sugar Producers Association (CEFS)     TASSC   
European Services Forum (ESF)-2 SIF   TASSC fin 
European Trade Union Committee for Education – 
ETUCE 
SIF   TRUN   
European Trade Union Confederation  SIF   TRUN   
Federation Francaise de la Couture du Pret-a-Porter 
des Courtiers et des Createurs du Mode 
    TASSC   
Federation of Agricultural Producers and Forest 
Owners (MTK) 
    NGO   
FENAP     TRUN   
FoodDrinkEurope SIF   TASSC   
Foreign Trade Association (FTA)     TASSC   
French business confederation (MEDEF)     TASSC   
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German Engineering Federation (VDMA)      TASSC   
I'm not a membre of something. I'm just free.     CITZ   
Intel Corporation SIF   BIZ   
International Confederation of EU Beet Growers 
(CIBE) 
    TASSC   
International Fur Trade Federation     TASSC   
IP Federation     TASSC   
J.O. Sims Ltd     BIZ   
Les entreprises du médicament (LEEM)     TASSC   
Lufthansa German Airline     BIZ   
Nexus Foundation     NGO   
Ocean Spray International, Inc.     BIZ   
Orgalime - The European Engineering Industries 
Association 
    TASSC   
Organisation of Tomato Industries (OEIT)     TASSC   
personal contribution     CITZ   
Plateforme d’opposition au marché transatlantique-3     NGO   
Pominter sarl     BIZ   
private citizen SIF   CITZ   
Remote Gambling Association     TASSC   
Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA)     TASSC   
TechAmerica Europe     TASSC   
The International Air Cargo Association (TIACA)     TASSC   
The Mentor Partnership     BIZ   
Trade Secrets and Innovation Coalition (TSIC)     TASSC   
University of Leiden, The Netherlands     ACA/R   
voestalpine Edelstahl     BIZ   
Wendy Cockcroft Web Design     BIZ   
 Total 12 0   1 
3. October 2012 Joint solicitation on regulatory issues, 
DG Enterprise/DG Trade and OIRA/USTR 
SIF Joint Code FIN 
AAPC-ACEA Joint Contribution      TASSC   
Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients Committee 
(APIC), European Fine Chemicals Group (EFCG), 
Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates 
(SOCMA) 
  J TASSC   
Administrative Conference of the United States     GOVT   
Advanced Medical Technology Association 
(AdvaMed) 
    TASSC   
Airlines for America     TASSC   
Airports Council International - North America,   J TASSC   
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Airport International Council Europe 
Almond Board of California     TASSC   
American Apparel and Footwear Association     TASSC   
American Chamber of Commerce to the European 
Union (AmCham EU)  
    TASSC   
American Chemical Society     TASSC   
American Feed Industry Association     TASSC   
American Forest and Paper Association     TASSC   
American Frozen Food Institute     TASSC   
American Meat Institute     TASSC   
American National Standards Institute     NGO   
American Soybean Association     TASSC   
Amway     BIZ   
Association of the European Self-Medication Industry 
(AESGP) + Consumer Healthcare Products 
Association (CHPA)  
  J TASSC   
Asociación Española de Productores de Vacuno de 
Carne (ASOPROVAC)   
    TASSC   
Asociación de Fabricantes de Material Eléctrico 
(AFME)  
    TASSC   
Association of German Banks (Bankenverband)      TASSC fin 
Association of the German Chambers of Industry and 
Commerce (DIHK)  
    TASSC   
ASTM International     NGO   
Biowest     BIZ   
British American Business  SIF   TASSC fin 
Business Europe + US Chamber of Commerce SIF J TASSC   
Business Roundtable (BR), Trans-Atlantic Business 
Dialogue (TABD), European Roundtable of 
Industrialists (ERT)  
    TASSC   
British Telecom (BT Group)     TASSC   
Confederation of Danish Industry (DI)     TASSC   
Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI)      TASSC   
Cosmetics Europe + Personal Care Products Council 
(PCPC)  
  J TASSC   
Deutsche Post DHL     BIZ   
Digital Europe SIF   TASSC   
Ebay Inc.     BIZ   
EuropaBio + BIO (Biotechnology Industry 
Organization)  
  J TASSC   
European Apparel and Textile Confederation 
(EURATEX)  
    TASSC   
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European Association of Automotive Suppliers 
(CLEPA) + Motor & Equipment Manufacturers 
Association (MEMA)  
  J TASSC   
European Association of Dairy Trade (EUCOLAIT)     TASSC   
European Boating Industry     TASSC   
European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) + 
American Chemistry Council (ACC)  
  J TASSC   
European Crop Protection Association (ECLA) + 
CropLife America (CLA) 
  J TASSC   
European Electronic and Fire Security Industry 
(EURALARM)  
    TASSC   
European Engineering Industries Association 
(ORGALIME) 
    TASSC   
European Express Association (EEA)      TASSC   
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries 
and Associations (EFPIA) and Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) 
  J TASSC   
European Generic Medicines Association (EGA) + 
Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA)  
  J TASSC   
European Radiological, Electromedical and 
Healthcare IT industry (COCIR) + Medical Imaging 
& Technology Alliance (MITA)  
  J TASSC   
European Renewable Ethanol (E-Pure)     TASSC   
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